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About 25 years after Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the ‘end of history’, 
ideological and strategic competition between democracies and autocra-
cies has firmly reentered international relations. The rise of China has 
fuelled debates about the economic performance of authoritarian regimes 
compared with democratic ones (Zhao 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012). Questions about the attractiveness of alternative development 
models have gained prominence, not least with the economic and financial 
crises that hit the European Union (EU) but left China largely unaffected. 
In addition, several observers have identified a pushback across the devel-
oping world against EU and USA good governance support, which is at 
least partly driven by the rise of China and other authoritarian powers 
(Puddington 2008; Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014).
One prominent aspect in these discussions is the question of whether 
and how China’s engagement in Africa affects the EU’s attempts to sup-
port governance reforms in African countries. Some argue that China’s 
economic cooperation ‘with no strings attached’ undermines the EU and 
other Western actors’ efforts to support human rights and democratic 
structures (Halper 2010). Others point out that for the EU and other 
Western actors security, economic or aid policy interests often trump 
efforts to support political reforms (Olsen 1998; Brown 2005; Brüne 
2007; Jünemann and Knodt 2007). China’s presence would thus have a 
minor effect, if any. More than 15 years after China began intensifying its 
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engagement with Africa, a comprehensive study on the interaction effects 
between China’s presence in Africa and the EU’s good governance strate-
gies is still lacking. This book makes one of the first theoretically guided 
and empirically grounded contribution to this debate.
Empirical evidence suggests that governments in Africa have responded 
very differently to the EU’s demands to engage in governance reforms. 
Autocratically governed countries, such as Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda, 
started to reluctantly engage with the EU on governance reforms in the 
early 2000s. Yet, since the mid-2000s when China’s presence started to 
reduce Africa’s dependence on the EU, the openness of countries like 
Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda to engage with the EU has varied widely. 
Since the mid-2000s, Rwanda has willingly cooperated with the EU on 
governance reforms; Ethiopia has remained very reluctant to engage; and 
Angola has largely ignored EU requests for cooperation. These different 
reactions cannot easily be explained. All three regimes can be classified as 
authoritarian, dominant party systems with similarly low levels of political 
liberalisation. Moreover, all three have seen a reduction in their depen-
dence on the EU because of increased access to cooperation with China.
Two main questions are therefore at the core of this book. What 
explains the differences in African governments’ willingness to engage 
with the EU on governance reforms? To what extent does China’s pres-
ence affect African governments’ openness to engage with the EU on 
governance reforms? The analysis thus focuses on African governments’ 
strategies towards the EU and China. It analyses how and to what extent 
African governments engage with the EU on governance reforms, and it 
investigates whether access to cooperation with China influences African 
governments’ cooperation strategies.
Linking research on good governance support and on authoritarian 
regimes, the book develops a theoretical framework to address these ques-
tions. It contributes to the academic debate on the influence of external 
actors on governance reform elsewhere. In particular, it explains how the 
domestic logic of political survival shapes authoritarian governments’ 
incentives to engage with the EU and China.
Moreover, the analysis makes an empirical contribution by providing an 
in-depth analysis of the interaction of the EU’s good governance strate-
gies, the survival strategies of dominant party systems and the engagement 
of China with three African authoritarian regimes—Angola, Ethiopia and 
Rwanda—between 2000 and 2014. The empirical analysis is informed by 
more than 200 semistructured interviews conducted with government 
officials and non-state actors in the EU, China, Angola, Ethiopia and 
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Rwanda between 2009 and 2013. The analysis centres on the EU’s 
engagement in African dominant party regimes and on China as a third 
external actor. However, the findings yield broader implications for 
authoritarian regimes beyond Africa and for the EU’s and China’s engage-
ment in other regions.
The main argument of this book is that the survival strategies of gov-
ernments in dominant party systems are the most important factor that 
influences African governments’ willingness to engage in governance 
reforms. The survival strategies define the government’s basic preferences 
for cooperating with the EU. Other variables, such as the specific good 
governance strategy the EU uses, African countries’ dependence on the 
EU and access to cooperation with China, set additional incentives that 
make cooperation more beneficial or less costly. In contrast to widespread 
assumptions that the growing presence of China in Africa has made it 
more difficult for the EU to support good governance, this study finds 
little evidence that would support this claim. Instead, China’s engagement 
with African countries is part of a broader set of factors that influences 
African governments’ openness to engage with the EU. These findings 
have important implications for researchers as well as policy-makers.
1.1  EU Good GovErnancE StratEGiES FacE two 
challEnGES: thE PrEdominancE oF aFrican dominant 
Party SyStEmS and china’S riSE in aFrica
While bringing good governance reforms more prominently onto the 
agenda in its relations with African countries, the EU has been confronted 
with two key challenges. First, dominant party systems have become the 
predominant type of political regime in Africa and political liberalisation 
has been on the decline, making it more difficult for the EU to promote 
reforms. Second, the growing presence of China in Africa has fundamen-
tally changed the broader context in which the EU seeks to support 
reforms, raising questions about the implications of China’s rise for the 
EU’s good governance policies.
EU Good Governance Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa
Support for democracy, human rights and the rule of law became an 
explicit objective in the EU’s external relations with the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. During the 1990s, the EU could rely mainly 
 INTRODUCTION 
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on sanctions and small volumes of governance aid to support reforms in 
sub-Saharan Africa and beyond (Crawford 2001). The turn of the century 
then brought a qualitative and quantitative shift in the EU’s policies. Since 
2000, good governance support has become a more prominent issue in 
the EU’s development policy and other areas of external relations. The 
EU has developed a positive approach to support governance reforms in 
sub-Saharan Africa that aims to establish an active cooperation with the 
target government. Particularly reforms in the international aid system 
have allowed the EU to expand its positive instruments since 2000.
Over time, the EU has broadened its understanding of good gover-
nance (see also Börzel and Risse 2009; Carbone 2010). In the 2005 
European Consensus on Development, the EU presented good gover-
nance as a precondition for sustainable and equitable development as well 
as for providing effective development assistance (European Union 2005). 
At the same time, good governance was put forward as an important 
objective of EU development policy and EU external relations. In the 
‘Agenda for Change’ (European Commission 2011), the EU’s more 
recent development policy strategy, the EU has made assistance for demo-
cratic governance one of the two main areas on which development policy 
should concentrate. The Agenda for Change confirmed that the EU views 
‘good governance’ as a comprehensive concept, stating that the EU aims 
at promoting ‘human rights, democracy and other key elements of good 
governance’ (European Commission 2011; emphasis author).
However, one has to bear in mind that even as support for governance 
reforms has become a more important concern in the EU’s external rela-
tions, it is obviously only one of the EU’s policy objectives and interests 
(for an overview on conflicting objectives in democracy promotion, see 
Grimm and Leininger 2012). In its relations with African countries and 
elsewhere, the EU often prioritises security, stability and cooperation on 
migration management over good governance (Kopstein 2005; Burnell 
and Calvert 2005; Jünemann and Knodt 2007, for Africa see Olsen 1998; 
Brüne 2007; Brown 2005). EU energy, trade and other economic interests 
mitigate the EU’s willingness to push for governance reforms. Moreover, 
development policy interests and objectives may also conflict with the EU’s 
good governance support. Similar to other aid bureaucracies that are under 
(public) pressure to show that development aid positively impacts poverty 
reduction and economic growth, the EU is less likely to push for political 
reforms and use negative conditionality in countries with good economic 
performance and progress in poverty reduction (Del Biondo 2011).
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Between 2000 and 2014, the EU developed a range of instruments 
that allow it to not only react to imminent political crises, but to pro- 
actively support tendencies towards political openness and prevent degra-
dations in political liberalisation. In its relations with sub-Saharan African 
countries, the EU seeks to promote good governance through political 
and aid policy dialogues, the provision of governance aid and (non-)
material incentives. According to statistics from the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), EU good governance aid gradually 
increased between 2000 and 2014 in absolute and relative terms. The EU 
institutions provide almost as much governance aid to Africa as Germany 
and the UK combined (Hackenesch 2016). The EU also strengthened 
political dialogue as defined in Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. It 
introduced new instruments such as the Governance Incentive Tranche 
that aims at setting positive incentives to support reforms (Molenaers and 
Nijs 2009). While the EU could also rely on sanctions to respond to seri-
ous violations of human rights or a coup d’état, it has been more reluctant 
to apply sanctions in the 2000s than it was in the 1990s (Portela 2010; 
Zimelis 2011).
The EU’s positive approach towards good governance reforms requires 
that African governments are, at least to some extent, willing and open to 
engage with the EU on the implementation of its good governance instru-
ments (see also van Hüllen 2015). If African governments are not ready to 
engage in political and aid policy dialogues, to respond to positive incen-
tives such as the Governance Incentive Tranche, and to cooperate on the 
implementation of governance aid, the EU has few means by which to 
engage with them on governance reforms. While the EU has enhanced its 
positive approach to support good governance, dominant party systems 
with very specific domestic incentive structures have become the most 
prominent regime type in Africa. Moreover, China has become an alterna-
tive cooperation partner, potentially affecting African governments’ incen-
tives to engage with the EU.
The ‘New Authoritarianism’ in Africa: Dominant Party Systems
The EU started developing its good governance instruments in the 
1990s, when the third wave of democratisation triggered greater political 
openness and regime change in a number of sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. However, after a period of political liberalisation, it quickly became 
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evident that many countries in sub-Saharan Africa remained authoritarian 
despite democratic institutional façades (Ottaway 2003; Kemmerzell 
2010, 348; Levitsky and Way 2010).
The variation in authoritarian institutions and regime types is immense. 
Scholars commonly differentiate between monarchies, military, one-party 
and dominant (or multiparty) regimes (Hadenius and Teorell 2007; 
Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). These distinctions are based on the different 
modes of maintaining power: hereditary succession (monarchies), threat 
of the use of force (military) or elections (party regimes) (Hadenius and 
Teorell 2007, 147f). Dominant party regimes are characterised by a hege-
monic party that dominates the political and economic life in a country. 
They hold regular elections and allow opposition candidates to participate 
in elections, but their elections are not free and fair, and possibilities for 
opposition candidates to participate are considerably restricted. On the 
other hand, dominant party regimes are distinct from one-party systems as 
one-party systems forbid all parties other than the one in power (Hadenius 
and Teorell 2007, 147f).
Globally speaking, the incidence of different types of authoritarian 
regimes changed markedly over time. Macroanalyses find that the number 
of dominant party systems has significantly increased since the early 1990s. 
Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) demonstrate that today dominant party 
regimes constitute by far the largest category of authoritarian regimes and 
about one-third of all political regimes. Hadenius and Teorell (2006, 
2007) argue that since the early 1990s, more than 50 per cent of all 
authoritarian regimes are dominant party autocracies.
As these macro-quantitative studies do not focus on specific regions, 
they overlook the fact that the high number of dominant party systems 
that we observe today is driven to an important extent by regime changes 
in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. The large majority of African 
authoritarian regimes can be classified as dominant party systems (Fig. 1.1). 
Many African autocracies combine dominant party rule with a strong per-
sonalistic element (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Geddes 2003). Many 
countries have institutionalised regular elections. In fact, by 2017 only 
two countries in Africa had not held elections.1 However, whether elec-
tions and other formally democratic institutions contribute to more 
democracy in Africa has been controversially discussed (Lindberg 2009; 
Lynch and Crawford 2011; Cheeseman 2015). Clearly, authoritarianism 
in Africa has not vanished. But compared to the postcolonial states in the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s that were dominated by military and one-party 
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regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Kemmerzell 2010, 337f), the 
political institutions of authoritarianism in Africa today are considerably 
different in nature.
Insights from studies on the domestic politics of authoritarian regimes 
give reason to be tentatively optimistic about the EU’s and other external 
actors’ chances of supporting democratisation in African dominant party 
systems. Quantitative research finds that development aid and democracy 
aid are more likely to support democratisation in party-based autocracies 
than in other types of authoritarian regime (Wright 2009; Cornell 2012). 
Fig. 1.1 Political regimes in Africa in 2012




The effect of aid and democracy aid is attributed to the role of the ruling 
party: in party-based regimes, the ruler can afford higher levels of political 
liberalisation and is more likely to remain in an influential position even 
after regime breakdown. Development aid and democracy aid thus pro-
duce lower costs for political leaders in party-based regimes compared 
with other authoritarian regimes (Wright 2009; Cornell 2012). Foreign 
aid has been found to have a stronger positive effect on democratisation 
since the end of the Cold War (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015); a finding 
that is in line with earlier studies on the effect of development aid on 
democratisation (Dunning 2004). Moreover, positive instruments appar-
ently have more effect than negative instruments: economic sanctions are 
less likely to destabilise party-based autocracies (Escribà-Folch and 
Wright 2015).
Based on these findings, the EU and other external actors should be 
more successful in supporting governance reforms in party-based autocra-
cies than in other types of authoritarian regimes. However, empirical find-
ings in this book suggest that the EU’s success in encouraging governments 
in these regimes to address governance reforms varies widely across coun-
tries and over time. A more nuanced perspective regarding the factors that 
explain these differences within the large group of dominant party systems 
thus seems necessary.
China’s Rise in Africa
Support for governance reforms became a priority in the EU’s and other 
Western actors’ policies towards Africa at a very specific period in time, 
and with regard to the international context. During the 1990s, the EU 
and other Western actors were the most important international political 
and economic partners for African countries. Moreover, the normative 
underpinnings of the good governance agenda were largely unchallenged. 
This international context has changed considerably since the early 2000s 
and notably as a result of the rise of China. China’s emergence as a major 
actor in Africa is part of a broader international power shift; but China is 
by far the most substantive actor in terms of its economic size and global 
reach (Humphrey and Messner 2008). Moreover, it is the only one of the 
emerging powers that potentially represents an alternative economic and 
political model.
China’s engagement in Africa intensified tremendously within a rela-
tively short period of time. From 2000 onwards, activities including trade, 
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investment, assistance and diplomacy have reached previously unknown 
heights. While political interests dominated China’s relations with African 
countries until the mid-1990s, economic interests have been at the core of 
the relationships since. Intensification and diversification of economic 
relations between China and Africa are both a direct consequence of 
China’s economic growth since the mid-1990s and of reforms in China’s 
foreign economic policy.
Aid, trade, investments and loans often form comprehensive packages 
in Chinese relations with individual states (Alden 2007). In 2009, China 
became Africa’s second-largest trading partner after the EU (in total), 
ahead of the USA and far ahead of other emerging economies, such as 
India or Brazil. With regard to aid volumes, the exact amount is hard to 
establish, due to a lack of comparable statistics (Grimm et  al. 2011; 
Brautigam 2011). In recent years, the Chinese aid budget has increased by 
about 30 per cent annually. Chinese aid was estimated to have been at 
around USD7.1 billion in 2013 (Kitano and Harada 2015). About half of 
Chinese aid is provided to African countries (Information Office of the 
State Council 2011). This would have made China a donor comparable to 
Germany and much larger than India or Brazil—but considerably smaller 
than the EU institutions. Chinese loans to Africa appear to greatly exceed 
aid volumes: Brautigam and Hwang (2016) estimate that China provided 
about USD86.3 billion between 2000 and 2014. Chinese banks, such as 
the Export Import Bank and the China Development Bank, are giving 
preferential and commercial loans to African countries at low interest 
rates. These loans are often linked to resource revenues, and they are used 
for infrastructure projects that are implemented by Chinese state-owned 
companies (at either the central or provincial levels).
The implications of China’s rise for Western governance and democ-
racy promotion are still mostly discussed within the media and the policy 
community; academics have only recently started taking an interest in this 
topic. While African countries are in great need of more financial support 
to advance their economic development, many commentators in Europe 
suspect that China’s growing engagement undermines Western actors’ 
efforts to support governance reforms in African countries.
Three main lines of argument are put forward. First, some observers 
suggest that China reduces the leverage of the EU and other Western 
actors to set incentives for reform. EU diplomats in Uganda, for 
instance, openly complain that they are ‘rapidly losing influence’.2 
Second, China is perceived to represent an alternative development 
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model that competes with a European/Western model. The former 
German Minister for Development Cooperation, Dirk Niebel, observed: 
‘China perceives our value-based development cooperation as interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of developing countries. There is indeed a 
competition among donors. We are asked for issues related to good 
governance. China is approached for supporting large infrastructure 
projects’.3 Third, some argue that China and other authoritarian 
regional powers bolster authoritarianism in third countries. Recent 
quantitative work demonstrates that China’s economic cooperation 
with party-based autocracies tends to have a stabilising effect (Bader 
2015b). This would make it more challenging for the EU and other 
Western actors to support governance reforms.
1.2  diFFErEnt PartS oF thE SamE ElEPhant? 
rESEarchinG EU Good GovErnancE StratEGiES 
and china’S EnGaGEmEnt in aFrica
In order to investigate why African dominant party systems are willing to 
engage with the EU on governance reforms, this book brings together 
debates related to EU good governance support, authoritarian regimes 
and China’s engagement in Africa. Each of these fields of research, if taken 
individually, gives limited insights to analyse why African governments 
engage with the EU in governance reforms, or not. Despite an impressive 
body of studies on (the EU’s) good governance strategies and on authori-
tarian regimes, the interaction between international factors and the 
behaviour of political actors in the target country remains under- 
researched. This book therefore combines research on EU good gover-
nance support and on authoritarian regimes and develops a theoretical 
framework to analyse the interaction between the EU, African govern-
ments and China.
Debates on external good governance support have been particularly 
concerned with the EU’s influence on its immediate neighbours. Studies 
on external Europeanisation and EU external governance have developed 
comprehensive frameworks on what works, what does not work and why 
in the EU’s attempts to support political reforms beyond its borders 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005; Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009; Youngs 2009; Freyburg et  al. 2011; Börzel and 
Risse 2012; van Hüllen 2012). Yet, the theoretical frameworks in these 
strands of research cannot be easily transferred to investigate the EU’s 
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support for governance reforms in Africa in light of the rise of China and 
to identify the factors that shape African governments’ willingness to 
engage with the EU on governance reforms. The necessary conditions, 
causal mechanisms and scope conditions for effective rule and norm trans-
fer—for instance, the level of statehood or interdependence with the 
EU—differ considerably between the EU’s neighbours and countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
Beyond research on the EU’s influence on political reforms in neigh-
bouring countries, a vibrant discussion on the effectiveness of democracy 
aid and other instruments to promote democratic reforms has emerged 
since the late 1990s. This research is driven by an ‘instrument-logic’, focus-
sing on the effect of specific (EU) instruments such as development aid 
(Goldsmith 2001; Dunning 2004), democracy aid (Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 
2010; Dietrich and Wright 2012), sanctions (Portela 2010; Zimelis 2011; 
Del Biondo 2015) or budget-support suspensions (Hayman 2011; 
Molenaers 2012; Faust et al. 2012; Molenaers et al. 2015) on governance 
reforms (see also Warkotsch 2008; Kotzian et al. 2011). This work is gen-
erally interested in two main questions: why does the EU use a specific 
instrument or strategy in a given situation, and not others? How effective 
are the EU’s instruments, measured in terms of their impact on gover-
nance reforms? Both questions are closely related. The coherence and con-
sistency in the EU’s usage of certain instruments (for example sanctions or 
budget-support suspensions) is one important factor that influences the 
success of these instruments. By doing so, however, the agency of domestic 
actors, which is crucial for political reforms, is often neglected.
In turn, studies on authoritarianism have traditionally been concerned 
with the domestic factors that explain regime durability or transition to 
democracy. Analyses on authoritarianism have thrived over the past decade 
(for example, Wintrobe 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Burnell and 
Schlumberger 2010; Croissant and Wurster 2013; Köllner and Kailitz 
2013; Gerschewski 2013). While most of this work is interested in the 
stability, durability, and social and economic performance of authoritarian 
regimes, some researchers have began using insights into the domestic 
logic of political survival to study the influence of aid, democracy aid and 
sanctions (Lektzian and Souva 2007; Wright 2009; Cornell 2012; Escribà- 
Folch 2012; Bader and Faust 2014) or to ascertain the effects of external 
linkage and leverage on political reforms (Levitsky and Way 2010). 
Research on the effects of external good governance support in authori-
tarian regimes provides first insights on the effect of aid, democracy aid 
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and sanctions on political liberalisation and democratisation in different 
types of authoritarian regimes. Yet, this work gives little explanation for 
why aid, democracy aid and other instruments have differential effects on 
the same type of authoritarian regime, such as the large group of dominant 
party systems.
Literature on the influence of external actors on authoritarian regimes 
is dominated by studies analysing the effects of democracy promotion 
instruments on political reforms. In parallel, a new research agenda on the 
influence of authoritarian powers, such as China, Russia, Venezuela or 
Iran, on political reforms elsewhere has started to evolve (Bader et  al. 
2010; Burnell 2010; Melnykovska et al. 2012; Vanderhill 2012; Tolstrup 
2013; Bader 2015a; von Soest 2015). These studies conduct macro- 
quantitative analyses or investigate the influence of authoritarian great 
powers on their immediate neighbourhood. Only very few authors explic-
itly address the implications of authoritarian powers for the EU’s or other 
actors’ attempts to support democratic reforms (e.g. Risse and Babayan 
2015). These studies mostly focus on the interaction between the EU and 
Russia in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics (Dimitrova and 
Dragneva 2009; Tolstrup 2013).
Finally, China’s engagement in Africa has been widely researched in 
recent years. Scholars interested in China–Africa relations have been inves-
tigating, for instance, the role of different actors involved in the decision- 
making process of China’s Africa policy; how China’s aid, trade and 
investment in Africa have developed; and what factors explain the intensi-
fication of bilateral relations (Alden 2007; Reilly and Na 2007; Alden 
et al. 2008; Brautigam 2009; Taylor 2010; Brautigam 2015). Some have 
also analysed interaction effects between China and the EU’s engagement 
in Africa with regard to development, security or other policy fields (Men 
and Barton 2011; Wissenbach 2011; Carbone 2011; Grimm and 
Hackenesch 2017). These bodies of work have made great empirical con-
tributions to deepen our understanding of the current power shift. To 
date, however, no structured analysis has been conducted to investigate 
the implications of China’s rise for the EU’s good governance policies in 
Africa.
Why Should We Focus on African Governments’ Strategies?
In order to examine the effects of China’s presence on the EU’s good 
governance policies, this book centres on domestic politics and African 
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governments’ strategies to engage with the EU and China. Investigating 
whether and if so why African governments are willing to engage in the 
implementation of the EU’s governance instruments is essential for under-
standing whether these instruments result in their intended outcomes. In 
this regard, the findings of this book matter for several reasons:
First, research on external democracy and governance support 
(Carothers 1999; Andrews 2013), EU political conditionality in the 
neighbourhood (Checkel 2000; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; 
van Hüllen 2012), economic conditionality (Killick 1997) or democratic 
sanctions (Portela 2010; Blanchard and Ripsman 2013) has argued time 
and again that the political will of the decision-makers in the target coun-
try to engage with external actors is a precondition for effective gover-
nance support. Similarly, literature on the effectiveness of development aid 
has demonstrated that ‘ownership’ of the recipient country, in other words 
the political will of the partner government to engage with external actors 
in the implementation of reforms, substantially shapes the impact of exter-
nal support (Fraser and Whitfield 2009). Yet, research on good gover-
nance promotion and aid effectiveness has so far paid little attention to the 
factors that actually influence the willingness of African governments to 
engage with the EU.
Second, gaining a better understanding of why governments in domi-
nant party systems are (not) willing to engage with the EU on governance 
reforms is of important empirical relevance. Dominant party regimes con-
stitute by far the largest group among the authoritarian regimes today 
(Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). No consensus exists regarding the likeli-
hood of dominant party regimes democratising or transitioning to another 
form of authoritarian rule. Some argue that dominant party regimes are 
more likely to transform into single party regimes (Magaloni and Kricheli 
2010, 133), while others find that they are the ‘typical stepping stones to 
democracy’ (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 152). Understanding why gov-
ernments in these regimes are (not) willing to engage with the EU on 
governance reforms thus contributes to deepening our knowledge of 
whether the EU ultimately supports these regimes to democratise or to 
transition to another form of authoritarianism.
Third, insights into why governments in dominant party regimes are 
willing to engage or not in governance reforms may lead to a more 
nuanced perspective on the effects of China’s rise on the EU’s good gov-
ernance instruments. Debates in the media and academia are often biased 
in two ways: they start by assuming that China has mainly negative 
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 implications for the prospects of democratic reforms in third countries and 
for external good governance support; and they rarely enquire about the 
negative effects and unintended side-effects of the EU’s good governance 
strategies. In this regard, analysing the domestic incentives of African 
authoritarian governments to engage in governance reforms provides a 
starting point for assessing how attractive (or costly) not only the EU’s 
but also China’s support to African countries is.
Finally, this specific research perspective also holds relevance in judg-
ing the legitimacy of external good governance support. The rise of the 
good governance agenda has been characterised as a substantial shift in 
donor–recipient relations (Moore 1995; Herdegen 2007). The tradi-
tional understanding of sovereignty, in which a government could orga-
nise its domestic political processes without interference from the 
international community, gave way to a modified view on sovereignty 
according to which not every form of political system regardless of its 
organisation is seen as valuable and worth preserving (Moore 1995, 94; 
Dolzer 2004, 54; Herdegen 2007, 122f). Several observers have chal-
lenged the legitimacy of external good governance support and argued 
that it should become more demand driven (Tilly 2007). In development 
policy, this controversy centres on the question of how external good 
governance support relates to African countries’ ‘ownership’ (i.e. Pender 
2007). In authoritarian countries, where governments do not allow for 
meaningful political competition, normative considerations that external 
actors should not impose their priorities face a fundamental dilemma. A 
better understanding of the incentives for African governments when 
presented with the EU’s demands to engage on governance reforms is 
therefore also paramount to advance debates about the legitimacy of the 
EU’s policies.
1.3  why anGola, EthioPia and rwanda?
The EU’s success in making African authoritarian, dominant party regimes 
address governance issues has varied markedly since the turn of the cen-
tury. Empirical evidence presented here illustrates that African dominant 
party regimes have responded very differently to the EU’s demands to 
engage on governance reforms. We will investigate three dominant party 
regimes—Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda—where the difference in the 
governments’ openness towards EU good governance policies has been 
particularly pronounced. At the same time, the cases differ with regard to 
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the four main explanatory factors identified in the theoretical framework—
the EU’s good governance strategies, African governments’ survival strat-
egies, their dependence on the EU, and their access to cooperation with 
China. This variance on the dependent variable and explanatory factors 
across countries and over time allows for assessing the explanatory power 
of each variable (Gerring 2007, 97f).
Three Dominant Party Regimes
Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda can all be classified as dominant party 
regimes. In all three countries, political life is controlled by a ruling party 
that has strongly entrenched itself in power. The Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has dominated Ethiopian pol-
itics since it overthrew the militarist Marxist Derg regime in the early 
1990s (Abbink 2006). In Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
has controlled political and economic developments since the genocide in 
1994 (Beswick 2010). In Angola, the People’s Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has dominated political life since indepen-
dence and particularly since the end of the civil war in 2002 (Roque 2008; 
Soares de Oliveira 2015).
Research on authoritarian party regimes suggests that the way the rul-
ing party comes to power considerably impacts its resilience and durability 
(Smith 2005; Brownlee 2007). All three ruling parties have their origins 
in well-organised guerrilla movements with strong internal discipline and 
a high level of indoctrination. All three parties came to power after a vio-
lent struggle. All three had a difficult relationship with the international 
community during their power struggle. All three parties have maintained 
relatively high levels of independence from international pressure, influ-
ence and financial support.
A close connection between the party, the military and the business sec-
tor has emerged in all three regimes, at least partly as a result of the libera-
tion struggle. All three governments have strongly centralised access to 
rents. In Ethiopia (Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011) and Rwanda (Booth 
and Golooba-Mutebi 2012), party-run companies dominate the private 
sector. These companies not only allow for the creation of sources of 
income for regime supporters, they also make it possible for the ruling 
party to generate important revenues. In Angola, the state-owned oil 
company Sonangol gives the presidency centralised access to oil revenues 
and their distribution. Moreover, the policy of ‘Angolanisation’4 permits 
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the party to use its access to rents from foreign investments to generate 
support for the regime.
At the same time, Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda have set up formally 
democratic institutions: they hold regular elections, have established par-
liaments and some—at least formal—separation of powers. Yet, govern-
ments in all three countries do not allow for meaningful political 
competition or a change of government. All three countries score low on 
political rights and civil liberties according to international macroindices, 
such as the one published by Freedom House or the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). Moreover, the institutionalisation of succession remains 
a fundamental challenge. In Rwanda, President Kagame initiated a refer-
endum and changed the constitution to remain in power when his second 
term ended in 2017. In Ethiopia, the issue had to be addressed when 
Prime Minister Meles died suddenly in the summer of 2012. In Angola, 
discussions on the succession of President Dos Santos started ahead of the 
parliamentary elections in 2012. The president did not have to step down 
formally, but his age and health situation required him to leave office in 
2017.
In a Nutshell: Angola’s, Ethiopia’s and Rwanda’s Responsiveness
The case studies will investigate Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda’s respon-
siveness in more detail. In a nutshell, the analysis finds that in the early 
2000s, the Rwandan, Ethiopian and Angolan governments all started to 
reluctantly engage in political dialogue with the EU. All three govern-
ments cooperated with the EU on the implementation of governance 
aid, albeit reluctantly. All three have been willing to engage on gover-
nance reforms related to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
government institutions, but have been hesitant to cooperate on demo-
cratic  governance. Despite these strong similarities between the three 
countries in the early 2000s, some differences can also be observed. 
From the beginning, the Angolan government was more hesitant in 
responding to EU demands to cooperate compared with Ethiopia and 
Rwanda (Fig. 1.2).
From the mid-2000s onwards, in parallel to China’s rise in Africa, the 
openness of these countries towards EU demands to cooperate has varied 
widely. Rwanda has willingly engaged in political and aid policy dia-
logues, has implemented governance aid and committed to a compre-
hensive strategy to promote governance reforms. Ethiopia has remained 
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much more reluctant to institutionalise political and aid policy dialogues 
on governance reforms, to commit to governance reform objectives and 
to cooperate on the implementation of governance aid. Angola has 
largely ignored EU demands for cooperation and showed little interest in 
engaging in dialogue or the implementation of governance aid.
The clear variance with regard to Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda’s open-
ness to engage with the EU makes these countries particularly pertinent 
cases. Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda represent ‘diverse cases’ (Gerring 
2007, 97f) that capture the full range of possible variation on the depen-
dent variable. African government’s strategies towards the EU are con-
ceived as a continuous variable that can range from (pro)active cooperation 
to indifference. On this continuum, Angola and Rwanda represent ‘extreme 
cases’, where the government is particularly open to cooperation (Rwanda) 
or indifferent towards the EU (Angola). Selecting ‘extreme cases’ builds on 
the premise that the insights gained from these cases can be generalised to 
the cases located between the two extremes (Rolfing 2012, 70). Ethiopia is 
an interesting example for what could be called a ‘mean’ or ‘median’ case, 
where the government is reluctant to cooperate with the EU on gover-
nance reforms. The strategies of the three governments change over time, 
which gives additional variation for analysing the explanatory factors.5
1.4  StrUctUrE oF thE Book
Building on the domestic logic of political survival in authoritarian 
regimes, this book develops a theoretical framework to explain why African 













governance reforms in light of the rise of China (Chap. 2). Building on 
research on the EU’s good governance strategies and the politics of 
authoritarian regimes, Chap. 2 argues that differences in African govern-
ments’ openness to engage with the EU on governance reforms can be 
explained by the interaction of four factors: the specific good governance 
strategies that the EU adopts in its relations with individual African coun-
tries; the domestic survival strategies of African authoritarian regimes; the 
economic dependence of African authoritarian regimes on the EU; and 
African countries’ access to cooperation with China as an alternative coop-
eration partner.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 delve into the cases of Rwanda, Ethiopia and 
Angola. For each country, two to four time periods are identified, depend-
ing on how the EU adapts its good governance strategies towards African 
dominant party regimes. For each period, the case studies investigate the 
interaction of the four main variables established in the theoretical frame-
work to explain why African governments respond differently towards the 
EU’s demands to engage in governance reforms. Chapter 6 summarises 
the main findings, highlights contributions to academic research, and dis-
cusses policy implications that emerge from the analysis.
notES
1. The two countries are South Sudan and Eritrea.
2. See Süddeutsche Zeitung, ‘Wettlauf gegen die Zeit und gegen andere. Noch 
können Deutsche und Europäer ihre Hilfe an Bedingungen knüpfen. Doch 
sowohl die Konkurrenz aus China als auch das Öl könnten das Gewicht 
westlicher Werte deutlich schmälern’, 3 June 2013, page 6.
3. Niebel Interview for Die WELT on 4 February 2013; online: http://www.
welt.de/politik/deutschland/article113349127/Meine-Soehne-haben-
inder-Schule-den-Promi-Malus.html, last access 3 June 2014. Author’s 
translation.
4. All international companies have to give their Angolan business partner a 30 
per cent stake in their investments. The MPLA may influence which compa-
nies or individuals are nominated as potential partners for international busi-
nesses, which makes sizable opportunities for cooptation.
5. This study analyses three diverse cases with regard to African governments’ 
openness to engaging with the EU in governance reforms. No conclusions 
can be drawn as to what extent these cases mirror the distribution of varia-
tion in the responsiveness of African governments across all African domi-
nant party regimes. A cursory review of EU documents, interviews in 
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Brussels with EU officials who are well-versed in EU–Africa cooperation on 
governance reforms across all African countries and evaluations of the EU’s 
good governance instruments suggest that many other African countries are 
probably situated somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, similar to the 
Ethiopian government that cooperates reluctantly.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
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CHAPTER 2
The Initial Puzzle: Why Governments 
in Dominant Party Systems Engage 
with the EU on Good Governance  
Reform, or Not
When choosing to cooperate on governance reforms, the EU and African 
governments have to assess their choices in light of domestic and interna-
tional, short- and long-term costs and benefits that this cooperation 
entails. Sometimes the EU’s and African governments’ preferences con-
verge and cooperation provides joint gains; sometimes, preferences 
diverge. The EU and African governments do not make their decisions 
about when, how and on what aspects of governance reforms they want to 
cooperate in isolation. Their decisions are deeply embedded in negotia-
tions about development aid and interests in the wider network of bilateral 
economic, security and political cooperation. The costs that the EU and 
African governments might have to bear when deciding to cooperate on 
governance reforms may be outweighed by benefits reaped from other 
parts of the relationship.
Whereas the EU’s motives for and interests in promoting governance 
reforms are comparatively well researched, much less is known about the 
factors that shape African governments’ willingness to engage with the 
EU. This is the central concern of this book. This chapter develops an 
analytical grid to assess African governments’ responsiveness towards EU 
demands to engage in governance reforms and identifies the factors that 
shape African governments’ response strategies.
The analysis adopts a basic, rationalist framework for interaction. Actors 
are assumed to make decisions about cooperation consciously and to base 
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their decisions about engaging in cooperation on rational (im)material cost– 
benefit calculations shaped by the information available to them and by 
their underlying belief systems. The basic interest for both—the EU and 
African governments—is to remain in power, and their decisions to coop-
erate on governance reforms are also informed by this basic interest. EU–
Africa cooperation on governance reforms can then be conceived of as a 
situation of strategic interaction in which both sides have a preference for 
a specific outcome of the cooperation and a certain amount of bargaining 
power to influence that outcome. This framing builds on recent research 
which has conceived donor–recipient relations in general (Whitfield and 
Fraser 2009) and the implementation of the EU’s good governance 
instruments in particular (van Hüllen 2015) as a situation of international 
cooperation.
According to Keohane’s (1984, 51) seminal definition, cooperation 
occurs ‘when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated prefer-
ences of others, through a process of policy coordination’. This definition 
presumes that actors’ behaviour is directed towards some goal(s) and that 
cooperation provides gains or rewards to the actors. These rewards do not 
have to be equally large for both actors. But cooperation emerges only if the 
interaction leaves both better off (or at least not worse off) than unilateral 
action and no agreement. Through cooperation, actors do not necessarily 
seek to help each other; the adjustment of policies is done in anticipation 
that it will bring gains for one’s own situation (Milner 1992, 468).
Cooperating on governance reforms confronts the EU and African gov-
ernments with three cost–benefit calculations. First, both sides assess the 
immediate benefits and costs that cooperation on governance reforms 
entails. Second, they analyse their interest in the bilateral relationship and 
weigh the benefits and costs of cooperating on governance reforms against 
those of engaging in other areas and policy fields within the context of their 
bilateral relations (e.g. trade, investment or security cooperation). Third, 
they weigh the costs and benefits of their bilateral cooperation against 
opportunities for cooperation offered by third actors, such as China. In this 
regard, cooperating on governance reforms can be described as a ‘two-level 
game’ (Putnam 1988), where the EU’s and African governments’ prefer-
ences for cooperation and their bargaining power are substantially shaped 
by the domestic costs and benefits that cooperation entails.
EU–Africa cooperation on governance reforms is highly asymmetric in 
several ways. The instruments and the institutional framework for coop-
eration are substantially shaped by the EU: the EU makes an offer for 
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cooperation; it asks African governments to engage in political dialogue, 
aid policy dialogues, the implementation of governance aid or to comply 
with EU demands for political reforms. African governments then decide 
if they want to engage with the EU. Through its agenda-setting power, 
the EU can substantially influence the outcome of cooperation. By pro-
moting a specific content of good governance and by using specific instru-
ments to promote governance reforms, the EU pre-defines and structures 
possible sets of outcomes.
In addition, cooperation is asymmetric because the distributional con-
sequences of cooperating on governance reforms vary widely for the EU 
and African governments. The EU and African governments both weigh 
their decisions to cooperate on governance reforms against the domestic 
costs and opportunities that this cooperation entails. For the EU, asking 
African governments to engage in governance reforms only indirectly 
affects domestic politics within the EU. By contrast, for African govern-
ments, cooperation on governance reforms has very direct (and potentially 
disruptive) consequences for their chances of staying in power. African 
governments’ decision to engage in governance reforms may affect the 
stability and longevity of their rule. By cooperating with African govern-
ments on governance reforms, external actors become closely involved in 
domestic decision-making processes in African countries (Leininger 
2010).
Moreover, EU–Africa cooperation on governance reforms is highly 
asymmetric, since it is closely linked to the provision of development aid. 
The EU has operationalised most of its instruments to support gover-
nance reforms in Africa within the context of its development policy. 
Asymmetric interdependence in donor–recipient relations thus allows the 
EU to inflict direct costs or set financial incentives to leverage in favour of 
cooperating on governance reforms.
Building on research on EU good governance support and authoritar-
ian regimes, the following sections identify the factors that shape African 
governments’ strategies to engage with the EU in governance reforms. 
This book argues that African governments’ openness to cooperate is 
influenced by four main factors (Fig. 2.1): first, the EU’s good governance 
strategies—the ‘content’ and the ‘instruments’ that the EU ‘offers’ for 
cooperation—shape African governments’ willingness to engage. Second, 
African governments’ openness to cooperate is influenced by their survival 
strategies. Third, African governments take into account their interests to 
engage with the EU ‘beyond’ governance reforms and notably their 
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economic dependence on the EU. Fourth, African governments consider 
opportunities for cooperation offered by third actors, such as China. The 
following sections describe each of these factors and their interaction 
effects in more detail.
2.1  The eU’s sTraTegies To PromoTe governance 
reforms
To assess the EU’s strategies to promote governance reforms in African 
countries, this analysis builds on research that has analysed the EU’s strat-
egies for promoting governance reforms (Börzel and Risse 2009; Wetzel 
and Orbie 2011; Magen and McFaul 2009; Jünemann and Knodt 2007). 
I distinguish two dimensions of the EU’s good governance strategies. 
First, the EU may emphasise a different content or substance of good 
governance and use a different channel to support governance reforms. 


















Second, I argue that the EU can choose different instruments and thereby 
promote reforms through either a more conflictive or cooperative strategy.
The EU’s Approach: Content and Channels
The definition of ‘good governance’ has been intensely debated (Kohler- 
Koch and Rittberger 2006). One can distinguish between a broad and a 
narrow definition of good governance (Leftwich 1994; Börzel et  al. 
2008a; Robinson and Hout 2009). Some scholars and practitioners of 
democracy promotion have adopted the former; the development aid 
community and researchers working on development policy have initially 
advocated the latter.
Some scholars adopt a narrow understanding of good governance 
which is limited to the efficient and effective functioning of the state. They 
closely associate good governance with the management and performance 
of the administration and the regulatory framework of the state. Principles 
such as efficiency and effectiveness, predictability, transparency, account-
ability, the level of corruption or sound financial management constitute 
important elements of this understanding (Conzelmann 2003; Faust 
2004; Andrews 2013). This narrow definition has been strongly influ-
enced by development policy, and notably by the World Bank (Kaufmann 
et al. 1999; Fuster 1998). The EU could choose to promote the transpar-
ency of decision- making processes, the fight against corruption, the 
strengthening of public financial management, and civil service and 
administrative reforms, or it could support the capacities of government 
institutions to improve the functioning of the administration.
Other authors working in the field of democratisation and external 
democracy promotion adopt a broader definition with a stronger norma-
tive dimension relating to the input dimension of ‘good’ governance, such 
as the respect for human rights and democracy (Burnell 2000; Santiso 
2003). In their understanding, good governance also entails political 
aspects, and democratic structures are perceived as key components of 
good governance. Following this broader understanding, the EU could 
seek to promote competitive democratic politics, including the strength-
ening of electoral regimes, political and civil rights, the separation of pow-
ers, and horizontal and vertical accountability.
The content of EU good governance policies can be differentiated 
according to two dimensions of legitimacy formulated by Scharpf (1999)—
input and output legitimacy. Output legitimacy corresponds to the narrow 
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(regulatory) understanding of governance, whereas input legitimacy is 
equated with the wider (political) concept of good governance predomi-
nant in the fields of democratisation and democracy promotion studies.
In addition to the content of EU good governance policies, the EU 
may use different channels of influence and target state or non-state actors 
to promote governance reforms. In using the intergovernmental channel, 
the EU could seek to alter the preferences of the target government to 
introduce reform processes by manipulating their cost–benefit calculation, 
or it could aim at changing the target government’s preferences for achiev-
ing outcomes by socialising them into new norms through processes of 
social learning and persuasion. The transnational approach, in contrast, 
seeks to empower non-state actors in relation to their governments 
(Schimmelfennig 2007).
Combining the different contents and channels the EU may use, this 
study follows Börzel et al. (2008b), who identify four ideal-type approaches 
on how the EU can promote governance reforms (Table 2.1). On the one 
hand, the EU may place stronger emphasis on either input- or output- 
related reform goals. On the other hand, it may either target the intergov-
ernmental channel (state actors) or the transnational one (non-state 
actors).
The first approach of effective government addresses the intergovern-
mental channel and seeks to promote output-oriented objectives, focusing 
on the administrative core of good governance. The EU could seek to 
improve governance by enhancing the capacities of the government and 
its administration or by improving the transparency of decision-making 
processes. The second approach of effective governance also places empha-
sis on output-oriented reform goals. But it either includes non-state actors 
in the implementation process to produce better policies by pooling 
resources and increasing acceptance, or tackles the strengthening of non- 
state organisations that help to better implement policies. The third 
approach of democratic government again relies on the intergovernmental 
channel. While promoting input-oriented objectives, the EU targets the 
Table 2.1 Four approaches of external good governance support
Output legitimacy Input legitimacy
Intergovernmental Effective government Democratic government
Transnational Effective governance Democratic governance
Source: Börzel et al. (2008b)
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state to make it establish and safeguard a public sphere where interests can 
be articulated and aggregated. The EU could, for instance, promote civil 
and political rights by supporting the legal framework or independent 
state institutions that hold the government accountable. The fourth 
approach of democratic governance combines the transnational channel 
with input-oriented reform objectives. In line with this approach, the EU 
could support the capacities of non-state actors to empower them to 
improve the democratic quality of decision-making processes and hold the 
government accountable.
The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative or Confrontational Strategy?
External actors can also seek to impact governance reforms in third coun-
tries through different mechanisms and types of instrument. Studies on 
democracy promotion, external Europeanisation and aid conditionality 
have suggested various typologies to classify the EU’s instruments to pro-
mote governance reforms, depending on their different logics of action, 
mechanisms of influence and different schools of compliance and 
Europeanisation research (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Magen 
and Morlino 2009; Magen and McFaul 2009; Börzel et al. 2008b). 
External actors can seek to promote governance reforms through posi-
tive or negative conditionality, linking material or non-material incentives 
to the implementation of governance reforms. Conditionality can be used 
ex-post (i.e. reductions in development aid in response to deteriorations in 
governance) or ex-ante (i.e. in the EU enlargement process). External 
actors may use various forms of political or aid policy dialogues with a view 
to changing the preferences of the government or non-state actors in the 
target country through strategies of persuasion and social learning. 
External actors may seek to support governance reforms by transferring 
technical and financial assistance to support the human, administrative and 
financial capacities of state or non-state actors in the target country.
For analytical purposes, and with respect to different underlying mecha-
nisms of influence and logics of action, the literature on EU external gov-
ernance and democracy promotion generally differentiates between 
conditionality, dialogue and aid, and often analyses only one of them, for 
instance the impact of democracy aid on political reforms. In practice, how-
ever, external actors generally combine these instruments in different ways. 
The EU’s instruments can respectively be conceived on a continuum rang-
ing from a ‘confrontational’ to a ‘cooperative-rewarding’ strategy (Fig. 2.2).






















Fig. 2.2 The EU’s good governance instruments: between confrontation and 
rewards
Source: Author’s compilation
At one end of the spectrum, external actors can adopt a confrontational 
strategy and merely rely on aid, trade or other forms of sanctions, for 
instance in response to serious violations of human rights or a coup d’état.
Beyond a confrontational strategy and the usage of sanctions, external 
actors can combine dialogue, governance aid and conditionality in various 
ways. A cooperative strategy can take different forms, depending on the 
combination of dialogue, technical and financial assistance, and condition-
ality that external actors choose. In the case of a cooperative-conflictive 
strategy, the EU would combine governance aid and dialogue with strong 
negative incentives such as budget-support suspensions to exert pressure 
on the target government. In the case of a cooperative-critical strategy, the 
EU would combine aid and dialogue with smaller ‘sticks’ such as critical 
public statements (shaming) or withholding governance aid to exert pres-
sure on the government. External actors could decide to adopt a purely 
cooperative strategy and rely merely on dialogue and governance aid to 
promote reforms. Finally, the EU could adopt a cooperative-rewarding 
strategy and combine dialogue and governance aid with positive incentives 
(‘carrots’), such as affirmative public statements or aid modalities such as 
budget support.
Combining the EU’s ‘approach’ and its ‘instruments’ allows us to 
develop a comprehensive framework to analyse the EU’s strategies to sup-
port governance reforms in individual African countries and over time. 
The EU could choose to put a strong emphasis on promoting either a 
narrow or a comprehensive governance agenda. It could choose to merely 
work with governments or to empower non-governmental actors vis-à-vis 
the government. In addition, the EU could choose not only to rely on 
dialogue and governance aid but also to combine these instruments with 
positive or negative incentives to foster an active cooperation on gover-
nance reforms. The costs and benefits that the narrow or comprehensive 
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agenda entail for African governments would thus be exacerbated by the 
EU’s usage of confrontational or rewarding governance instruments.
2.2  african governmenTs’ resPonsiveness
African governments can respond to the EU’s strategies in different ways. 
First, with regard to the content or substance of the EU’s approach, 
African governments may be more or less willing to engage in a 
 comprehensive or narrow governance agenda. In cases where the EU 
seeks to promote output- as well as input-related reforms, African 
governments may be willing to cooperate on a comprehensive agenda, 
they may be willing to engage only in reforms that improve the effective-
ness of government institutions or they may not be willing to cooperate 
with the EU on governance reforms at all. African governments could be 
more or less willing to accept EU support for non-state actors and the 
EU’s usage of the transnational channel. Second, African governments can 
choose to adopt different strategies towards different types of instrument 
that the EU seeks to employ. For instance, governments may be willing to 
engage in dialogue (political dialogue or aid policy dialogues), they may 
be willing to commit to concrete governance reform objectives in exchange 
for material incentives (positive conditionality), but they may not be will-
ing to cooperate on the implementation of governance aid or vice versa.
African governments’ responsiveness towards EU good governance 
instruments can be conceived on a continuum, ranging from active and 
willing engagement to indifference. Classifying ‘indifference’ is relatively 
straightforward and would entail that African governments do not engage 
in dialogue, would not agree to implement governance aid and do not 
comply with EU conditionality. In the case of indifference, African gov-
ernments would not be willing to engage either in a broad or narrow 
governance agenda. It is more difficult, however, to discern different 
forms of ‘cooperativeness’. For reasons of simplicity, the analysis will dis-
tinguish between reluctant and active cooperation. Active cooperation 
would entail that African governments are willing to cooperate with the 
EU on the entire governance agenda that the EU seeks to promote and 
across all governance instruments that it seeks to apply. Reluctant engage-
ment would entail that governments are willing to engage with the EU 
only in parts of the agenda that the EU seeks to promote and only in some 
of the cooperative instruments that the EU applies.
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Interaction Effects: EU Good Governance Strategies and African 
Governments’ Responsiveness
The study starts off with a simplified assumption that cooperation on gov-
ernance reforms is costly for African authoritarian regimes. External sup-
port for governance reforms is generally assumed to promote political 
liberalisation and thereby potentially challenges the propensity of African 
governments to persist in power (Wright 2009; Cornell 2012). Against 
this background, one would expect that the more the EU promotes a 
broad ‘content’ that seeks to support not only the effectiveness of decision- 
making processes but also their democratic quality and the more the EU 
seeks to empower non-state actors in holding the government account-
able, the less willing African governments should be to engage with the 
EU. Further, the more the EU puts pressure on African governments and 
uses a conflictive approach to support reforms, the less willing African 
governments should be to engage with the EU.
EU–Africa cooperation on governance reforms is an interactive and 
iterative situation (Table 2.2). Thus, if the EU narrows or broadens its 
good governance approach over time, we would expect that governments 
in African authoritarian regimes become more or less willing to cooperate. 
For instance, if the EU decides to broaden its approach from a narrow to 
a comprehensive governance agenda, African governments should become 
less willing to engage, as reforms geared towards democratic government 
and governance generate more costs for authoritarian regimes. If the EU 
narrows its approach and promotes mainly effective government, African 
governments would be expected to become more willing to engage with 
the EU since effective government institutions may also be in the interest 
EU good governance strategy   African governments’ responsiveness
Dimension I: Broad or narrow content? 
State or non-state actors? indifferent, reluctant or cooperative?
Dimension II: Cooperative or conflictive?





of African authoritarian regimes. Similarly, if the EU decides to adopt a 
more conflictive strategy and uses negative conditionality, this should 
prompt African governments to become more reluctant to engage with 
the EU. If the EU decides to adopt a more cooperative strategy and to 
provide positive additional rewards to the governments, this should induce 
them to become more willing to engage with the EU.
The EU’s good governance strategies are only one factor that shapes 
African governments’ willingness to cooperate on governance reforms. In 
order to develop more specific assumptions on the conditions under which 
governments are willing to engage, we therefore need to open the ‘black 
box’ of domestic politics of African authoritarian regimes.
2.3  sUrvival sTraTegies of governmenTs 
in DominanT ParTy regimes
When deciding if they want to cooperate, African governments assess the 
costs and benefits that the EU’s offer entails. Political leaders in dominant 
 party regimes are conceived as rational and self-interested actors seeking 
to maximise their chances of remaining in power (not too different from 
their counterparts in democracies). The threat of losing power, and oppor-
tunities to increase their chances of staying in power, is thus the basic fac-
tor that motivates authoritarian governments to cooperate with the EU on 
governance reforms. Understanding the costs they want to avoid and the 
benefits they seek helps to explain their openness to engage with the EU.
Survival Strategies
Autocratic leaders do not remain in office through competitive elections, 
where they would need to secure support from the majority of the elector-
ate. They therefore always fear being ousted. Put simply, domestic politics 
in authoritarian regimes can be conceived as a political ‘game’ between the 
leadership, members of the ruling coalition (i.e. the ruling party and the 
military) and the broader society (Bueno de Mesquita et  al. 2003). 
Dominant party regimes have a relatively broad ruling coalition, com-
pared to other autocracies. Whereas military regimes primarily rely on the 
military, or monarchies on the royal family, political leaders in dominant 
party systems, instead, have to secure support from members of the ruling 
party, the military and security forces, and sometimes also strategic busi-
ness sectors.
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Political leaders in dominant party regimes have at least three basic 
strategies at hand to increase their chances of retaining power. They 
can invest in strengthening party or state institutions. They can use 
arenas of political contestation such as elections or parliaments to 
mobilise support. They can rely on coercion to open or close political 
spaces (see Fig.  2.3 for an overview). Research on authoritarianism 
often examines only one of these strategies and investigates variation 
across different types of  authoritarian regimes. The objective here is to 
bring these three strategies together and to specify them for dominant 
party systems.
 The Foundation of Political Survival: Strengthening the Party or the State
Political leaders in dominant party systems need strong states or strong 
parties. Strong state institutions or strong parties are instrumental in effec-
tively managing arenas of contestation and opening and closing political 
spaces to increase their chances of staying in power. Political leaders in 
dominant party regimes can decide to particularly invest in building 
strong political parties, they can invest in building strong states or they can 
use a mixture of the two. In dominant party systems, the ruling party 
often fuses with formal state institutions. Ruling parties may almost sub-
stitute state functions or vice versa. Those political leaders that have nei-
ther strong ruling parties nor strong states are often quickly removed 
(Levitsky and Way 2010).
Recent research on autocratic regimes has often focused on the role of 
the ruling party in enhancing regime stability. Political parties in authori-
tarian regimes provide mechanisms to manage leadership succession 
(Geddes 2006) and intraelite conflicts (Brownlee 2007). They allow for 
distributing spoils to regime supporters (Magaloni 2006) and coercing 
Structural Factors
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opponents. Moreover, political parties help to develop a support base that 
the political leadership can mobilise, for instance in case of popular upris-
ing (Geddes 2006). Via access to financial revenues, career opportunities 
or other perks, the party gives its members a stake in the regime. Through 
trade unions, youth and women’s organisations or cooperatives, well- 
institutionalised ruling parties extend their influence to a large segment of 
society (Geddes 2006; Magaloni 2006). Empirical studies suggest that 
these institutional mechanisms make dominant party regimes more dura-
ble than other forms of authoritarian regimes such as monarchies or mili-
tary regimes (Smith 2005; Geddes 2006; Svolik 2012). Those regimes 
with relatively strong political parties are found to be most durable (Smith 
2005) and often among those economically most successful (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003; Faust 2007; Gehlbach and Keefer 2011).
Autocrats can also decide to invest in state institutions. Strong states are 
one essential factor in securing the stability and longevity of authoritarian 
rule (Huntington 1969; Levitsky and Way 2010, 57). Authoritarian state 
institutions may help governments to effectively coerce and repress politi-
cal opponents. Governments invest in the security apparatus and boost 
capacities of the army, the police, paramilitary forces or intelligence ser-
vices. According to Levitsky and Way (2010), the cohesive capacity of 
authoritarian states, defined as the level of compliance within the state 
apparatus and the reach of the state, is critical to effectively using coercion. 
Furthermore, governments also use state institutions as an instrument to 
provide public goods or to coopt regime opponents. Political leaders may 
decide to strengthen public administration and the effectiveness of bureau-
cracies, raise domestic revenues, and improve public goods provision. 
Modern, rational-legal and meritocratic bureaucracies in the Weberian 
sense allow for effectively formulating and implementing policies needed 
to generate economic growth, raise taxes or develop effective healthcare 
and education systems. On the other hand, governments may use state 
institutions to distribute perks and spoils. Regime opponents may be 
coopted by granting access to positions in the government administration. 
Political leaders may use state institutions to provide spoils to their support 
group, for instance, their ethnic group or people from their home town.
 Managing Political Survival: Effectively Controlling Arenas of Contestation  
Such as Elections, Parliaments and Courts
Dominant party regimes are not fully closed, but allow for some (albeit 
limited) political contestation. They establish formal democratic institu-
tions such as elections, parliaments or courts that strongly resemble their 
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equivalents in democratic regimes. Even though these institutions fulfil 
different functions than in democratic regimes, effectively managing are-
nas of contestation is important for incumbents to secure their position in 
power (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008; Schedler 2009).
Elections are probably most important in this regard. Even though 
elections in authoritarian regimes are not free and fair, winning elections 
with a high voter turnout and an overwhelming majority is vital for politi-
cal leaders (Magaloni 2006). Elections constitute important points in time 
when opponents inside or outside the ruling elite can directly challenge 
the incumbent. Opposition parties may seek to mobilise mass movements, 
for instance if they identify underlying schisms within the ruling elite that 
they can exploit (Brownlee 2007). Defecting members of the ruling party 
may decide to use elections to openly challenge the incumbent, for instance 
during periods of economic crisis (Reuter and Gandhi 2011). In addition, 
elections allow incumbents to enhance regime stability. Overwhelming 
electoral victories signal to regime supporters that it pays off to remain loyal 
to the leadership as the opposition presents no viable alternative. 
Overwhelming victories also signal to regime opponents that their chances 
of gaining power are limited (Magaloni 2006, 7ff; Magaloni and Kricheli 
2010, 129f). Moreover, election results give some indication about the 
popular support of the ruling party and about the regional and social dis-
tribution of its support base, allowing it to reward supporters with access 
to government funds and to punish defectors by restricting access to spoils 
(Magaloni 2006, 9). Political leaders may therefore decide to invest heav-
ily in election campaigns.
Beyond elections, governments in dominant party regimes may decide 
to use parliaments to solicit cooperation from the ruling party and reduce 
threats from opposition outside of the ruling elite (Gandhi and Przeworski 
2007). Parliaments may provide a forum for the government to grant 
policy concessions to opposition groups in exchange for regime support 
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Parliamentary seats may also be allotted 
to secure the support of members of the ruling elite. Political leaders in 
autocratic regimes may further invest in the judiciary to promote their 
interests. Moustafa and Ginsburg (2008, 4), for instance, show how courts 
are used to strengthen social control and sideline regime opponents: they 
may be used to promote ‘legal’ legitimacy; they may facilitate trade and 




 Managing Political Survival: Opening and Closing Political Spaces
Authoritarian leaders rely on different forms of coercion to open or close 
political spaces (Wintrobe 2001). Coercion is used as an instrument of 
sanction against individuals or organisations to reduce threats from the 
opposition and reinforce their grip on power (see Davenport 2007, for an 
overview). Following Levitsky and Way (2010) one can distinguish 
between ‘high-intensity’ and ‘low-intensity’ coercion. Dominant party 
systems are generally found to be less likely to use repression than other 
types of authoritarian regimes since they depend more strongly on the 
loyalty of broader segments of society (Davenport 2007; Escribà-Folch 
and Wright 2015).
Dominant party regimes can be expected to use high-intensity coercion 
to respond to mass protests and challenges from the opposition outside of 
the ruling elite. Prominent examples of high-intensity coercion would 
include the killing of protesters in Tiananmen Square in China, in 1989, 
or more recently in Tahrir Square in Egypt. High-intensity coercion is 
costly for authoritarian regimes, both economically and politically 
(Wintrobe 2001; Conrad 2011). It may have medium-term negative 
effects on economic development as citizens refuse to engage in economic 
activities and international investments decline in a politically insecure 
environment (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). In addition, high- 
intensity coercion requires autocrats to substantially invest in the security 
forces to secure their loyalty (Wintrobe 2001). Dominant party regimes 
would be expected to use high-intensity coercion as a measure of last 
resort only in situations when the leadership is in a particularly insecure 
position, facing very strong challenges from the opposition.
By contrast, dominant party regimes can be expected to generally rely on 
low-intensity coercion to gradually close political spaces. Low-intensity coer-
cion can take various forms. Authoritarian regimes may use a variety of for-
mal and legalised or informal strategies to intimidate and harass civil society 
organisations, and reduce the freedom of the media, opposition parties or 
individual regime critics (Davenport 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010). Low-
intensity coercion may be targeted directly at defecting members of the elite 
in order to limit their chances of challenging the incumbent. For instance, 
anticorruption campaigns may be used to marginalise party members who 
foster a split in the party. On the other hand, low- intensity coercion may be 
targeted at the broader society to limit the opportunities of defectors to 
mobilise mass support. For instance, if former party members seek to chal-
lenge the incumbent at the ballot box, reductions in press freedom and 
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spaces for opposition parties to campaign may limit the ability of defectors 
to mobilise support. If low-intensity coercion is successful, it reduces the 
need to rely on high-intensity coercion (Levitsky and Way 2010).
 Structural and Situational Factors That Impact on the Choice 
of Survival Strategies
Several factors influence political leaders’ decisions to use a specific type of 
strategy to increase their chances of remaining in power. Structural factors 
constrain the basic choices of political leaders to rely on a certain strategy. 
For instance, strong parties emerge only under very specific circumstances: 
conditions related to the founding moment of the regime may consider-
ably shape the incentive for political leaders to invest in party building 
(Brownlee 2007; Smith 2005). The presence (or absence) of access to 
easy revenues from natural resources is found to affect the willingness of 
political leaders to invest in strong parties and effective states (Smith 
2005; Ross 1999) and to use coercion and cooptation. Moreover, research 
on East Asian developmental states has illustrated that not only does 
access to revenue shape the willingness of political leaders to invest in 
strong states, but the presence of external security threats has also been 
identified as a necessary condition for strong state institutions to emerge 
(Doner et al. 2005).
Furthermore, a leadership’s political survival can be challenged by situ-
ational factors. Notably, opponents from outside or inside the ruling elite 
can confront the incumbent at a specific point in time. Challenges to 
regime survival constitute defining moments in the life of ruling parties 
and can induce substantial changes in survival strategies (Reuter and 
Gandhi 2011; Conrad 2011). First, political leaders can be under threat 
from groups outside of the ruling elite, such as opposition parties and mass 
movements (Ulfelder 2005; Geddes 2006; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). 
In Africa, for instance, mass movements and civil society protests played an 
important role in regime liberalisations and transitions in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Second, persons inside 
the ruling elite, such as individual members or factions of the ruling party, 
can decide to defect and to challenge the leadership by presenting them-
selves as a political alternative (Magaloni 2006; Reuter and Gandhi 2011; 
Svolik 2012). Finally, officials of the party or security forces may decide to 
defect without directly attempting to challenge the leadership. If that hap-
pens, it signals that the regime is weak, possibly prompting further erosion 




In summary, governments in dominant party systems can decide to 
invest in the party or the state. They need to control arenas of contestation 
and can decide to open or close political spaces to strengthen their grip on 
power. Strong state institutions or strong ruling parties are instrumental 
for governments in dominant party systems to effectively manage arenas of 
contestation and use coercion to open or close political spaces (Fig. 2.3). 
Whether the government decides to invest more strongly in the state or in 
the party and how it uses arenas of contestation and coercion is influenced 
by a set of structural and situational factors.
EU Good Governance Strategies Meet Dominant Party Regimes
We assume that cooperation on governance reforms can generate costs as 
well as benefits for authoritarian governments. Depending on which sur-
vival strategies governments use, EU demands to engage in governance 
reforms can converge or diverge with authoritarian governments’ prefer-
ences. The size of the costs and benefits that cooperation involves can vary 
significantly across countries and over time.
This basic proposition that cooperation on governance reforms can 
generate not only costs but also benefits contrasts with some of the 
research on good governance support. Some start by assuming that the 
implementation of governance instruments mainly entails costs for authori-
tarian governments. Studies that focus on the ‘input dimension’ of good 
governance and analyse, for instance, the effect of democracy aid on politi-
cal reforms usually start by assuming that democracy aid fosters political 
liberalisation and thereby entails costs for the target government (Wright 
2009). Governments in relatively stable authoritarian regimes with good 
chances of remaining in power are then expected to accept some democ-
racy aid as they can afford higher levels of political liberalisation without 
losing power (Cornell 2012). Moreover, studies focusing on the ‘output 
dimension’ of good governance argue that most target governments 
accept aid geared towards promoting effective institutions merely as 
‘signals – to garner short-term support from the international community’ 
(Andrews 2013, 215). Governments’ interest in receiving development 
aid, rather than a genuine interest in engaging in governance reforms is 
identified as the main driver for cooperation (Andrews 2013).
The previous section developed a comprehensive picture of possible 
survival strategies. African governments’ cooperation with the EU on gov-
ernance reforms touches only upon parts, but not all, of these strategies. 
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Recall from Sect. 2.1 that EU good governance strategies are directed 
towards supporting the effectiveness of government institutions or the 
democratic quality of decision-making processes; moreover, the EU can 
strengthen the capacities of non-state actors or empower them in holding 
the government accountable. Cooperation with the EU on the implemen-
tation of governance instruments may therefore be relevant for (a) build-
ing strong and effective state institutions; (b) managing arenas of 
contestation such as elections, parliaments or courts; and (c) open or close 
political spaces (Fig. 2.3). On the other hand, since the EU mainly engages 
with African governments and the state more broadly, the EU’s good gov-
ernance strategies have limited relevance for political leaders’ decisions to 
build strong ruling parties. Under what conditions does cooperation with 
the EU on governance reforms then involve costs or benefits for authori-
tarian governments (Table 2.3)?
Table 2.3 The costs and benefits of cooperating on governance reforms
Survival strategies Costs and benefits of 
cooperation
I. Building effective states
The more governments use and invest in strengthening 
state institutions to generate economic growth and 
provide public goods…
The more governments use formal state institutions 
mainly to distribute private goods and spoils….
…the higher the benefits  
to cooperate with  
the EU
…the higher the costs to 
cooperate with the EU
II. Managing arenas of political contestation
The more governments are confident about winning 
elections without significant fraud…
The more governments are afraid of facing challenges 
from the opposition during elections…
…the higher the benefits to 
cooperate with the EU
…the higher the costs to 
cooperate with the EU
III. Opening or closing political spaces
The more governments decide to open political spaces to 
prevent opposition challenges…
The more governments decide to use low-intensity 
coercion to gradually close political spaces to prevent 
opposition challenges…
The more governments decide to use high-intensity 
coercion to close political spaces to respond to imminent 
threats to regime survival…
…the higher the benefits to 
cooperate with the EU
…the lower the costs  
to cooperate with  
the EU
…the higher the costs  





 Building Effective States
For governments that decide to invest in building effective states geared 
towards promoting economic growth and public goods provisions, 
 cooperation with the EU on governance reforms can be beneficial. 
Cooperating with the EU may help governments to improve access to 
domestic tax revenues or to make policy formulation and implementation 
more effective. EU support for public administration and civil service 
reform, public financial management and the rule of law are thus expected 
to resonate well with the preferences of the government. Moreover, even 
EU assistance to strengthen capacities of non-state actors that support the 
government in providing basic public services can converge with the gov-
ernment’s preferences.
By contrast, authoritarian regimes that have limited interest in building 
effective states, because they mainly use the state to distribute rents and 
spoils, have few incentives to cooperate with the EU on governance 
reforms. EU support geared towards improving the transparency of public 
finances, anticorruption policies and civil service or public administration 
reforms run counter to the government’s attempts to use government 
institutions to distribute spoils. In these cases, cooperation with the EU 
on governance reforms is thus expected to be costly.
 Managing Arenas of Political Contestation
EU support geared towards elections, parliaments or courts may also 
entail costs or benefits. Cooperating with the EU may bolster the external 
legitimacy of the authoritarian regime;1 EU technical assistance may help 
African governments to actually conduct elections. However, EU assis-
tance may also be exploited by the opposition and bolster its position vis- 
à- vis the government.
One would expect that the type of challenge to regime survival that 
the government faces ahead of elections is an important factor that miti-
gates the size of the costs and benefits that cooperation entails, and thus 
African governments’ interests in engaging with the EU on elections. 
Governments that face little challenge from opponents and that can win 
elections overwhelmingly and relatively easily without resorting to sig-
nificant fraud are likely to have an interest in cooperating with the 
EU. In these cases, EU technical assistance may provide important ben-
efits to support the election process: EU public statements after the 
elections or findings from election observation missions may boost 
domestic and international legitimacy. In contrast, in cases where the 
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opposition or defecting members of the elite use elections to directly 
challenge the ruling party, cooperating with the EU may be costly. The 
EU’s critical public statements and its technical assistance to support the 
media or civil society to monitor the election campaign and election 
process may be exploited by the opposition and used to further chal-
lenge the incumbent.
 Opening or Closing Political Spaces
For governments that decide to open or close political spaces, cooperating 
with the EU on governance reforms may also generate costs and benefits. 
Cooperation with the EU is likely to accrue some benefits in cases where 
governments decide to open political spaces to strengthen input legiti-
macy. The EU may extend technical assistance needed, for instance, to 
support the media or civil society organisations. Cooperation with the EU 
may provide additional external legitimacy during periods of political 
openings.
Instead, for governments that decide to use high- or low-intensity coer-
cion to close political spaces, cooperation with the EU on governance 
reforms is expected to generate costs. However, the size of these costs 
varies depending on the measures governments use and the type of chal-
lenge to regime survival that authoritarian governments face.
In situations where governments use high-intensity coercion to counter 
mass opposition, engagement with the EU in governance reforms is costly 
and the government is least likely to engage. In case of mass opposition, 
even small steps towards liberalisation and ceasing coercive measures may 
immediately threaten regime survival. In this context, engaging with the 
EU in political dialogue, the implementation of governance aid or other 
EU instruments geared towards supporting governance reforms would be 
particularly risky for the government.
In cases where governments use low-intensity coercion to respond to 
party splits or reduce challenges from defecting members of the ruling 
elite, cooperation on governance reforms with the EU is also risky. Yet, 
engagement in governance reforms is less challenging here than in cases of 
mass mobilisation. Finally, if members of the ruling elite defect but do not 
choose to openly challenge the leadership, the government has more lee-
way to engage with the EU in governance reforms. While erosion of the 
ruling elite may signal that the regime is weak, only in the medium- to 
long-term may opponents seek to exploit this weakness, run in elections 
themselves, align with opposition groups and mobilise mass opposition.
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2.4  african economic DePenDence on The eU
The higher the costs of engaging with the EU in governance reforms, 
the more African governments take into account their dependence on 
the EU when deciding if they want to cooperate with the EU. 
African governments’ dependence on the EU is shaped by their vulnera-
bility to EU pressure and actions taken by the EU. According to Keohane 
and Nye’s (1987) seminal definition, ‘dependence means a state of being 
determined or significantly affected by external forces’.
African governments thus weigh costs stemming from the implementa-
tion of governance instruments against benefits offered by the EU in the 
form of development aid or trade and investments. Moreover, they assess 
how vulnerable the EU is to actions taken by them. The more dependent 
African governments are on the EU, the more likely they are to cooperate. 
The less dependent African governments are on the EU, the less likely 
they are to cooperate if this entails risks for regime survival. While this 
argument is relatively straightforward, the more difficult (and largely 
empirical) question is to define how dependent African countries are on 
the EU.
Dependence on Aid and Other Official Flows
If the EU provides important volumes of external finance, African govern-
ments may be willing to engage in governance reforms, even in cases 
where these reforms are costly. The higher the government’s dependence 
on development aid as a source of domestic revenue and the higher the 
EU’s share in total aid flows to the country, the more willing the govern-
ment should be to engage with the EU.
African governments may use development aid and loans to divert them 
to regime supporters. Development aid allows the government to free its 
own resources and to use them to coopt strategic groups or to avoid taxa-
tion of those societal groups that are important for the government to 
remain in office. Empirical studies find, for instance, that foreign aid 
increases government spending while reducing government revenue and 
efforts to raise taxes (Remmer 2004). All types of foreign aid affect the 
opportunity costs of autocratic leaders to modify the allocation of their 
own resources. Regardless of whether or not aid is channelled through 
projects or direct budget support, it is a form of external finance that frees 
up government resources. Governments can (but do not necessarily do) 
use these resources to coopt regime opponents.
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We need to add several points to this basic picture. African govern-
ments assess the short- and longer-term benefits of cooperating with the 
EU. First, some aid modalities give the government considerably more 
discretionary power to allocate resources according to its preferences. The 
government’s propensity to free domestic resources in case the EU or 
other donors provide food aid is considerably lower than in the case of 
direct budget aid, at least in the short-term. Second, some forms of aid 
and sectors to which aid is allocated may be much closer to the govern-
ment’s preferences than other sectors, freeing up more domestic resources 
in the short-term. Third, if the EU decides to stop or withhold develop-
ment aid, the costs for the African government differ depending on the 
modalities by which aid is provided. For instance, withholding budget 
support funds that the government uses to pay the salaries of civil servants 
may be more detrimental in the very short-term than withholding project 
aid allocated to constructing rural roads.
Dependence on Trade and Investments
Access to trade and investments set direct and more indirect incentives for 
African governments to cooperate with the EU. For many African coun-
tries, trade taxes account for a large share of overall tax revenues. African 
governments have often maintained a strong control over strategic export 
sectors. In addition, many African countries still have only very few export 
commodities, and their export markets are not very diversified (Di John 
2010). The EU as a whole has been the largest trading partner for many 
countries. Trade with the EU may generate important tax revenues for 
African governments or revenues for societal groups whose support is par-
ticularly important for the government. If export goods cannot easily be 
shifted to other markets, the vulnerability of the government to potential 
actions taken by the EU is high.
In addition to trade, direct investments may have direct and more indi-
rect effects. They have an indirect effect if they help to promote economic 
growth, giving the government more resources that it can use to buy sup-
port. If the population associates economic growth with the government, 
this boosts its legitimacy. Direct investments may also have more direct 
effects. Investments in strategic sectors, for instance resource extraction, 
increase government revenues. Direct investments may also create impor-
tant sources of income for societal groups on which the government relies 
to remain in power. Foreign direct investments in Africa have been small 
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compared to other regions, but European and North American companies 
have traditionally been the major sources of direct investments (AfDB, 
OECD and UNDP 2016, 52ff). The dominance of European companies 
has been particularly pronounced in some (often resource-rich) countries, 
often as a result of colonial ties.
We can conclude that through aid, trade and investments, the EU 
potentially has a strong leverage to set incentives for African governments 
to cooperate on governance reforms (Table  2.4). The higher the eco-
nomic dependence on the EU, the more likely the government is willing 
to engage in governance reforms. However, some notes of caution need 
to be sounded. All other things being equal, countries that depend on the 
EU in terms of aid but not trade and investments may have much stronger 
incentives to cooperate with the EU on governance reforms than coun-
tries that depend on the EU in terms of trade and investments but not aid. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the EU does not condition access to aid 
and trade in similar ways to governance reforms. For instance, the Cotonou 
Agreement allows the EU to suspend aid and trade preferences in case of 
fundamental human rights violations or disrespect of democratic princi-
ples (Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement). Yet, in practice, the EU has 
mostly used the suspension of aid rather than trade to sanction a breach of 
the essential element clause Portela (2010).
2.5  The rise of china: WhaT effecT?
What happens if China becomes a major partner for African countries? 
Similar to their cooperation with the EU, governments in dominant party 
regimes also define their interests in engaging with China taking into 
Table 2.4 How economic dependence on the EU affects African governments’ 
willingness to cooperate on governance reforms
Dependence on aid and other official flows
High Low
Dependence  
on trade and 
investments
High
Incentive to cooperate on 
governance reforms is high
Incentive to cooperate on 
governance reforms is medium
Low
Incentive to cooperate on 
governance reforms is 
medium
Incentive to cooperate on 
governance reforms is low
Source: Author’s compilation
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account their domestic survival strategies. Economic cooperation with 
China may reduce African governments’ dependence on the EU and thus 
shape African governments’ incentives to cooperate with the EU on gov-
ernance reforms. China may also offer to cooperate with African govern-
ments on shaping their survival strategies, which may equally affect their 
willingness to engage with the EU (see Table 2.5). China is obviously only 
one of the emering powers and its engagement with African countries is 
part of a broader power shift. However, China is by far the most important 
actor in terms of its economic weight and it is the only actor that poten-
tially provides an alternative development model.
Cooperating with China: Reducing Economic Dependence 
on the EU?
The basic argument on how the rise of China shapes African governments’ 
openness to engage with the EU in governance reforms is again relatively 
straightforward. China may provide African governments with access to 
additional sources of development aid, official flows, trade and invest-
ments, thereby reducing the vulnerability of African governments to EU 
pressure. The more that cooperation with China reduces African coun-
tries’ economic dependence on the EU, the less likely African govern-
ments are to engage with the EU in governance reforms. The much more 
difficult issue is assessing how and to what extent China affects African 
governments’ dependence on the EU. To measure the relevance of China 
compared to the EU, one needs to compare the structure of European 
and Chinese cooperation with African countries against the background of 
the domestic incentives for African countries to cooperate with the EU 
and China.
The extent to which aid and official flows from China reduce African 
governments’ dependence on EU aid hinges on several factors. The first 
Table 2.5 Cooperation with China: what effect on African governments’ 
 willingness to cooperate on governance reforms?
Does cooperation with China reduce economic 
dependence on the EU?
Yes No
China engaging in 
survival strategies?
Yes Strong effect Medium effect




factor is the size of Chinese official flows. All other things being equal, one 
can assume that the more a country has access to official flows from China, 
the less the African government is willing to cooperate with the EU on 
governance reforms. The modalities through which official flows are pro-
vided and the sectors to which they are provided are a second factor shap-
ing African governments’ willingness to engage with the EU. The more 
China’s official flows match the preferences of African governments in 
terms of modalities and sectors to which they are provided, the less likely 
the government is to cooperate with the EU. Lastly, the timing of when 
China starts providing substantial official flows to African countries should 
have an impact on African governments’ vulnerability to EU pressure. If 
China provides important volumes of official flows at a point in time when 
the EU attempts to use development aid funds to put pressure on African 
governments, they can be expected to be less willing to comply with EU 
demands.
Similarly, the extent to which access to Chinese trade and investments 
reduces African countries’ dependence on the EU depends on the scale 
and structure of economic cooperation. The diversification of export mar-
kets and the opening of markets for new export goods as a result of access 
to trade with China impact on African governments’ interests in cooperat-
ing with the EU. Growing trade with China may provide significant wind-
fall profits for African governments. Cooperation with China may create 
business opportunities for societal groups whose support is crucial for 
African governments to remain in power.
In addition, if China significantly increases its direct investments in 
African countries, this may create opportunities for countries that have 
previously had very little access to foreign direct investments. Or it may 
diversify sources of direct investments and reduce the dominance of 
European companies.
China: Alternative Support for Survival Strategies?
African governments analyse the benefits and costs of cooperating with 
the EU on governance reforms not only in light of their economic depen-
dence on the EU and potential shifts in dependence due to access to coop-
eration with China. African governments also take into account alternative 
offers to engage in their survival strategies. The Chinese government does 
not embrace the promotion of ‘good governance’ as an objective in its 
external relations. In contrast, its foreign policy discourse highlights prin-
ciples of non-interference, projects a traditional understanding of national 
 THE INITIAL PUZZLE: WHY GOVERNMENTS IN DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEMS… 
46 
sovereignty and explicitly rejects the promotion of a development ‘model’. 
Yet, China might still engage with African governments in their survival 
strategies because of China’s own economic and political interests or in 
response to requests from African governments.
As in the case of cooperation with the EU, African governments assess 
how cooperation with China fits with their domestic survival strategies. 
Recall the panoply of strategies and institutions that governments in African 
dominant party regimes can use to secure their position in power (Sect. 
2.3). The Chinese government could provide assistance that resembles EU 
good governance strategies and targets similar dimensions of African gov-
ernments’ survival strategies as the EU. China could, for instance, assist in 
improving the capacities and effectiveness of government institutions 
through training courses or supplying office equipment. China’s economic 
interests may lead the Chinese government to provide technical assistance 
to address some of the side effects stemming from growing economic 
interdependencies with African countries. For example, growing Chinese 
investments may prompt a closer engagement with anti-corruption bodies 
or support to African countries’ regulatory frameworks.
On the other hand, China could also engage with African governments 
on elements of their survival strategies that the EU does not target. In 
contrast to the EU, China may engage with African ruling parties. Some 
have argued that the introduction of inner-party checks and balances, the 
institutionalisation of leadership succession and perfomance-based incen-
tive systems for party cadres constitute important factors that contributed 
to sustained economic growth in China (Keefer 2007; Zhao 2010; 
Gehlbach and Keefer 2011). Despite numerous differences between the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and African ruling parties, cooperation 
on inner-party reforms might still be very attractive. Particularly for those 
African political leaders who seek to substantially invest in reforming and 
strengthening their ruling parties, China could become an interesting 
cooperation partner. For China, party-to-party cooperation may be inter-
esting from a political as well as economic perspective. High-level visits by 
party officials can be one instrument to intensify political relations, for 
example, with those countries where economic cooperation is limited. 
Regular dialogue between ruling parties may give important insights into 
domestic political dynamics in African countries. Party-to-party relations 
may also open channels to establish and promote business relations. 
Very little research exists on China’s cooperation with African govern-
ments that relates to these governments’ survival strategies. Two prelimi-
nary propositions can be made. First, the stronger the Chinese economic 
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and political interests in cooperating with individual African countries, the 
more likely China is to engage with African countries in elements of their 
survival strategies—either by request of the African government or to ease 
growing economic interdependencies. Second, the more the Chinese 
experience with economic and political reforms ‘resonates’ with African 
domestic contexts and African governments’ survival strategies, the more 
China’s support affects African governments’ willingness to cooperate 
with the EU on governance reforms.
2.6  maP of The PUzzle: exPlaining african 
governmenTs’ resPonsiveness
African governments face some tough choices when deciding whether they 
want to engage with the EU in governance reforms, or not. Drawing the 
points from this chapter together, we can start to build a picture on the fac-
tors influencing African governments’ decision to engage with the EU.
First of all, African governments’ decision is influenced by the EU’s 
good governance strategies. More specifically, the content or substance of 
what the EU seeks to promote as part of its good governance agenda and 
the instruments the EU uses, both shape African governments’ willingness 
to cooperate on governance reforms. Second, African governments weigh 
up the costs and benefits that cooperation with the EU entails against their 
chances of remaining in power. The more the EU’s offer for cooperation 
aligns with the domestic survival strategies of African governments, the 
more likely they are willing to cooperate and vice versa. Third, African 
governments analyse the costs resulting from their engagement in gover-
nance reforms against other benefits of cooperating with the EU. If the 
EU offers comprehensive and attractive packages of aid and trading oppor-
tunities to African countries, African governments may still be willing to 
engage with the EU in governance reforms, even if this engagement bears 
certain risks for regime stability. Fourth, African governments do not take 
their decisions to cooperate with the EU in isolation. Instead, they assess 
opportunities of engaging with the EU in light of cooperation opportuni-
ties provided by other international actors such as China. If China becomes 
an alternative cooperation partner, reducing African countries’ economic 
dependence on the EU and providing attractive support for African 
governments’ survival strategies, we would expect that African govern-
ments become less likely to engage with the EU in governance reforms.
EU-Africa cooperation on governance reforms is an interactive and 
iterative situation. In this regard, changes in one or several of the four 
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main variables over time are expected to result in changes in African gov-
ernments’ openness to engage. For instance, if the EU decides at a specific 
point in time to broaden the content of its good governance strategy, 
African governments may become less willing to cooperate. If African gov-
ernments’ survival strategies shift, for example, in response to substantial 
threats from the opposition, this may reduce their willingness to engage. 
Finally, changes in African governments’ dependence on the EU and 
changing access to cooperation with China over time may also affect 
African governments’ willingness to engage in governance reforms.
The aim of this book is to explain differences in African governments’ 
openness to engage with the EU in governance reforms by exploring 
interaction effects between the EU’s good governance strategies, the sur-
vival strategies of African governments, their dependence on the EU and 
the rise of China as an alternative cooperation partner.
The following three chapters all proceed in a similar way. For each 
country case, between two and four time periods are distinguished, 
depending on whether the EU has modified its good governance strategies 
in that country. For each time period, the chapters analyse the interaction 
of the four main variables. The main objective of the within-case analysis is 
to explain why the responsiveness of the Angolan, Ethiopian or Rwandan 
government towards EU demands to engage in governance has varied 
over time. In addition, the case studies use cross-case comparisons to fur-
ther investigate the relative explanatory power of the four main variables.
noTes
1. See, for instance, Simpser and Donno (2012) for a discussion on the unin-
tended side- effects of election monitoring.
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Between 2000 and 2014, the Rwandan government has been increasingly 
active in cooperating with the EU on governance reforms. Why has the 
government reluctantly started to engage and why has it then become 
more active and at times proactive?
This chapter argues that Rwanda is an example of a country where the 
EU’s good governance strategies largely converge with the preferences of 
the target government, particularly in the second half of the 2000s. Due 
to the conjuncture of specific structural conditions, the Rwandan govern-
ment has a strong interest in building an effective state to improve public 
goods provision in order to enhance its position in power. It faced some 
opposition in the early 2000s, but has seen very limited open challenges to 
regime survival after 2005. The government faced limited difficulties in 
winning elections and it used mostly low-intensity coercion to prevent 
opposition from emerging.
In this context, EU support for governance reforms that focused on 
building effective state institutions and strengthening formally democratic 
ones (instead of empowering civil society actors) generated few costs but 
largely converged with the preferences of the Rwandan government, par-
ticularly after 2006. Moreover, by providing significant amounts of develop-
ment aid (a large proportion of it as direct budget support between 2006 
and 2012), the EU was an attractive partner for the government, outweighing 
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those (albeit limited) costs of cooperating on governance reforms. In con-
trast, Rwanda had little access to economic cooperation from alternative 
cooperation partners, such as China. China has not (yet) emerged as an 
alternative cooperation partner in terms of size of economic cooperation 
and support for the Rwandan government’s survival strategies.
This period of relative convergence between the EU and the Rwandan 
government’s preferences has probably come to an end as of 2012. The 
EU and other donors’ decision to use budget support funds to exert pres-
sure on Rwanda to cease backing rebels in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) in 2012 and Kagame’s decision to change the constitution 
and run for a third term during the 2017 elections seems to herald a new 
era in Rwanda’s relations with the EU and other donors.
3.1  Structural FactorS Shaping rwanda’S Survival 
StrategieS
The Rwandan leadership faces three interrelated structural challenges. First, 
the core elite on which the leadership relies to remain in power is relatively 
small. The most influential parts of Rwanda’s political and economic elites 
are former Tutsi refugees from Uganda who fought the war against Hutu 
extremists in 1994.1 Returnees settled mainly in urban areas, most of them 
in Kigali (Ansoms 2009, 293ff). Even today returnees from Uganda still 
hold key positions in the government (Ansoms 2009; Reyntjens 2010), the 
military and the security apparatus (Waugh 2004) as well as in the business 
sector which is dominated by companies owned by the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012). However, while still in 
exile, the RPF leadership made efforts to expand its support base and to 
include Hutu in prominent positions. When it took power in 1994, the RPF 
sought to integrate other (mostly Tutsi) returnees from Burundi, Tanzania 
and European countries as well as genocide survivors and moderate Hutu 
who had opposed the radicalisation of the former regime in the early 1990s.2
Second, given the circumstances of how it came to power and its nar-
row, (still) ethnicity-based support group, the Rwandan leadership is 
confronted with a considerable security dilemma. A regime change 
could still constitute a substantial security threat to the elite. This secu-
rity dilemma has several implications. The leadership has reason to 
expect that mass movements and mass opposition could quickly become 
uncontrollable. Thus it has a strong interest in not only maintaining 
support from the elite that sustains it in power, but to make sure that 
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popular dissatisfaction does not grow. Moreover, the Rwandan leader-
ship probably does not expect support from the EU or other interna-
tional actors to guarantee its security, not least in light of the inactivity 
of the international community during the genocide in 1994. Thus, the 
ruling elite supposedly has a strong interest in preserving its indepen-
dence from international actors despite its strong aid dependence.
The third structural dilemma relates to Rwanda’s scarce domestic rev-
enues and weak economic development. As we will see below, Rwanda 
has benefited from substantial aid inflows, notably from the EU. Yet, 
while the Rwandan government needs to maintain support from the 
broader populace as well as the core elite, it has few domestic economic 
resources that are easy to access and that require little manpower, such 
as oil or other natural resources. The leadership thus has only a small 
margin of manoeuvre in maintaining support from the elite by granting 
spoils and perks. These three challenges—a small core elite, the resulting 
security dilemma and scarce resources—considerably impact on the 
leadership’s basic choice of strategy to tighten its grip on power.
3.2  rwanda reluctantly engaged with the eu 
in the early 2000S
The EU has had limited relations with Rwanda until the genocide in 1994. 
The genocide left the country with multiple crises: about one-tenth of a 
population of eight million was killed; two million people fled the country, 
mostly to the neighbouring DRC; and one-fifth of the population was 
suspected of having been involved in the genocide. Important parts of 
basic infrastructure were destroyed and the economy was depressed. In 
the first few years after the genocide, the EU and other donors provided 
humanitarian aid to support the rehabilitation and reconciliation process. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the EU’s relations with Rwanda normalised 
and the EU (and other donors) shifted its support from humanitarian to 
long-term development aid.
The EU’s Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005
 The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Government
As part of the EU’s shift from humanitarian aid to long-term development 
assistance, support for governance reforms became a stronger priority of 
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the EU’s policies towards Rwanda. Between 2000 and 2005, the EU put 
the emphasis on promoting not only the effectiveness of government insti-
tutions but also the democratic quality of decision-making processes. The 
first country strategy paper, signed by the European Commission (EC) 
and Rwanda in 2002, indicates the importance the EU attaches to sup-
porting democratic institutions, human rights, the holding of elections 
and the judicial system (Government of the Republic of Rwanda and 
European Commission 2002). The paper mentions the need to strengthen 
the involvement of civil society actors in the decision-making process, but 
the focus clearly lies on enhancing state institutions (ibid).
In the early 2000s, the EU spent the bulk of its aid on rural develop-
ment and macro-economic support (European Commission and Rwanda 
2003, 26ff). It also allotted parts of its aid funds to promoting the effec-
tiveness of government institutions and the democratic quality of decision- 
making processes. OECD aid data show that the EU allocated similar 
volumes of aid in support of input and output legitimacy (Table 3.1).
Between 2000 and 2005, the EU focused mainly on the intergovern-
mental channel to support governance reforms and used the transnational 
channel to a much lesser extent. It channelled only small volumes of aid to 
non-state actors through the European Development Fund (EDF). The 
country strategy paper for the ninth EDF did not identify assistance to non-
state actors as a priority for the EU’s support to Rwanda (Government of 
the Republic of Rwanda and European Commission 2002). Only €2 million 
Table 3.1 EU governance aid to Rwanda 2000–2014 (in USD million and in per cent)
Rwanda 2000–2005 2006–2010 2011–2014
Total governance aid 49.22 48.56 5.23
Total aid (all sectors) 495.69 646.12 160.66
Governance aid/share in total EU aid 9.9% 7.5% 3.3%
Output legitimacy 22.19 3.54 5.23
Input legitimacy 27.03 45.02 0.00
Output legitimacy/share in total governance aid 45.1% 7.3% 100%
Input legitimacy/share in total governance aid 54.9% 92.7% 0.00
Source: Author’s compilation, based on data from OECD DAC Aid statistics (2016) (Query for EU 
institutions; ‘total governance aid’ includes all aid reported for the EU institutions under the category 
‘151:I5a: Government & Civil Society-general, Total’ to the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System. 
‘Output legitimacy’ includes public sector and administrative management, public finance management, 
decentralisation and support to subnational government, anti-corruption organisations and institutions; 
‘input legitimacy’ includes legal and judicial development, democratic participation and civil society, elec-
tions, legislature and political parties, media and freedom of information, human rights, women’s equality. 
Data accessible at http://stats.oecd.org; last accessed: 5 October 2016)
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was to be allocated to support civil society organisations (out of €12 million 
reserved to support governance reforms) (European Commission and 
Rwanda 2003, 30f). The EU proposed to launch a fund for civil society 
organisations, jointly managed with the government (ibid). It allocated 
only small aid volumes to Rwanda through the  European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Most of these funds were pro-
vided to international rather than Rwandan civil society actors (Table 3.4).
 The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Critical
In the early 2000s, the EU promoted governance reforms through dia-
logue and governance aid combined with some negative conditionality. 
The EU launched political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou 
Agreement in 2004. During political dialogue meetings, the EU asked the 
government to establish benchmarks against which to measure progress 
on governance reforms (European Commission and Rwanda 2005). 
Together with other donors, the EU made efforts to establish and institu-
tionalise different forms of aid policy dialogues that developed along with 
reforms to the international aid architecture in the early 2000s. As part of 
these dialogues, the EU together with other donors sought to make gov-
ernance reforms an important topic (Hayman 2006).3 Beyond political 
and aid policy dialogue, the EU began to support governance reforms 
with EDF and EIDHR aid funds (see above).
Furthermore, the EU pressured Rwanda to promote political reforms. 
Similar to other international actors, the EU criticised the limiting of 
political space for civil society and the opposition ahead of the 2003 elec-
tions, and decided to withhold aid funds dedicated to supporting the elec-
tions (Kimonyo et  al. 2004; Hayman 2008, 172). During the EDF 
mid-term review in 2004, the EU argued that it would not increase aid 
funds due to Rwanda’s limited progress on governance reforms (European 
Union 2004b, 16). The mid-term review rated Rwanda’s performance on 
governance reforms as ‘insufficient’ (European Union 2004b, 15).4
Beyond these material incentives, the EU criticised the governance 
situation in several public statements and non-public démarches 
(Table 3.2). The EU had issued a common position in 1998, which it 
renewed several times. The common position identified support for dem-
ocratic reforms and human rights as a key objective of the EU’s policies in 
Rwanda (European Union 2002). It used declarations and presidency 
statements to raise concerns regarding the human rights situation. In a 
strong public statement published in the autumn of 2004, for instance, 
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the EU criticised deteriorations in the governance situation (European 
Union 2004a).
The Rwandan Government’s Responsiveness: Reluctant 
Engagement
In response to the EU’s demands to cooperate on governance reforms, 
the Rwandan government reluctantly started to engage with the EU in the 
implementation of governance instruments. Already in the early 2000s, 
the Rwandan government was slightly more forthcoming in engaging 
with the EU than Ethiopia and Angola, as we will see in the next 
chapters.
 Rwanda’s Responsiveness: Political Dialogue and Aid Policy Dialogues
Political dialogue with the EU remained ad hoc and informal until 2004. 
High-level government officials participated in the dialogue. The govern-
ment agreed to discuss a broad range of issues related to democratic and 
effective governance reforms as well as regional peace and security. In con-
trast to Ethiopia and Angola, the Rwandan government agreed to establish 
benchmarks to measure progress on governance reforms as part of a for-
mal political dialogue (European Commission and Rwanda 2005; 
European Union 2004b, 17). The government agreed to hold two Article 
8 dialogue meetings in 2005, during which it discussed with the EU the 
abolition of the death penalty in the context of the Gacaca trials, the trans-
fer of the génocidaire from the international criminal tribunal in Arusha to 
Rwanda and problems related to Interahamwe rebels in Eastern Congo 
who fled to the DRC after the genocide (Euréval and PRODEV 2006).
Table 3.2 EU statements and démarches related to governance reforms 
2000–2011
2000–2005 2006–2011 Total
Positive Critical Positive Critical
EU public statements on governance reforms 4 6 3 1 14
Démarches – 3 – 1  4
Source: Author’s compilation, based on EU annual human rights reports and documents published by the 
Council of the EU
C. HACKENESCH
 55
Beyond the Article 8 political dialogue, the Rwandan government 
reluctantly started to engage with donors in governance reforms during 
aid policy dialogues. Parallel to the international effectiveness agenda, 
which had emerged from the early 2000s with the Millennium Development 
Goals and the high-level fora on aid effectiveness, donors started to 
improve their aid coordination structures at country level and intensified 
aid policy dialogues with developing-country governments (Whitfield and 
Fraser 2009). Rwanda was one of the few African countries that agreed 
early on to institutionalise aid policy dialogues with the EU and other 
donors (Hayman 2006).5 As part of these aid policy dialogue meetings, 
the government reluctantly agreed to address governance reforms.6 It was 
slightly more willing to address governance issues as part of its aid policy 
dialogues with the EU and other donors than Ethiopia and particularly 
Angola. For instance, in contrast to Ethiopia, the Rwandan government 
was willing to set up specific aid policy dialogues with an explicit focus on 
governance reforms, for instance, to discuss the elections, support for the 
Supreme Court or Gacaca jurisdiction (Euréval and PRODEV 2006).
 Rwanda’s Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid
The Rwandan government reluctantly agreed to implement governance 
aid and to include positive conditionality in its engagement with the 
EU. Together with the UK, the EU was the driving force in negotiating a 
new budget support agreement with Rwanda in 2003 (Hayman 2006, 
79f). The government accepted benchmarks to assess progress on public 
financial management and transparency of government finance in the 
agreement. Yet, despite pressure from the EU and the UK, Rwanda did 
not agree to include objectives related to democratic reforms, such as free 
and fair elections (Hayman 2006).
Rwanda reluctantly accepted financial and technical aid from the EU 
and other donors targeted to promote governance reforms. The govern-
ment agreed to allocate a portion of funds from the eighth EDF to sup-
port governance reforms. An analysis of joint annual reports on the 
implementation of EU aid to Rwanda (2001, 2002 and 2004) as well as 
the EDF mid-term review (European Union 2004b, 8) and an indepen-
dent evaluation of the EU’s aid to Rwanda (Euréval and PRODEV 2006) 
suggests that governance aid projects were implemented relatively 
smoothly and with few delays. Until the end of 2005, the bulk of EU aid 
allocated to governance reforms was disbursed (Euréval and PRODEV 
2006, 57; European Union 2004b, 8).
 RWANDA 
56 
Moreover, compared to Ethiopia and Angola, Rwanda was more open 
to assistance that aimed at supporting the effectiveness and democratic 
quality of decision-making processes. For instance, the government 
engaged with the EU in public financial management reform. It agreed to 
use the bulk of EU aid earmarked for supporting governance reforms for 
the rehabilitation of the judiciary, prisons, the parliament and other govern-
ment buildings (European Commission and Rwanda 2003, 51f; 2005, 14).
In addition, the government accepted support from the EU and other 
donors to assist the constitutional referendum and the parliamentary and 
presidential elections, for instance, by fostering the human and adminis-
trative capacities of the national electoral commission (European 
Commission 2009). It also welcomed the EU election observer mission to 
monitor the 2003 elections, and accepted support from the EU and other 
donors for democratic institutions such as the Human Rights Commission 
(CNDH) that had been established in 1999, even though the CNDH’s 
budget remained largely financed by the government itself (Kimonyo 
et  al. 2004, 44f, 51f). Government institutions such as the National 
Commission for Unity and Reconciliation (NURC) also benefited from 
the EU and other donors’ support (Kimonyo et  al. 2004). Rwanda 
accepted support from the EU and other donors for drafting the legal 
framework for these and other institutions such as the Ombudsman or the 
Office of the Auditor-General of Public Finance.
To summarise, the EU adopted a relatively broad approach and sought 
to promote democratic government in the early 2000s. The EU not only 
attempted to support the effectiveness of government institutions, but 
also the democratic quality of decision-making processes. Moreover, the 
EU used a cooperative-critical strategy and put pressure on the Rwandan 
government to open political spaces. The Rwandan government, in turn, 
started to reluctantly engage. One would assume that since the EU sought 
to promote a broad understanding of good governance and used a 
cooperative- critical approach, cooperation on governance reforms would 
become quite costly for Rwanda. It is thus surprising that Rwanda reluc-
tantly started to engage with the EU in the early 2000s.
The Rwandan Government’s Survival Strategies
 Strong Domestic Opposition and Threats to Regime Survival
The EU’s demands to cooperate on governance reforms coincided with 
the end of the transition phase after the genocide. By the early 2000s, the 
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Rwandan government had re-established basic domestic security and its 
monopoly on power (Waugh 2004; Reyntjens 2009; Prunier 2009). Basic 
economic development had resumed; by the early 2000s, economic devel-
opment in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) had returned to pre- 
genocide levels (Marysse et al. 2006). Moreover, a referendum on the new 
constitution and the first presidential and parliamentary elections were 
finally scheduled for 2003 after having been postponed several times.
At the same time, the Rwandan government faced mounting domestic 
opposition during the early 2000s. Rwandan (and international) civil soci-
ety organisations and the media increasingly voiced concern that the 
peace-building process was not accompanied by higher levels of political 
liberalisation and political competition. Moreover, several members of the 
‘government of national unity’7 defected, suggesting that the Rwandan 
leadership’s attempts to broaden its support base were failing (Waugh 
2004; Reyntjens 2013). Some former members of the government—
moderate Hutu and Tutsi survivors—went into exile. Others joined the 
domestic opposition, for instance, the  Republican Democratic Movement 
(MDR), the largest opposition party (Waugh 2004). The former president 
Bizimungu, a Hutu member of the RPF who became president of the 
‘government of national unity’ in 1994, also openly challenged Kagame. 
Bizimungu resigned in 2000 to establish his own party, the Parti 
Democratique pour le Renouveau (PDR), to create a political alternative 
to the RPF (Reyntjens 2004). In addition, the Rwandan government 
faced some—albeit limited—external security threats. In 2001, the Forces 
démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel movement active 
in the eastern part of the DRC and composed of former Interahamwe and 
génocidaire who fled to the DRC after the genocide, attacked Rwanda 
(Longman 2004, 75; International Crisis Group 2009).
 Survival Strategies: Building the Foundation for State Reform, 
Managing Arenas of Contestation and Using Low-intensity Coercion
With the end of the transition phase after the genocide, strengthening the 
effectiveness of government institutions to improve public goods  provision 
became a high priority for the Rwandan government, and it launched a civil 
service reform (Hausman 2011). The effectiveness of the government 
slightly improved in the early 2000s and the level of corruption remained 
low (see Fig.  3.3 later). In addition, the government established several 
 democratic oversight institutions such as the national electoral commission, 
the Ombudsman’s office and the Commission on Human Rights.8  
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Some observers question their impartiality and claim that these democratic 
oversight institutions remained relatively weak. The first Ombudsman, for 
instance, was one of President Kagame’s closest allies, one of the RPF found-
ing members and later the RPF secretary-general.9
The Rwandan leadership responded to the growing domestic opposi-
tion by substantially limiting political spaces. Low-intensity coercion was 
used to secure the RPF’s and President Kagame’s victory in the elections. 
The MDR, the most important opposition party, was banned ahead of the 
2003 referendum and elections (Reyntjens 2004). The former president 
Bizimungu could not run in the elections; he was arrested in 2003 and 
later sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment (Beswick 2010, 235). Finally, 
press freedom was further restricted (Reyntjens 2004).
The referendum on the new constitution and presidential and parlia-
mentary elections in 2003 constituted an important arena for members of 
the opposition, civil society and the media to challenge the RPF. While 
there was little doubt that the RPF and President Kagame would be victo-
rious in the elections, winning with a considerable majority was consid-
ered to be important to signal that the RPF and President Kagame had a 
firm grip on power (Reyntjens 2004). The parliamentary and presidential 
elections finally resulted in a landslide victory for the incumbent regime. 
The RPF gained about 73 per cent of the votes and President Kagame was 
elected with more than 90 per cent.
After the elections, spaces for the media and civil society organisations 
were further reduced. A new and quite restrictive law that required civil 
society organisations to register with the government had already been 
passed in 2001. In June 2004, a parliamentary commission on ‘genocide 
ideology’ accused some of the most prominent domestic and international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) of promoting ethnic division. 
Leading figures of LIPRODHOR (Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et 
la Defense des Droits de l’Homme), the most important independent 
human rights organisation, left the country (Longman 2011).
When the EU approached Rwanda to engage in governance reforms in 
the early 2000s, the government was preoccupied with reinforcing formal 
political institutions and putting more emphasis on economic growth and 
public goods provision. EU assistance to support the effectiveness of gov-
ernment institutions thus aligned with the government’s preferences. At 
the same time, ahead of the 2003 elections, the Rwandan government 
faced growing opposition and political competition from former members 
of government. The government used low-intensity coercion to respond 
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to the growing opposition. In this context, the EU’s attempts to promote 
input legitimacy have generated substantial costs and only very limited 
benefits.
Rwanda: Strongly Aid Dependent on the EU in the Early 2000s
The EU started asking the Rwandan government to cooperate on 
governance reforms during a period when Rwanda was also highly 
dependent on EU aid. Engaging with the EU in governance reforms 
thereby yielded important direct economic benefits for Rwanda. The 
EU is also an important trading partner and source of direct invest-
ments. Yet, trade and investments still make up a small share of 
Rwanda’s GDP.
During the past decade, real GDP growth averaged about 8 per cent 
per annum and Rwanda has been one of the fastest growing economies 
not only in Africa but also beyond. Yet, GDP growth was, to an important 
extent, driven by aid inflows (Marysse et al. 2007). Rwanda’s aid depen-
dence has been very high if measured by the share of aid to gross national 
income (GNI). Between 2000 and 2005, development aid accounted for 
18–24 per cent of GNI (Fig. 3.1), making Rwanda one of the most aid- 
dependent countries in Africa. Rwanda is also strongly aid dependent if 
measured by the share of government revenues. Between 2000 and 2005, 
development aid accounted for about one-third of government revenues; 
Rwanda’s domestic tax base has been very low in comparison to other 
African countries.
After the genocide, and particularly since 2000, Rwanda saw a shift in 
its international relations. Traditional partners such as France or Belgium 
that had supported the old regime even during the genocide, considerably 
reduced their engagement. Other donors such as the EU and the UK, in 
turn, scaled up their support. Between 2000 and 2012, the EU institu-
tions, together with the World Bank, the USA and the UK, have been the 
largest donors to Rwanda (Fig. 3.2). In terms of financial volume, the EU 
as a whole (EU institutions and member states) was the largest donor 
between 2000 and 2005. Aid provided by the EU institutions to Rwanda 
in that time accounted for about 26 per cent of total OECD DAC donors’ 
aid. The EU institutions started to channel aid through direct budget sup-
port in 2003 and directed significant shares of their aid to infrastructure 
and social services, such as healthcare and education.
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The EU and other Western donors’ willingness to substantially 
increase aid to Rwanda can at least partly be explained by Western feel-
ings of guilt for not intervening in Rwanda during the genocide of 1994. 
Moreover, the Rwandan government has very actively embraced the 
international aid effectiveness agenda as it emerged in the early 2000s 
(Hayman 2009).
The EU was the most important destination for Rwandan exports until 
the mid-2000s. Yet, the overall volume of exports and its share of GDP 
has been quite small. Rwanda has a large trade deficit that has grown con-
siderably over time. Some argue that Rwanda was able to finance its 
imports mainly due to substantial access to development aid (Marysse 
et al. 2006; IMF 2013); much of it from the EU. By the early 2000s, pro-
duction of coffee and tea—Rwanda’s two major export commodities—
was at pre-genocide levels, and exports had resumed (Oomen 2005, 900). 
Tea and coffee account for more than 50 per cent of Rwanda’s exports. 
Furthermore, the EU has been one of the largest investors in Rwanda. Yet, 
the overall level of direct investments in Rwanda had been very low in the 
















































Fig. 3.1 Net ODA as a share of GNI in Rwanda
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Fig. 3.2 ODA flows to Rwanda (disbursements in USD million)
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee Aid statistics (2016); author’s 
compilation
In the early 2000s, the EU thus became one of the most important 
donors to Rwanda. It channelled aid through modalities and to sectors 
that largely matched the preferences of the Rwandan government. Rwanda 
therefore had a strong interest in closely cooperating with the EU. These 
benefits that cooperation with the EU ‘beyond’ governance reforms 
entailed compensated for the costs that cooperation on governance 
reforms produced. Its dependence on EU aid can thus explain why 
Rwanda reluctantly started to engage in the early 2000s, even though 
cooperation was risky for regime survival. Yet, this argument would be 
even stronger if one could control for alternative explanations, such as 
access to cooperation with China.
China: No Alternative Cooperation Partner in the Early 2000s
In contrast to the EU, China has played a limited role as an economic 
cooperation partner or as a partner to support the Rwandan government’s 
survival strategies. Between 2000 and 2005, China’s cooperation with 
Rwanda was very limited.
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When the EU started to foster cooperation on governance reforms in 
the early 2000s, bilateral trade between Rwanda and China as well as 
Chinese foreign direct investments in Rwanda were close to zero 
(Fig. 3.4). Moreover, Rwanda’s access to Chinese grants and loans has 
been very restricted. China supported a few infrastructure projects, such 
as road construction, the renovation of the stadium in Kigali and the 
extension of a nursing school (Table 3.3). The financial volume of Chinese 
projects is difficult to estimate and directly compare with the EU’s aid, as 
official data cannot be accessed. For the period between 2000 and 2004, 
interviews with Rwandan and Chinese government officials10 and a press 
analysis give no insights into the financial volume of China’s aid projects. 
However, the list of projects (Table 3.3) strongly suggests that the vol-
ume of Chinese aid between 2000 and 2005 has been negligible com-
pared to the EU’s aid.
Beyond economic cooperation, engagement with China has not pro-
vided the Rwandan government with an alternative to the EU with regard 
to cooperating on the government’s survival strategies. Exchanges 
between the RPF and the CCP have remained relatively limited (Fig. 3.5 
Table 3.3 Chinese aid projects 2000–2005
Year Type of project Financial 
volume
2002 Construction of Kibungo hospital and nursing school 
(Ngoma District); extension of the school (in 2004/2005)
USD 7 
million grant
2003 Joint China–Rwanda agriculture cooperation project: 




Construction of CIMERWA Cement factory, operated by a 
Chinese company on behalf of the Rwandan government;  









2001 Construction of Kinyinya-Nyarutarama and Kinyinya- 




Commodities aid (food aid; office equipment and relief) –
2004 Construction of conference hall ‘Prime Holdings’ –
2005 Construction of Ministry of Foreign Affairs USD 8.9 
million grant
Source: Author’s compilation, based on data from MOFCOM, aid transparency initiative, The New Times 
and BBC monitoring international reports
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below), and China has not assisted Rwanda in strengthening the effective-
ness of government institutions, managing arenas of contestation or using 
coercion.
3.3  rwanda proactively engaging with the eu 
in the late 2000S deSpite china looming
Between 2006 and 2011, the EU continued to promote democratic gov-
ernment. At the same time it shifted its instruments from a cooperative- 
critical to a cooperative-rewarding strategy. The Rwandan government, in 
turn, has become very active, and at times proactive about engaging with 
the EU in governance reforms.
The EU’s Good Governance Strategies Between 2006 and 2011
 The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Government
In the years between 2006 and 2011, the EU continued to promote dem-
ocratic government. The EU highlighted the importance of improving the 
electoral process, strengthening the separation of powers and enhancing 
access to justice (Government of the Republic of Rwanda and European 
Commission 2007). The EU used several channels of communication 
with the government to address issues of democratic and, to a lesser extent, 
effective governance reforms. During Article 8 political dialogue meet-
ings, the EU raised concerns regarding limitations of freedom of speech, 
press freedom and the revision of the media law, shortcomings in the elec-
toral process, judicial reform and the Gacaca or the abolition of the death 
penalty (European Commission and Rwanda 2008).
OECD aid statistics illustrate that the EU’s governance aid remained 
stable in the second half of the 2000s (Table 3.1). OECD aid statistics also 
suggest that the EU put a strong emphasis on supporting input legitimacy. 
Between 2006 and 2010, the EU directed almost all governance aid to 
support democratic reforms, a large part of which was allocated to support 
justice sector reform, as will be documented below.
The EU continued to put little emphasis on the transnational channel. 
In the country strategy paper for the 10th EDF, support to non-state 
actors was not identified as an explicit objective of the EU’s policies, and 
the amount of assistance allotted to supporting civil society actors through 
the EDF has been small. Engagement with non-state actors was conceived 
of as a cross-cutting issue in the strategy paper rather than a direct objec-
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tive of the EU’s aid to Rwanda (Government of the Republic of Rwanda 
and European Commission 2007, 47). Only around 2010 did the EU 
start to design a programme to support non-state actors through the EDF.
The EU gave some aid to non-state actors through the EIDHR (Table 3.4). 
Yet, a significant share of EU aid targeted international NGOs based in France, 
Germany or Belgium rather than Rwandan NGOs. Furthermore, the EIDHR 
project descriptions11 suggest that most EIDHR funds channelled to Rwandan 
NGOs were used to support justice reform and the reconciliation process. EU 
support for civil society organisations engaged in the justice sector aimed at 
supporting the effectiveness and efficiency of the justice system, rather than 
the independence of the judiciary or other elements of horizontal account-
ability. In contrast, the EU only provided a limited amount of aid through the 
EIDHR that focused on promoting freedom of the press or of association.12
 The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Rewarding
Around 2005 the EU modified its strategy from cooperative-critical to 
cooperative-rewarding. The EU increasingly refrained from putting pres-
sure on Rwanda, but instead rewarded the government through additional 
development aid, via aid modalities such as budget support and public 
rhetorical support. By increasing development aid and through its choice 
of aid modalities, the EU signalled to Rwanda that it viewed the political 
situation as generally positive.
In 2006, the EU rewarded Rwanda for its compliance with the require-
ments of the governance incentive tranche with a 30 per cent aid increase. 
This is the highest possible tranche, received by only five African coun-
tries (European Commission and Rwanda 2008, 1). In 2009, Rwanda 
was the first African country to which the EU offered an ‘MDG con-
tract’—a special form of direct budget aid with higher aid levels and long-
term predictability.13 During the 2009 EDF mid-term review, the EU 
increased aid levels by 30 per cent (€89 million). Rwanda is again one 
among only eight African countries where the EU raised aid funds during 
Table 3.4 EU aid to non-state actors through the EIDHR 2000–2011
2000–2005 2006–2011 Total
Volume in USD 6,307,588 8,390,594 14,698,182
Share to local NGOs 27% 55% 43%
Number of projects 16 41 57




the mid-term review.14 About 80 per cent of EU aid to Rwanda was spent 
through direct budget aid. The head of the EU delegation in Kigali, 
Michel Arrion, explains the decision by the ‘[…] exemplary progress 
Rwanda made in recent years in good governance, sustainable develop-
ment and the fight against poverty and hunger’.15 In 2009, the EU also 
decided to channel most of its governance aid through government bud-
gets (as sector budget support), thereby signalling that it appreciates 
progress on reforms.
In contrast, deficiencies regarding democratic governance did not 
prompt the EU to exert pressure. The EU never reduced aid or shifted 
budget support to other aid modalities, unlike some EU member states.16 
In contrast to the early 2000s, it has not used public statements to openly 
criticise the government (Table 3.2). Around the parliamentary and presi-
dential elections in 2008 and 2010, the EU did not publicly express con-
cern. Instead, it mostly relied on cooperative instruments such as political 
dialogue and non-public démarches.17
The Rwandan Government’s Responsiveness:  
(Pro)Active Engagement
Between 2006 and 2011, good governance has been a prominent issue in the 
Rwandan government’s policy documents and its public discourse vis- à- vis 
donors. In public speeches, for instance, during meetings with OECD DAC 
donors, President Kagame highlighted on a regular basis that governance 
reforms constitute a key element of the government’s development strategy.18 
Compared to the period between 2000 and 2005, the Rwandan government 
engaged more actively with the EU in the implementation of governance 
instruments. In contrast to Ethiopia, and particularly Angola, Rwanda has at 
times even taken proactive initiatives to intensify cooperation on governance 
reforms with the EU and other donors.19
 Rwanda’s Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues
The Rwandan government continued to engage in a regular and compre-
hensive formal political dialogue with the EU between 2006 and 2012. It 
has conducted political dialogue with the EU at the minister of foreign 
affairs level and invited relevant representatives from other line ministries 
or government institutions, depending on the issue under discussion. 
Dialogue took place on a regular basis up to four times a year, a frequency 
which has reportedly been in the interest of both sides.20
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During political dialogue meetings, the government has been willing to 
address a broad range of issues related to regional peace and security, 
effective government as well as democratic governance reforms. 
Participants report that the dialogue has been open and frank and has 
sometimes influenced the government’s position, for instance, in the case 
of the abolition of the death penalty in 2007 (European Commission and 
Rwanda 2008). The government was also willing to discuss sensitive issues 
such as reform of the justice sector. It discussed legislative reforms such as 
the laws on ‘genocide ideology’, ‘divisionism’ and the media that have 
been strongly criticised by human rights organisations and other interna-
tional observers (European Commission and Rwanda 2008). Even though 
it is difficult to assess the influence of these dialogue meetings on the 
government’s position, it should be noted that the government has been 
willing to discuss these issues with the EU.21 Beyond such formal dialogue 
mechanisms (and unlike Angola and Ethiopia), the government has 
allowed the EU (and other donors) very good informal access to 
decision-makers.
Compared to the early 2000s, Rwanda has also more prominently 
engaged with the EU in governance reforms as part of its aid policy dia-
logues. It continued to discuss governance reforms with the EU and other 
donors during the annual donor–government meetings.22 During these 
meetings, Rwanda presented reform progress, for instance, regarding 
justice sector reform, the fight against corruption, public financial man-
agement or decentralisation and agreed with the EU and other donors on 
reform objectives for the following year. In contrast to Ethiopia and par-
ticularly Angola, Rwanda has also maintained regular policy dialogues 
with the EU and other donors regarding specific policy and institutional 
reforms, such as justice sector or public financial management reforms as 
part of the budget support intervention.23
 Rwanda’s Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality
Rwanda defined concrete benchmarks to measure progress on governance 
reforms together with the EU and other donors. Compared to Ethiopia 
and particularly Angola, Rwanda has been much more ambitious in defin-
ing reform objectives and more actively engaged with the EU.
To comply with the EU’s requirements for receiving a ‘governance 
incentive tranche’, the government developed a comprehensive ‘gover-
nance action plan’. This plan was relatively detailed and contained tar-
gets related to political rights and civil liberties, the rule of law, the 
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effectiveness of government institutions and the fight against corruption 
(European Commission and Rwanda 2007). The government updated 
the plan for the 2008 joint annual report on EU aid to Rwanda 
(European Commission and Rwanda 2008). According to the EU’s 
assessment, Rwanda made substantial progress in complying with its 
reform commitments.24
Some interviewees suggest that debates on the governance action 
plan influenced the government’s decision to ask the EU and other 
donors to conduct a ‘joint governance assessment’.25 During a meeting 
with donors in 2006, President Kagame was critical that Rwanda’s rank 
in international governance indices was outdated and often did not 
adequately reflect Rwanda’s situation. Kagame then asked the EU and 
other donors to jointly assess the governance situation to develop a 
shared understanding and more adequate analysis on the state of 
reforms. The first joint governance assessment was published in 2008 
(Government of the Republic of Rwanda and World Bank 2008). The 
revision was not published until 2011, after lengthy and very contro-
versial discussions between the government and donors (JGA Steering 
Committee 2011). Yet, despite these difficulties, the government argu-
ably signalled its willingness to engage with the donors (Klingebiel 
2011); a very different situation to that of other African authoritarian 
governments.
 Rwanda’s Responsiveness: Governance Aid
Between 2006 and 2011, Rwanda also actively engaged with the EU in 
the implementation of governance aid. The analysis of joint annual reports 
on the implementation of EU aid to Rwanda for 2006, 2007 and 2008, 
and interviews with European and Rwandan officials suggest that the gov-
ernment actively cooperated with the EU on the implementation of gov-
ernance aid. Compared to the period between 2000 and 2005, aid 
allocated to governance reforms has been disbursed without complica-
tions. In contrast to Ethiopia and particularly Angola, Rwanda has engaged 
with the EU not only on effective but also democratic reforms.
The government agreed to allocate part of the EU’s governance aid 
funds to a programme that supports the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development in strengthening public financial management, the National 
Authorising Officer26 and the Rwandan Institute for Statistics (European 
Commission 2009, 34ff). It agreed to increase the funding for this project 
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from €6.8 million to €10 million in 2010, indicating its support for the 
project.
Rwanda agreed that a significant share of EU governance aid should 
support the justice sector. Rwanda had launched the Gacaca system in the 
early 2000s—an attempt to use traditional community-based instruments 
of justice for the reconciliation process. Even though different perceptions 
exist as to whether the initial idea for the Gacaca system came from the 
government or international actors, Rwanda took an active stance in 
implementing the Gacaca trials (Oomen 2005). Rwanda’s aid policy strat-
egy, published in 2006, requested that the EU remains one of the key 
donors for the justice sector (together with the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Germany), indicating a strong preference for EU aid to the justice sector.27 
Moreover, Rwanda developed a comprehensive reform strategy for the 
justice sector and asked the EU and other donors to channel such support 
through sector budget support. Even though Rwanda has not always fully 
complied with all reform objectives agreed upon with the EU and other 
donors, interviewees and minutes of the aid policy dialogues indicate a 
general consensus between the government and donors on reform 
progress.28
The government was open to allocating a small share of governance 
aid to support elections, the media and parliament. Together with 
other donors, the EU supported the 2008 parliamentary elections. 
Rwanda agreed that the EU would support the national electoral com-
mission ahead of the 2010 presidential and 2011 local elections 
(European Commission 2009). It agreed to allocate a small share of 
EU governance aid to support the capacities of parliamentary commit-
tees in fulfilling their function of oversight over the executive. A small 
share of aid was allocated to support the Great Lakes Media Centre and 
a vocational training centre for journalists (European Commission 
2009).
In contrast to Ethiopia, Rwanda did not openly object to the EU’s 
(arguably very limited) demands to allocate aid to non-state actors 
through the EDF or the EIDHR. A project to support non-state actors 
that is managed jointly with the National Authorising Officer was for-
mally launched in 2010 (European Commission 2009). Yet, the calls 
for proposals to fund civil society organisations were delayed, indicat-
ing a rather weak interest in the project on the Rwandan government’s 
side.29 The government seems to have a clear preference for NGOs 
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involved in the delivery of basic services, rather than advocacy activi-
ties that empower NGOs in holding the government accountable.30
To summarise, the EU has continued to promote democratic govern-
ment since 2006. However, in contrast to the early 2000s, it has been 
quite reluctant to put pressure on the Rwandan government. Instead, it 
has adopted a cooperative-rewarding strategy. Whereas in the early 2000s, 
Rwanda only reluctantly started to engage with the EU, it has been 
increasingly active in cooperating on the implementation of governance 
instruments since the mid-2000s. At times, the government has even 
taken a proactive approach and launched its own initiatives to cooperate 
with the EU and other donors on governance issues (i.e. the joint gover-
nance assessment).
It is surprising that the Rwandan government has even started to pro-
actively cooperate, in spite of the fact that the EU has not narrowed its 
approach to support merely effective government. The EU’s strategies 
alone can therefore not fully explain the changes in the responsiveness of 
the Rwandan government. The following sections will show that the 
Rwandan government’s willingness to proactively engage with the EU is 
influenced by its survival strategies, its dependence on the EU as well as 
the continuously limited access to cooperation with China.
The Rwandan Government’s Survival Strategies
 A Period of Regime Stability with Few Threats to Regime Survival
In contrast to the early 2000s, between 2006 and 2011, the Rwandan 
leadership experienced a period of relative stability with few challenges 
from domestic political opponents. Even though the leadership’s support 
coalition has further eroded, defecting members of the elite did not sub-
stantially challenge the leadership. Particularly ahead of the 2010 presi-
dential elections, several high-level members of the RPF went into exile, 
suggesting an erosion of the core support base of the regime. Defectors 
included close allies of President Kagame, senior officers of the armed 
forces and the intelligence services who played an important role during 
the RPF’s invasion of Rwanda in the early 1990s (Cooke 2011; EIU 
2011). Rumours about a coup d’état spread in Kigali in 2010, spurred on 
by a string of grenade attacks. However, former members of the RPF’s 
inner circle made limited attempts to organise a political opposition to 
Kagame (Cooke 2011; EIU 2011).
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Moreover, domestic opposition from outside the ruling elite was lim-
ited between 2006 and 2011. No major opposition party was formed and 
the Rwandan government faced little criticism from domestic NGOs.31 
No major public demonstrations were held, where people expressed their 
dissatisfaction and openly challenged government policies. Instead, public 
opinion polls seem to suggest that Rwandans were quite happy with their 
government.32 According to Gallup polls (2013), 95 per cent of Rwandans 
had confidence in their government in 2009 and 94 per cent approved of 
their government in 2012.
External opposition, such as rebel groups in the DRC, also did not pose 
a major threat to regime stability. The military strength of the FDLR was 
considerably reduced.33 However, the FDLR has remained a political chal-
lenge. While the RPF government made substantial efforts to overcome 
ethnic polarisation, a rebel movement close to the Rwandan border that 
aims to fuel ethnic tensions, directly challenges this policy.34 The leader-
ship in Kigali thus has a strong interest in minimising security risks (Silva- 
Leander 2008; Prunier 2009, 322).
Between 2006 and 2011, the strongest opposition probably came from 
international NGOs, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch 
and the International Crisis Group. These NGOs published several very 
critical and influential reports that accused the Rwandan government of 
not respecting basic political and civil rights.35 Yet, most international 
NGOs have left the country and thus direct their reports at an interna-
tional rather than domestic audience within Rwanda.
 Survival Strategies I: Strengthening the Effectiveness of Government 
Institutions to Improve Public Goods Provision
Since 2006, the Rwandan government has substantially invested in devel-
oping a rational-legal and meritocratic bureaucracy. Reforms of govern-
ment institutions were geared towards raising more domestic revenues 
and improving public goods provision.
Rwanda launched a second major civil service and administration 
reform in the mid-2000s (Hausman 2011). Between 1998 and 2009, the 
number of central government staff was cut by 90 per cent and salaries for 
those who remained tripled.36 A public service commission was created in 
2007 to standardise civil service recruitment and to establish safeguards 
against patronage. To improve service delivery and define policy priorities, 
the government also introduced annual leadership retreats in the mid- 
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2000s that bring together high-level officials from various branches of the 
government (Iyer 2012).
Rwanda initiated reforms to improve the management of domestic rev-
enues. It introduced an ambitious public financial management reform in 
the mid-2000s to improve all stages of the budget cycle, and it gave the 
Rwanda Revenue Authority and the Auditor-General more powers 
(Klingebiel and Mahn 2011). These reforms quickly yielded results. 
Rwanda considerably improved its performance on the Public Expenditures 
and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicators between 2008 and 2010.37 
Observers argue that (in contrast to many other African countries) these 
reforms were mostly put forward by the government and not enforced by 
donors (ibid).
Rwanda kicked off a major administrative and fiscal decentralisation 
programme (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012, 433). Responsibility for the 
delivery of public services, such as education, healthcare or road construc-
tion was partly transferred to the local level (Hausman 2011). Along with 
the decentralisation efforts, the central government introduced measures 
to hold local officials accountable for their actions. The so-called imihigo 
performance contracts allow the leadership to condition rewards and 
resources on local authorities’ success in promoting economic growth, 
and strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of the bureaucracy. Yet, 
they also allow the leadership in Kigali to better control local authorities 
and to expand political influence. For instance, imihigo contracts include 
goals related to voter mobilisation. Critics therefore argue that rather than 
increasing accountability of local officials towards the population, these 
performance contracts bolster accountability chains between Kigali and 
local authorities (Ingelaere 2010, 433; 2011, 67f; Ansoms 2009; Ansoms 
and Rostagno 2012).
These various efforts to advance the effectiveness of Rwandan govern-
ment institutions are reflected in considerable improvements in interna-
tional governance indices. According to the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, government effectiveness and control of corruption have sig-
nificantly ameliorated since 2005. Rwanda is among the best-performing 
countries across Africa in these areas (Fig. 3.3) and performs better than 
Ethiopia and particularly Angola.
The government’s efforts to enhance the effectiveness of government 
institutions were geared towards both increasing and improving the deliv-
ery of services and the provision of public goods. Since the mid-2000s, 
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the government has considerably increased its spending on social services 
such as healthcare, education and social protection in line with the priori-
ties defined in its national development strategies. For instance, public 
spending on healthcare as a share of total government expenditure has 
been high (more than 10 per cent per annum), according to the World 
Development Indicators. Rwanda’s spending on social services ranks con-
siderably above the average in sub-Saharan Africa, and above Ethiopia and 
Angola.
The government’s efforts to boost public goods provision have shown 
rapid results. Household surveys conducted between 2000 and 2012 sug-
gest that poverty in urban as well as rural areas has been considerably 
reduced since the mid-2000s (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012).38 With a Gini 
coefficient of 0.49 in 2011, Rwanda is still one of the most unequal coun-
tries in the world. Yet, over time inequality has at least slightly decreased, 
from 0.51  in 2000 and 0.52  in 2006 (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012). 
Rwanda has been one of the few African countries that achieved most of 
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Fig. 3.3 Government effectiveness and control of corruption in Rwanda




Rwandan citizens also perceive the government’s policies to be quite 
successful. According to Gallup polls (2013), 78 per cent of Rwandans 
had confidence in their healthcare system in 2007; in 2012, 76 per cent of 
Rwandans were satisfied with their education system. Moreover, 86 per 
cent of Rwandans felt that the national economy was improving.
 Survival Strategies II: Using Arenas of Contestation and Low-intensity 
Coercion to Prevent Challenges from the Opposition
In the years between 2005 and 2011, arenas of contestation, such as elec-
tions or reforms in the justice sector, allowed the government to signal its 
firm grip on power. Moreover, the government used low-intensity coer-
cion and a gradual closing of political spaces to prevent challenges to 
regime survival.
Parliamentary elections in 2008 and presidential elections in 2010 did not 
confront the government with a major opposition challenge, but instead 
allowed the incumbent regime to tighten its grip on power. After banning the 
Republican Democratic Movement MDR ahead of the 2003 elections, chal-
lenges from opposition parties during the 2008 parliamentary elections were 
very limited (Reyntjens 2010, 11f). Winning the elections with a substantial 
majority was thus no major difficulty, and international observers found that 
the election process itself had been relatively free (European Union 2008). 
Some observers suggest that the government was even too successful at the 
ballot box. They suspect that the RPF actually received almost 98 per cent of 
the votes, but decided to downplay the official results to 76 per cent to appear 
less autocratic (Stroh 2008; Hayman 2011; Reyntjens 2010; Longman 
2011). The strong results for the RPF signal to regime opponents that organ-
ising a political alternative would have limited chances of success. The over-
whelming majority in the 2010 presidential elections was also not questioned 
(Reyntjens 2010). With 93.8 per cent of the votes, Kagame gained a landslide 
victory.
The Rwandan government made justice sector reforms, and particu-
larly the Gacaca process, a priority (see, e.g. Brown 2010; Samset 2011 for 
the following). The RPF had arrested about 120,000 people on suspicion 
of being involved in the genocide. The civil war and the genocide had 
largely destroyed the judicial system. To cope with the large number of 
culprits and to establish a system of justice rooted in Rwanda’s traditional 
society, the government initiated the Gacaca processes in 1998; first trial 
courts were established in 2002. The Gacaca system effectively started in 
2005, and by 2010 most detainees had stood trial. The justice system 
 RWANDA 
74 
undoubtedly faced tremendous challenges in coping with the conse-
quences of genocide. However, several experts stated that the Gacaca pro-
cess had been instrumentalised by the ruling party and ultimately reinforced 
the RPF’s grip on power.40
The Rwandan government applied various measures of low-intensity 
coercion to prevent potential opposition. It relied on the laws on ‘division-
ism’ (2001), ‘genocide ideology’ (2008) and a new media law (2009), to 
limit political opposition, challenges from civil society organisations or the 
media (Beswick 2010; Samset 2011). In addition to these legal measures, 
the government also used more informal tactics such as harassment, arrests 
or ‘disappearances’ of opposition candidates to further limit political 
spaces (Beswick 2010; Samset 2011). Ahead of the 2010 presidential elec-
tions, for instance, Victoire Ingabire, the most prominent opposition can-
didate who sought to challenge Kagame at the ballot box was arrested on 
charges of ‘divisionism’. After an internationally contested trial, a Rwandan 
tribunal sentenced her to eight years in prison in 2012. In January 2014, 
the court extended her sentence to 15 years’ imprisonment.
Between 2006 and 2011, Rwanda has thus experienced a period of 
limited challenges from the opposition. The government used low- 
intensity coercion to prevent such challenges; it heavily invested in the 
effectiveness of government institutions and faced limited challenges when 
managing arenas of contestation such as elections or the judiciary. EU 
demands to cooperate on strengthening the effectiveness of government 
institutions and the democratic quality of decision-making processes 
matched the government’s preferences. EU demands to address measures 
of low-intensity coercion entailed few costs. Analysing Rwanda’s interest 
in engaging with the EU in governance reforms by focusing on EU good 
governance strategies and the Rwandan government’s domestic survival 
strategies cannot fully explain why Rwanda became not only increasingly 
active, but at times even proactive, in engaging on governance reforms 
between 2006 and 2011. One therefore also needs to consider Rwanda’s 
broader interests in cooperating with the EU and opportunities to engage 
with alternative partners such as China.
Rwanda’s Economic Dependence on the EU
Between 2006 and 2011, Rwanda remained strongly dependent on the 
EU and was as dependent on the EU as it was between 2000 and 2005. It 
was (again) clearly more dependent on the EU than Angola and Ethiopia.
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Aid as a share of Rwanda’s GNI slightly reduced compared to the early 
2000s. Yet, it still accounted for 18–20 per cent of GNI (Fig. 3.1), making 
Rwanda one of the most aid-dependent countries in Africa. The share of 
aid increased to about 50 per cent of government revenues and to 40–50 
percent of the government’s budget (IMF 2013, 22).
On the other hand, Rwanda’s domestic tax base (direct and indirect 
taxes) stayed quite small. The government’s efforts to improve domestic 
tax systems did, however, bear some fruit. Since 2005, revenues from 
direct and indirect taxes grew considerably. Yet, they still account for a 
relatively small share of overall revenue. Rwanda’s overall tax revenue also 
remained below both the regional and sub-Saharan African average (IMF 
2013, 21). Rwanda has very little access to non-tax revenues, since it has 
very few natural resource deposits that can be exploited.
Since the mid-2000s, the Rwandan government has continued to 
actively embrace the international aid effectiveness agenda. President 
Kagame has been very vocal in advocating the agenda, for instance, during 
the high-level meetings in Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). 
Rwanda has been among those countries that had made most progress in 
implementing their international commitments to strengthen aid effec-
tiveness.41 Rwanda actively used the international aid effectiveness agenda 
to hold the EU and other donors accountable for the commitments they 
had made in reforming their aid systems (Hayman 2009). Rwanda was the 
only African country that published an ‘aid policy strategy’, identifying 
direct budget support as Rwanda’s preferred aid modality. Donor officials 
therefore often portray and praise Rwanda as a country with an exception-
ally strong ‘ownership’ of its national development strategy and clear will-
ingness to articulate its policy preferences vis-à-vis donors; in contrast to 
other aid-dependent countries in Africa. Some have argued that Rwanda 
has considerably more control over its relations with traditional donors 
than other African countries (Hayman 2009; Whitfield 2009).42
Between 2006 and 2011, the EU institutions remained the largest 
donor to Rwanda, together with the USA, the World Bank and the 
UK. The EU institutions provided about one-quarter of Rwanda’s total 
aid (Fig. 3.2) and the EU as a whole (EU institutions and member states) 
was the largest donor to Rwanda. Cooperation with the EU has been 
attractive to Rwanda not only because of the amount of EU aid, but also 
because its aid instruments and the sectors it supports match the Rwandan 
government’s preferences. The EU institutions (and the UK) have succes-
sively raised the share of direct budget aid, giving the Rwandan govern-
 RWANDA 
76 
ment more flexibility on how to spend its aid. Together with the UK, the 
EU institutions have been at the forefront in negotiating a new budget 
support framework with the government and establishing direct budget 
support as an important aid modality in Rwanda (Hayman 2006). By 
2010, about half of all aid channelled through government budgets was 
provided as budget support. Between 2000 and 2010, the EU was the 
second-largest budget support donor after the UK. In the same period, 35 
per cent of all budget support to Rwanda was provided by the EU, most 
of it after 2005. In contrast, other large donors, such as the USA, gave 
most of their aid off the budget; humanitarian and food aid still account 
for most US aid.
The EU and other budget support donors conditioned their budget aid 
to expenditures on public goods, particularly healthcare and education. 
The previous section has illustrated that the Rwandan leadership has a 
clear interest in strengthening public goods provision to enhance support 
from the broader populace. The EU’s priorities thus strongly converge 
with the preferences of the Rwandan government.
Between 2006 and 2011, the EU was the second most important des-
tination for Rwanda’s exports after neighbouring countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Fig. 3.4). Yet, trade still has a low share of Rwanda’s GDP. Moreover, 
exports to the EU have given Rwanda limited opportunities to diversify its 
export sectors, as exports to the EU mostly consist of coffee and tea. 
Rwanda’s exports—particularly towards East African countries—have 
increased considerably since 2006, mainly due to stronger economic inte-
gration within the East African Community.
Rwanda made considerable progress in improving its regulatory frame-
work and making its business environment more attractive to foreign 
direct investments. Rwanda’s performance in the ‘Doing Business’ report 
has improved considerably; it jumped from position 158 in 2005 to posi-
tion 59 in 2012. However, these efforts have had little effect on the vol-
ume of direct investments. According to the World Development 
Indicators, FDI inflows as a share of GDP have been close to zero (and 
substantially below the average for sub-Saharan Africa) between 2000 and 
2012, with slight increases after 2008. Anecdotal evidence from inter-
views with Chinese, European and Indian entrepreneurs in Rwanda sug-
gests that several factors influence low levels of investment.43 As a 
landlocked country with weak infrastructure links towards neighbouring 
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countries, investments in Rwanda are quite expensive compared to other 
countries in the region. Moreover, even though it has become much easier 
to start a business in a relatively short time, domestic regulations often 
change (also retrospectively), making long-term planning difficult for 
investors.
Rwanda’s dependence on development aid as the main source of reve-
nue and the relative importance of EU aid, the EU’s choice of aid modali-
ties and the convergence of the EU and the Rwandan government’s 
preferences as to how to spend aid made the EU an attractive partner. Low 
costs that cooperation on governance reforms involved, in combination 
with the substantial benefits from overall aid that Rwanda received in 
return, explain why Rwanda not only reluctantly but even proactively 
cooperated with the EU on governance reforms between 2006 and 2011. 
However, this argument would—again—be even stronger if one could 








































Fig. 3.4 Rwanda’s exports to selected countries (in USD thousands)
Source: Author’s compilation, based on UNCTAD statistics (2016)
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China: Becoming More Important, But No Alternative 
Cooperation Partner (Yet)
China’s economic cooperation with Rwanda has rapidly intensified since 
2006, when the third Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
meeting was held in Beijing. Since then, aid, trade and investments have 
grown considerably. Yet, as of 2014, China had not (yet) emerged as an 
economic partner as important as the EU, and has hardly reduced 
Rwanda’s dependence on the EU and other traditional donors. Moreover, 
China provides little support to the Rwandan government’s survival strat-
egies that would compete with EU good governance policies.
 China: More Important, But No Alternative Economic Cooperation 
Partner
After 2006, when the EU and other donors started to substantially raise 
aid flows to Rwanda and shifted much of their aid to direct budget sup-
port, China has also increased its grants and interest-free and concessional 
loans (Table 3.5). Rwanda has mostly benefited from projects announced 
under the FOCAC action plans. The two rural schools, the hospital, the 
agriculture demonstration centre or the USD32 million concessional loan 
for road renovation in Kigali (Table 3.5) are all part of the 2006 FOCAC 
package. Beyond activities within the FOCAC framework, Chinese 
 projects in Rwanda include two grants to the Rwandan defence forces or 
for office equipment for the RPF.
According to Chinese and Rwandan officials, during the past few years, 
China’s annual aid budget for Rwanda was about USD30 million.44 This 
would make China a medium-sized donor to Rwanda with an aid budget 
similar to, for instance, that of Germany, but considerably smaller than 
that of the EU institutions (about €80 million annually during the past 
few years). Chinese aid is provided off the budget and information on the 
volume of aid projects is difficult to access—not only for researchers but 
also for the Rwandan government itself. China gives aid in the form of 
turnkey projects, implemented by Chinese companies and with some of 
the material sourced from China. Some Rwandan officials thus argue that 
immediate multiplier effects for the Rwandan economy through project 
implementation are limited. Chinese aid is welcomed with open arms by 
Rwandan government officials because ‘this is something that was not 
there before’,45 as one official put it. Yet, Chinese aid modalities do not 




Table 3.5 China’s aid projects 2006–2012
Year Type of project Financial volume
2006 President’s office/state house USD1.5 million grant
USD9–10 million grant
2008 Donation for earthquake victims USD50,000 grant
2008 Two primary rural schools in eastern and 
northern provinces (Rulindo and 
Gatsibo)
USD1.6 million grant
2008 Masaka Polytechnic Hospital in Kigali 
suburbs
Supplementary works for the polyclinic 
hospital
USD4 million–9.9 million grant
2008 Agricultural technical demonstration 
centre in Rubona, Huye district (rice and 
mushrooms)
USD4.5–5.3 million grant
2008 CCP donates computer and other office 
equipment to RPF
USD100,000 grant
2009 Road rehabilitation in Kigali USD32 million concessional loan
2009 For president Kagame, support for 
orphans
USD70,000 grant
2009 Confucius Institute in Kigali and grants 
scholarships
–
2010 Floating dock for Marine regiment;
two boats for Rwanda defence forces to 
protect methane gas plant on Lake Kivu
grants (volume undefined)
2010 Purpose undefined USD6 million (China 
Development Bank)
Technical cooperation for bamboo 
cultivation and craft processing
–
2011 Technical, vocational and educational 
training centre
USD11 million
2011 Purpose undefined Yuan 50 million grant; Yuan 50 
million, interest-free loan (equal to 
USD8 million each)
2012 Multinational roads: Rusizi-Karongi- 
Rubavu lot 4: Mwityazo-Ruvumbu 










Since 2006, China’s share in Rwanda’s trade has gone up rapidly. China 
has surpassed the EU in 2011 to become the second most important 
export destination after exports towards the East African Community 
(Fig. 3.4). Taking together imports and exports, China is currently the 
fifth largest trading partner after Kenya, the EU as a whole, Uganda and 
the USA.
Rwanda mostly exports minerals (ore), coffee and some tea to China. 
Trade with China has thus allowed Rwanda to increase export volumes 
and to diversify export markets. Trade with China has not (yet) opened 
new export sectors and (so far) made little contribution to diversify 
export products.46 Rwanda exports ore, coffee beans and tea leaves 
mostly as raw materials with little value added. The trade preferences that 
China has granted to African countries do not cover roasted coffee and 
packaged tea, and thus have allowed Rwanda to export only unprocessed 
commodities.47
Despite Rwandan government efforts to attract more international 
investments, particularly from China, Chinese investment flows and stocks 
have remained small. Investment data reported by Chinese and Rwandan 
officials vary substantially. According to information from the Rwanda 
Development Board, Chinese investment stock had only been at around 
USD10 million by 2011; but according to data from the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM), investment stock had been at about USD20 
million by 2010. Investment stock from the largest investors—companies 
from South Africa and Kenya—each totalled about USD100,000. Chinese 
investments are concentrated in the hospitality sector (hotels and restau-
Table 3.5 (continued)
Year Type of project Financial volume
30/12/ 
2012
Projects to be defined (information 
January 2013)
USD16 million (one or two 
grants)
USD19 million interest-free loan
Scholarships, various years –
Total committed grants and interest-fee and concessional loans between 2005 and 
December 2012 (rough estimate) USD245 million
Source: Author’s compilation based on: The New Times, BBC monitoring international reports, Chinese 
embassy website, website of Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; interviews with Chinese and Rwandan 
government officials in Kigali March/April 2010 and July 2013, Beijing July 2010 and January 2013; 
Grimm et al. (2010). If not stated otherwise, the loans listed here are provided by the China EXIM Bank.
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rants); some investments also target manufacturing, telecommunications 
and mining. Very few Chinese investments in Rwanda have seen capital 
injections from the China Africa Development Fund (CADFund).48 The 
CADFund bought shares in a media company that offers digital pay TV.49 
CADFund investments in an assembly plant for mobile phones and in a 
large hotel in Kigali were under consideration, but have not materialised.50
Only since 2011 have private company registrations and investment 
commitments grown considerably. The volume of investments is thus 
likely to grow in the medium-term.51 For instance, a new Chinese textile 
company has opened in Kigali’s special economic zone in 2014. This proj-
ect has been politically supported by the Chinese government, following a 
similar precedent in Ethiopia. The project will become another model case 
for the relocation of Chinese industries towards Africa.52
In terms of trade and official flows, China is by far the most important 
non-traditional partner for Rwanda. According to Rwandan (and Indian) 
officials, access to financial assistance from India, Brazil or South Africa has 
remained limited.53 In 2008, India extended a USD80 million conces-
sional loan for a hydropower plant on the Nyabarongo River. Another 
USD120 million concessional loan for an irrigation project has been 
approved. Similar to loans from the Chinese EXIM Bank, concessional 
loans provided by the Indian EXIM Bank are tied: 75 per cent of the goods 
and services have to be sourced in India. According to Indian officials, 
India also gives some technical assistance for capacity building.54 Rwanda’s 
economic cooperation with South Africa, Brazil or Turkey has remained 
very limited in terms of financial volume (Grimm et al. 2010).
 Chinese ‘Model’ Attractive, But Little Chinese Support for Rwanda’s 
Survival Strategies
Beyond economic cooperation, engagement with China has not provided 
the Rwandan government with an alternative to the EU with regard to 
cooperating on the government’s survival strategies. President Kagame 
has frequently made references to the attractiveness of the ‘developmental 
state’ model for Rwanda in public speeches, both domestically and abroad. 
He has mostly referred to Singapore or South Korea, but has increasingly 
also mentioned China as a potential ‘model’ for Rwanda.
However, beyond general public statements, the attractiveness of 
China’s authoritarian capitalism has not yet resulted in a closer engage-
ment between the Rwandan and Chinese elites in how to reform domes-
tic political institutions. China offers little technical assistance for 
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government institutions, for example, to improve the efficiency of gov-
ernment bureaucracy, the regulatory environment or Rwanda’s capacity 
to generate domestic tax revenue. In contrast to countries like Ethiopia, 
Rwanda sends few high-level officials to China for training. China also 
offers limited assistance to support economic reforms. For instance, 
there has been, so far, relatively little exchange on agriculture or private 
sector development. Moreover, China does not assist the Rwandan gov-
ernment in reducing political spaces. Interviews with Rwandan govern-
ment officials and an extensive press survey suggest, for instance, that 
cooperation related to human rights, the media or civil society continues 
to be very limited.55
Exchange between the RPF and the Communist Party of China has 
been regular but less intense compared to other countries like Ethiopia. 
The CCP and the RPF have established relations in 1998 and have had 
regular party-to-party meetings since then (New Times 2010). Party-to- 
party exchanges could open opportunities to discuss leadership succession 
or the strengthening of party institutions. Yet, visits took place only one 































Fig. 3.5 Annual bilateral visits RPF–CCP
Source: Author’s compilation, based on news reports from the International Department 
of the Chinese Communist Party
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other African countries, the intensity of the CCP’s relations with the RPF 
figures in the medium range. In 2010, the RPF and CCP signed a memo-
randum of understanding (MoU) in Kigali (New Times 2010). It is unclear, 
however, to what extent the MoU results in an intensification of bilateral 
relations.
3.4  a u-turn in the eu’S StrategieS in 2012 
But little change in rwanda’S reSponSiveneSS
In the summer of 2012, the EU substantially modified its strategy 
towards Rwanda. When a report published by a UN panel of experts 
accused the Rwandan government of backing rebel groups in the Eastern 
DRC (UN Group of Experts 2012), the EU institutions, the USA and 
some EU member states such as Germany, the UK and the Netherlands 
partly suspended or withheld aid funds. The EU decided to postpone 
decisions regarding new aid commitments to the transport sector (€40 
million) and to the MDG contract (€30 million) in September 2012. In 
light of pressure from some EU member states, the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) also decided to hold out on the 
signing of new aid agreements for several months. The EU and most 
other donors eventually did not reduce aid levels, but started channel-
ling funds through other aid modalities such as sector budget support 
and project aid.56
While the UN panel of experts’ report was a main reason for the EU’s 
shift in strategy, the EU’s decision was also influenced by its more critical 
view regarding the governance situation. This more critical perception had 
gradually built up since the 2010 presidential elections. The EU therefore 
did not resume general budget support, even when the Rwandan govern-
ment took a more constructive role in the peace process in Eastern 
Congo.57
Beyond the shift in the EU’s policies from a cooperative-rewarding to a 
cooperative-conflictive strategy, the EU also slightly broadened the content 
of its good governance approach after 2012. The negotiations for the 
programming of funds from the 11th EDF for the period 2014–2020 sug-
gested that the EU wants to make assistance for governance reforms a 
more prominent issue than before. Moreover, the EU placed a stronger 
emphasis on supporting non-state actors in holding the government 
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accountable, indicating a gradual shift from democratic government 
towards democratic governance.
The Rwandan government vocally criticised the EU and other donors’ 
decision to withhold budget support funds and to use aid funds as 
 leverage.58 Yet, despite the EU’s shift in strategy, the Rwandan govern-
ment has remained willing to cooperate on governance reforms and 
engage with the EU in political and aid policy dialogues and the imple-
mentation of governance aid.
Rwanda’s Survival Strategies and Economic Dependence 
on the EU
When the EU and other donors decided to use aid funds as leverage to 
exert pressure on Rwanda, the EU’s shift in strategy caused Rwanda sub-
stantial challenges. The delayed budget support funds were estimated at 
totalling about 3 per cent of GDP (IMF 2013). At least in the short-
term, the Rwandan government had difficulties in mobilising funds to 
close the budget gap and struggled to pay civil servants. In 2013, eco-
nomic growth fell to 4.7 per cent due to donor decisions to freeze aid; 
between 2000 and 2012 the economy had been growing by 8.2 per cent 
on average (EIU 2013). Even though the EU (and other donors) did 
not finally reduce aid levels, the Rwandan government went through a 
period of great uncertainty as to whether aid would eventually be 
flowing.
At the same time, when the EU and other donors shifted their strat-
egy, the Rwandan government did not face substantial threats to 
regime survival and domestic opposition. In contrast to the Ethiopian 
government in 2005 (as we will see in the next chapter), the Rwandan 
government had more room for manoeuvre to continue engaging with 
the EU in governance reforms. We have seen that at least since 2010, 
the Rwandan regime’s support coalition has been eroding further. 
Members of the Rwandan security apparatus in particular have been 
defecting (Cooke 2011). Their departure put pressure on the Rwandan 
leadership to maintain the loyalty of the security apparatus. As there 
are few sources of easy domestic revenues in Rwanda, allowing the 
military to exploit natural resources in the DRC may help to maintain 
support from key segments of the security apparatus. Indeed, observ-
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ers point to Rwanda’s economic rather than security concerns to 
explain its support of rebel movements in the DRC (Huening 2013; 
Prunier 2009, 322ff).59
Signs of a Gradual Change in China’s Policy Towards Rwanda?
Since 2012, the volume of China’s assistance and concessional loans 
has grown. Parallel to disputes over Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC 
between the Rwandan government and traditional donors, China 
announced an increase of its development aid. In September 2012, a 
few weeks after EU donors threatened to withhold parts of their aid, 
President Kagame signed a USD25 million grant and interest-free 
loan agreement during his visit in Beijing (New Times 2012). According 
to Rwandan officials, the purpose of this loan was not immediately 
defined and subject to negotiations with the Chinese government. At 
the end of December 2012, a few weeks after the UN panel of experts 
had issued its final report, the Chinese ambassador to Rwanda pledged 
another two interest-free loans amounting to USD35 million that are 
to be used for infrastructure development in Rwanda (New Times 
2012). Whereas these grants and loans are relatively small compared 
to the volume of aid used by traditional donors to pressure the 
Rwandan government into ceasing its support for rebel movements in 
the DRC, nonetheless, China’s support was timely for the Rwandan 
government.
The motives of the Chinese government for increasing its aid to Rwanda 
in 2012 remain subject to speculation. They not only coincide with the 
disputes between the Rwandan government and traditional donors but 
also with Rwanda’s election to the UN Security Council. Similar to other 
donors that tend to financially reward non-permanent members of the 
Security Council (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith 2010), China probably had an interest in closer cooperation with 
Rwanda during this period.
The Rwandan government, in turn, has clearly become more interested 
in cooperating with China; at least partly as a result of the 2012 crisis.60 By 
withholding development aid, the EU and other traditional donors gave 
the Rwandan government an ever-more prominent indication of the 
implications of aid dependence. As a result, the Rwandan government has 
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started to explore options for intensifying cooperation with China and 
other emerging economies.
Outlook: What Prospects for Strengthening Economic Cooperation 
with China?
Until the end of 2014, China’s economic cooperation with Rwanda in 
terms of aid, trade and investments has been relatively limited compared 
to Rwanda’s cooperation with the EU. What are the prospects for deepen-
ing economic relations in the short- to medium-term?
In contrast to other African countries (for instance, Ethiopia and 
Angola), Rwanda has not (yet) received commercial loans or large-scale 
concessional loans for sizable infrastructure projects from the China 
EXIM Bank or the China Development Bank. But plans to support the 
building of a railway line (and a new airport) have been pushed by the 
Rwandan government. Not least due to the small size of the Rwandan 
market and its lack of strategic natural resources, Chinese banks have 
been reluctant to extend loans in the past. If the Rwandan government 
engages more closely with other East African countries and presents a 
vision for making infrastructure projects such as an airport or a railway 
line economically viable in a regional context, finance may be extended 
in the future. However, even though the Rwandan government has been 
quite active in reaching out to China to explore opportunities for receiv-
ing more official flows, Rwandan officials also clearly see the limits of 
how much finance they can expect from China. As one Rwandan govern-
ment official put it:
We have very limited means to leverage Chinese finance. Compared to other 
African countries, Rwanda has few things to offer. We do not play in the 
same league as countries like Ethiopia or Angola.61
A similar situation exists for trade and investments. Due to the size of 
Rwanda’s market, the difficult interregional connectedness and the lim-
ited presence of strategic resources, Chinese companies tend to engage 
with neighbouring countries such as Kenya or Tanzania instead. The 
Rwandan government has been quite active in developing strategies to 
strengthen trade and investment relations with China (one example being 
the new textile company that opened in 2014), but some of the above-




Rwanda only reluctantly engaged with the EU in governance in the early 
2000s, but became increasingly willing and at times proactive after 2006. 
What explains Rwanda’s initial reluctance and the change in the Rwandan 
government’s strategy over time?
2000–2005: Why Was Rwanda Reluctant to Engage with the EU 
in Governance Reforms?
The EU’s strategies to promote governance reforms in Rwanda initially 
produced only a few benefits but entailed some costs for the Rwandan 
government. The EU’s attempts to promote the effectiveness of government 
institutions and to support the establishment of formal democratic institu-
tions partly tied in with the government’s preferences. By the early 2000s, 
the Rwandan government had restored its monopoly on power and basic 
economic development. Economic growth, public goods provision and the 
introduction of formal democratic institutions became more important pri-
orities. The 2003 referendum on the new constitution and presidential and 
parliamentary elections marked the end of the post- genocide transition 
phase. In this context, EU support for the rehabilitation of parliament, 
democratic oversight institutions, the judiciary and the reconciliation pro-
cess thus partly converged with the government’s preferences.
At the same time, the EU’s attempts to promote democratic govern-
ment and the EU’s criticism and pressure to open spaces for civil society 
and opposition parties were risky for regime stability. The EU began to ask 
Rwanda to engage in democratic reforms during a period of growing 
domestic opposition and regime instability. Ahead of the 2003 presiden-
tial and parliamentary elections, some members of the ‘government of 
national unity’ defected to the opposition to challenge and compete with 
the RPF.  The government responded by banning the MDR, the main 
opposition party, and by limiting spaces for civil society organisations and 
the media. The EU’s criticism and pressure to open political spaces thus 
put the government in a difficult position.
In light of these costs and relatively limited benefits that EU good gov-
ernance strategies generated for the Rwandan government, one would 
have expected Rwanda to refuse or only very reluctantly accept to cooper-
ate with the EU on governance reforms. However, the challenges that 
cooperation on governance reforms caused were largely compensated by 
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Rwanda’s broader interests in cooperating with the EU. Since the end of 
the 1990s, Rwanda’s aid dependence was growing rapidly and the EU 
became one of its largest donors. Rwanda thus had a strong incentive to 
start engaging with the EU in governance reforms. Moreover, in the early 
2000s, Rwanda had very limited access to official flows from China (or 
other emerging economies) which could have shaped Rwanda’s interests 
in EU development assistance.
2006–2011: Why Did Rwanda Increasingly (Pro)actively Engage?
Between 2006 and 2011, EU good governance strategies caused little cost 
but some benefit for the government. The EU continued to promote 
democratic and effective government. The EU also continued to put little 
emphasis on using the transnational channel and made few attempts to 
empower non-state actors. The EU refrained from publicly criticising the 
Rwandan government or from imposing material pressure. Instead, it 
rewarded Rwanda through higher aid levels and aid modalities such as 
budget support.
The EU’s good governance strategies thereby largely aligned with the 
preferences of the government. After the end of the transition process, 
economic growth, public goods provision and state modernisation became 
even more important pillars for the government’s legitimacy. EU demands 
to cooperate on improving the effective management of state institutions 
(i.e. public financial management reforms) thus tied in with the Rwandan 
government’s preferences. Moreover, EU support for strengthening dem-
ocratic government and input legitimacy concentrated on areas where the 
EU and the Rwandan government’s preferences largely converged. EU 
support for democratic government put a strong emphasis on promoting 
justice sector reforms, including the Gacaca process, also an important 
priority of the Rwandan government. Furthermore, the EU provided rhe-
torical and material support for the elections in 2008 and 2010, which 
bolstered the domestic and international legitimacy of the regime.
In contrast, between 2006 and 2011, the EU refrained from criticising 
the gradual closing of political spaces. From the mid-2000s onwards, the 
Rwandan regime experienced a period of relative stability with few chal-
lenges from the opposition from outside or within the country. After ban-
ning the main opposition party ahead of the 2003 elections and the 
crackdown on independent civil society organisations in 2004, domestic 
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opposition was substantially weakened. Members of the inner core of the 
elite defected (particularly after 2008) and joined the opposition or left 
the country. The Rwandan government used various strategies of low- 
intensity coercion and successfully prevented the emergence of a meaning-
ful opposition.
Between 2006 and 2011, EU good governance strategies thus entailed 
few costs but some benefits for the Rwanda government. Focusing only 
on the EU’s strategies and the Rwandan government’s survival strategies, 
however, cannot fully explain why Rwanda at times even proactively 
engaged with the EU in governance reforms. One would actually have 
expected the government to just actively engage.
To explain why Rwanda was even proactive in cooperating with the EU 
on governance reforms, one also needs to take into account Rwanda’s 
interests in cooperating with the EU ‘beyond’ governance reforms. While 
output legitimacy has become more important for Rwanda’s strategy to 
strengthen regime stability, the EU has remained important for Rwanda as 
a donor. The EU’s willingness to provide higher aid levels, to channel 
increasing shares of aid through the government’s budget and to direct 
aid to social sectors strongly coincided with the Rwandan government’s 
preferences. Rwanda thus had a strong interest in engaging with the EU.
The EU becomes even more attractive as a cooperation partner when 
taking into account that Rwanda has very limited access to cooperation 
with China (or other emerging powers). Economic cooperation between 
China and Rwanda has remained limited compared to economic coopera-
tion with the EU between 2006 and 2011. Since 2011, China has become 
Rwanda’s second-largest trading partner, after the EU, and an important 
source of direct investments. However, trade and foreign investments 
continue to account for only a small share of Rwanda’s economy. 
Furthermore, Rwanda’s engagement with China in institutional reforms 
and party-to- party contacts were also limited. Overall, cooperation with 
China is no alternative to the EU.
The 2012 Crisis and Its Aftermath: Why Has Rwanda Continued 
to Engage?
The EU shifted its strategy in 2012. It became more critical regarding the 
governance situation in Rwanda and it used budget support funds to pres-
sure the Rwandan government to cease backing rebels in the DRC. General 
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budget support was not resumed as the EU viewed the governance situa-
tion to be more critical and the preparations for Kagame’s third term was 
looming. Even though the EU’s shift in policy caused substantial difficulties 
for the Rwandan government, it continued to actively engage with the EU 
in the implementation of governance instruments between 2012 and 2014.
The conjunction of three factors explains the Rwandan government’s 
willingness to continue engaging. First, the EU and other donors put very 
strong pressure on Rwanda. Withholding aid put the government in a 
precarious position for several months, during which time it was unclear 
whether donors would eventually reduce aid levels or not. Moreover, the 
shift from budget support to sector budget support and other aid modali-
ties has caused substantial short-term costs as the government needed to 
fill the budget gap.
Second, the government could ‘afford’ to continue cooperating with 
the EU and other donors since the crisis did not originate in a substantial 
(domestic) threat to regime survival. The EU and other donors’ decision 
to rescind budget support was not a response to a situation of high- 
intensity coercion where the government had little room to manoeuvre (as 
in the case of Ethiopia in 2005, as we will see in the next chapter). Instead, 
the shift of the EU and other donors’ policies results from a gradual 
change in the perception of the Rwandan regime that has built up since 
the presidential elections in 2010 and where the UN expert report tipped 
the scale.
Third, even though Rwanda increasingly has access to cooperation with 
China, China’s grants and loans still remain small compared to the aid 
volume that the EU and other donors were withholding. China increased 
its official flows and strengthened its cooperation with Rwanda in 2012 at 
the height of the conflict between the EU and other donors and the 
Rwandan government. Moreover, the Rwandan government actively 
reached out to China (and other emerging economies) to explore options 
for deepening relations. However, it remains unclear to the government as 
to what extent China will become a more important economic coopera-
tion partner in the short- to medium-term.
What If…?
Counterfactual arguments are merely a ‘thought experiment’ (Tetlock and 
Belkin 1996), but they can make a contribution to strengthening the 
argumentation. What if the EU had broadened its good governance 
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approach over time from democratic government to democratic governance 
and what if the EU had continued to use a cooperative-critical approach 
between 2006 and 2011? If the EU had put more emphasis on empower-
ing civil society organisations vis-à-vis the government, EU strategies 
would have generated substantially more costs for the regime. If the EU 
had used more critical public statements and withheld aid to put pressure 
on the government, for instance, after the 2008 or 2010 elections, this 
would have entailed substantial direct costs for the government and might 
have empowered opposition and non-state actors.
What if Rwanda had already had much more access to cooperation with 
China in the early 2000s or at least between 2006 and 2014? The Rwandan 
government’s willingness to proactively engage with the EU (and other 
donors) in governance reforms was part of its efforts to maximise access to 
development aid funds. Rwanda was very active in shaping and imple-
menting the international aid effectiveness agenda, at least partly in order 
to receive more aid. If China had already been a major partner to engage 
with Rwanda in the early or mid-2000s, the Rwandan government might 
still have engaged with the EU in governance reforms. However, it is pos-
sible that the government would have been less proactive in cooperating 
on governance reforms.
Outlook
The case of Rwanda documents that the domestic logic of political survival 
in authoritarian regimes has important consequences for what the EU can 
achieve with its good governance strategy. Since the mid-2000s, the 
Rwandan government has very actively embraced the good governance 
agenda and actively cooperated with the EU (and other donors) on gov-
ernance reforms, at least partly with a view to position itself as an aid dar-
ling and increase access to development aid funds. In countries like 
Rwanda, where the government has not been politically challenged 
domestically since 2006, and where the government was generally willing 
to engage with the EU in governance reforms, the EU (and other donors) 
may have had more room to manoeuvre in urging for political reforms. 
Until 2012 the EU has been highly reluctant to pressure the government 
not to further reduce political spaces. As with other donors, the EU thus 
contributed little to counter the gradual closure of political spaces since 
2006, to avoid the hardening of authoritarian structures and to prevent 
the constitutional change that has allowed President Kagame to continue 




1. According to figures from the UNHCR, about 100,000 refugees returned 
from Uganda in 1994. Based on OAU and US State Department reports, 
Sarkin (2001) reports the growing dominance of Tutsi in the government 
(see also Silva-Leander (2008) and Ansoms (2009, 294)).
2. This observation is consistent with findings on authoritarian regimes. 
Political leaders generally prefer small coalitions. Yet, in light of mass 
movements, elite conflicts or severe social conflicts during the early stages 
of state formation, they are under pressure to broaden their coalition. This 
argument has been made, for instance, in the case of Asian states (Doner 
et al. 2005).
3. The minutes of these meetings can be found online at http://www.
devpartners.gov.rw/, last access on 3 June 2015.
4. The EU uses three main criteria to decide on the allocation of EDF funds 
and increases or reductions in EDF funds during the mid- and end-term 
review: the governance situation, the ‘needs’ of the country measured in 
terms of economic and social development, and the country’s capacities to 
absorb aid funds.
5. See Hayman (2006) for an analysis of the aid management framework and 
the different aid policy dialogue fora in Rwanda in the early 2000s. For an 
overview of the development of aid policy dialogue between the govern-
ment, the EU and other donors, also refer to Euréval and PRODEV 
(2006, 41ff).
6. The minutes of the aid policy dialogue meetings can be found at http://
www.devpartners.gov.rw/, last access on 3 June 2015.
7. The government of unity was created after the genocide. It was partly 
based on the Arusha Accords that were signed in 1993 by the RPF and the 
Rwandan government to end the three-year civil war (see also Prunier 
1997).
8. The national electoral commission was founded in 2000. The Ombudsman 
office was founded in 2003. See official mandate and legal framework of 
the Ombudsman online at https://www.ombudsman.gov.rw/, last access 
on 3 June 2014.
9. See, for instance, the interview with Tito Rutaremara online at http://
www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/content/data/oralhistory/
S7TitoRutaremaraid297/TitoRutaremara.pdf, last access on 3 June 2014.
10. Interviews with Rwandan and Chinese government officials were con-
ducted in Kigali in March and April 2010 and in July 2013 and in Beijing 
in January 2013.
11. Information on EIDHR projects for various years is available at EIDHR 
compendia; see European Commission (1995–2012).
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12. Some EIDHR funds were used for strengthening the civil society platform 
that monitored the 2008 and 2010 elections, to support freedom of the 
press or the human rights advocacy work of NGOs (European Commission 
1995–2012).
13. Aid provided under the MDG contract is not made conditional upon spe-
cific governance reforms. The main objective is to assist countries in mak-
ing progress in achieving the MDGs and reducing poverty. Nevertheless, 
the EU’s decision to reward Rwanda with an MDG contract signalled to 
the government that the EU views the governance situation as generally 
positive.
14. Results from the mid-term review are published on the website of the 
European Commission online at www.ec.europa.eu/development, last 
access on 10 November 2016.
15. EU Press statement, 7 May 2012, online at http://eeas.europa.eu/dele-
gations/rwanda/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/20120507_01_en.
htm, last access on 7 May 2013.
16. In response to a UN panel of experts report that accused Rwanda of sup-
porting rebel movements in the DRC, Sweden and the Netherlands shifted 
budget support to project assistance in 2008 (Hayman 2011, 677f). The 
EU did not.
17. In addition to these formal channels of communication, the EU used 
periodic informal meetings with the government to address governance 
issues.
18. See, for instance, speech by President Kagame at the Ninth Government of 




november-4-2010-&catid=34:speeches&Itemid=56&lang=en, last access 
on 3 June 2014.
19. In addition to the documents cited, the following section has been particu-
larly informed by interviews with officials from EU institutions, EU mem-
ber states and the Rwandan government. Interviews were conducted in 
Kigali in March and April 2010 and July 2013, and in Brussels in October 
2012.
20. Interviews with officials from the EU institutions, member states and the 
Rwandan government, Kigali March and April 2010.
21. Whereas issues related to governance reforms are brought onto the agenda 
mainly as a result of the EU’s initiative, the Rwandan government has been 
particularly interested in discussing the extradition of genocide suspects 
who have sought refuge in the EU. Broader international issues such as the 
aid effectiveness agenda or political developments in the EU were appar-
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ently not discussed during formal Article 8 dialogue meetings. Interviews 
with officials from the EU institutions, member states and the Rwandan 
government, in Kigali in March and April 2010 and in Brussels in October 
2012.
22. During the meetings the government discussed with donors its overall 
development strategy, progress achieved and areas of disagreement. The 
minutes of all meetings can be found online at http://www.devpartners.
gov.rw/, last access on 5 December 2015.
23. The minutes of the meetings can be found online at http://www.devpart-
ners.gov.rw/, last access on 5 December 2015.
24. Interviews with officials from the EU institutions, member states and the 
Rwandan government, Kigali March and April 2010, July 2013 and in 
Brussels October 2012.
25. Ibid.
26. The National Authorising Officer is located within the Ministry of Local 
Government and manages the implementation of EDF funds.
27. The aid policy strategy defines the government’s position on aid and seeks 
to clarify the responsibilities of different national and international actors 
in implementing aid (Government of Rwanda 2006). In this strategy, the 
government asks other donors, such as Sweden, to shift aid from the justice 
sector to other policy fields.
28. See minutes of sector budget support meetings accessible online at http://
www.devpartners.gov.rw/, last access on 3 January 2013 as well as inter-
views with officials from the EU institutions, member states and the 
Rwandan government, in Kigali in March and April 2010.
29. Interviews with EU officials in October 2012.
30. Limiting the political space for non-state actors caused a number of inter-
national NGOs to leave the country, rendering EU support for NGOs 
even more difficult.
31. Most Rwandan civil society organisations focused on service delivery and 
supported the implementation of government policies rather than seeking 
to hold the government accountable (Longman 2011).
32. In a political context where freedom of expression is severely restricted, 
public opinion polls have to be viewed with great caution, of course. This 
is equally relevant for opinion polls in Ethiopia and Angola.
33. Whereas exact figures are difficult to obtain, the FDLR was estimated as 
having about 10,000 troops in the early 2000s (Waugh 2004). By 2008 it 
suffered an erosion of its military strength and the number of troops was 
reduced to 6000 (Prunier 2009, 322ff, International Crisis Group 2009). 
According to UN figures, it had as few as 1500 to 1800 troops by 




eastern-congo/1808451.html, last access on 3 June 2014.
34. Moreover, the RPF came to power as a result of a situation not too differ-
ent: it was established in Uganda by armed refugees who had fled the crisis 
in Rwanda in the 1960s.
35. See, for instance, Amnesty International (2010) or Amnesty International 
(2012).
36. The 2006 reform reduced staff numbers from 10,000 to about 2000. 
Salaries that made up 73 per cent of government expenditure at the end of 
the 1990s were cut to 33 per cent. The percentage of civil servants with 
university degrees rose from 6 per cent in 1998 to almost 80 per cent in 
2005 (Hausman 2011).
37. PEFA seeks to assess the quality of the budget process. In 2010 Rwanda 
scored ‘good’ or ‘very good’ on 18 out of 28 PEFA indicators. The results 
for the PEFA analysis can be found online at http://www.pefa.org/, last 
access on 3 June 2016.
38. The rate of primary school completion increased from 76 per cent in 
2009–2010 to 79 per cent in 2010–2011. The gross enrolment rate for 
secondary education also increased (African Development Bank et al. 2011).
39. According to the MDG monitor, Rwanda achieved all goals except for goal 
2 (universal primary education) and goal 8 (global partnership for develop-
ment), where not enough information is available.
40. The RPF successfully resisted pressure to look back on human rights abuses 
and killings it carried out during the civil war in the early 1990s, during its 
military advance into Rwanda in 1994 as well as in the early years after the 
genocide (Prunier 1997, Longman 2004, 77). The RPF’s refusal to take 
responsibility and to be accountable for gross human rights abuses is seen 
as an important obstacle to long-term peace-building and stability 
(Longman 2004).
41. The 2007 report on Rwanda’s progress in meeting the principles set 
out by the Paris Declaration can be found online at http://www.oecd.
org/dac/effectiveness/42155403.pdf, last access on 10 December 
2016.
42. This ‘exceptionalism’ is also probably a result of Rwanda’s domestic sur-
vival strategies and the basic threats to regime stability that the government 
faces.
43. Interviews with Rwandan, Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs in Kigali in 
July 2013, in Delhi in July 2013 and in Beijing in July 2013.
44. Information here and in the following is based on interviews with Chinese 
and Rwandan officials in Kigali in March 2010 and July 2013 and in 
Beijing in January 2013.
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45. Interview with Rwandan government official, Kigali July 2013.
46. One-third of Rwanda’s exports is composed of metals and ore like tin, 
coltan, wolfram and cassiterite. Since the mid-2000s, the volume of ore 
exports has substantially increased, most of which goes to China (see UN 
Comtrade data).
47. In June 2013 China started to allow roasted coffee to be imported and 
may thus set incentives for Rwanda to roast and package the coffee domes-
tically before exporting it to China.
48. The CADFund is an equity fund set up by the China Development Bank 
after the 2006 meeting of the Forum for China–Africa Cooperation in 
Beijing. For more information on the CADFund, see, for instance, 
Sanderson and Forseythe (2013).
49. New Times (2011), Digital TV firm to add more channels, online at 
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?a=44509&i=14728, last 
access on 3 June 2014.
50. See also Joseph Mudingu ‘China and Rwanda celebrate years of economic 
and trade cooperation’, New Times, 29 October 2008, reprinted by BBC 
monitoring international reports.
51. The information on FDI flows and stocks was kindly provided by the 
Rwanda Development Board in an e-mail exchange in July 2013.
52. See ‘Chinese firm to set up new textile plant in Rwanda’, The East African, 
19 July 2014, online at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/
Chinese-firm-to-set-up-textile-plant-in-Rwanda/2560-2389932-
lx4x90z/index.html
53. Interviews with Rwandan and Indian government officials in Kigali in July 
2013 and in Delhi in July 2013.
54. Interviews with Rwandan and Indian government officials in Kigali in July 
2013 and in Delhi in July 2013.
55. Interviews with Rwandan and Chinese government officials in Kigali in 
March and April 2010 and in July 2013.
56. For AfDB see, for instance, IGIHE, 4 April 2013 ‘AfDB Gives US$ 
39.44 M to Rwanda’s Specific Sector Budget’, online at http://en.igihe.
com/business/afdb-gives-us-39-44m-to-rwanda-s-specific-sector.html, 
last access on 3 June 2014.
57. Conversations with officials from the EU and EU member states in June 
2013.
58. International observers were divided over the question of whether aid should 
be cut or not. The former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair (who is known as a 
strong supporter of President Kagame) and the philanthropist and politician 
Howard Buffett argued against cutting aid. They reasoned that Rwanda is 
not the only party to be blamed for the crisis in the Eastern DRC, and aid 
cuts would therefore be one sided. Furthermore, they argued that aid has a 
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huge positive impact on poverty reduction in Rwanda; aid cuts would there-
fore not only hurt the poor but would also not contribute to solving the 
crisis. See Blair and Buffett (2013) ‘Stand with Rwanda. Now is not the time 
to cut aid to Kigali’. The Howard Buffett Foundation has even published its 
own, very critical assessment of the UN panel of experts report and the meth-
odology used for that report (The Howard G. Buffett Foundation 2013).
59. Reports published by the UN group of experts in 2001, 2005 and at the 
end of 2008 accused members of the Rwandan government of supporting 
rebel movements in the DRC (Huening 2013, Prunier 2009, 322ff). 
Findings of the report from the UN group of experts were contested and 
criticised, for instance, by Tony Blair and Howard Buffett.
60. Interviews with Rwandan government officials in Kigali in July 2013.
61. Interview with Rwandan official in Kigali in July 2013.
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Over the past decade, the Ethiopian government has remained hesitant to 
engage in governance reforms with the EU. It reluctantly started to engage 
in the early 2000s, and became more open ahead of the 2005 elections. 
After the 2005 election crisis, it at first refused to cooperate and then until 
the 2010 elections only reluctantly engaged. Between 2011 and 2014, the 
government has again become slightly more open to cooperation. What 
explains this overall reluctance and the slight changes over time?
This chapter argues that Ethiopia is an example of a country where the 
EU’s good governance strategies only partly converge with the prefer-
ences of the government. Due to specific structural conditions, the 
Ethiopian government generally has a strong interest in building an effec-
tive state and investing in public goods provision, not unlike Rwanda. 
Similar to Rwanda, the government faced opposition from within the rul-
ing elite in the early 2000s. In response, the Ethiopian government also 
invested in making state institutions more effective. In contrast to Rwanda, 
however, the Ethiopian government faced mass opposition and direct 
threats to regime survival, notably during the 2005 elections. In the after-
math of the crisis, it used low-intensity coercion as a response to opposi-
tion. Moreover, the leadership used the state as an instrument of cooptation 
and expanded the influence of the party on the state and society. In this 
context, the EU’s good governance strategies caused some costs in the 
early 2000s and substantial difficulties after 2005.
100 
Ethiopia is considerably dependent on aid. In the early 2000s, the EU 
became one of the largest donors to Ethiopia. In the aftermath of the 
2005 election crisis, Ethiopia’s aid dependence slightly increased as output 
legitimacy became more important for the government. Moreover, the 
EU raised aid levels, providing aid through aid modalities and to sectors 
that matched the preferences of the government. Ethiopia’s (aid) depen-
dence thus explains why the government continued to at least reluctantly 
engage with the EU in governance reforms after 2005, even though coop-
eration generated significant costs.
Access to cooperation with China was limited in the early 2000s. Since 
the 2005 election crisis, however, China has become an alternative partner 
for the Ethiopian government. Yet, the Ethiopian government has contin-
ued to at least reluctantly engage with the EU, which gives substance to 
the argument that the presence of China only had a small effect on the 
willingness of African governments to engage with the EU in governance 
reforms between 2000 and 2014.
4.1  Structural FactorS Shaping Ethiopia’S 
Survival StratEgiES
When the EPRDF1 overthrew the militarist Derg regime in 1991 after 
17 years of armed struggle, the new regime had to transform the state 
and the economy from a feudal system into a modern state. The new 
government embarked on an economic reform and modernisation pro-
gramme. It inherited a relatively efficient bureaucracy that was prepared 
to work for the successor regime. The army was replaced by the armed 
wing of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the new 
government quickly gained the monopoly on power over most of the 
territory (Clapham 2009, 185; Young 2004).
The Ethiopian leadership faces several interrelated structural challenges 
that impact on the government’s basic choice of strategies for remaining 
in power. The political coalition that sustains the EPRDF regime is rela-
tively broad compared to its predecessors: the militarist Derg regime and 
the monarchy under Haile Selassie. The core elite consisted primarily of 
the TPLF—those Tigrayans who led the struggle against the Derg. 
However, to broaden its support base and to expand its influence through-
out the country, the TPLF developed alliances with several regional parties 
in the early 1990s. Under the umbrella of the EPRDF, the TPLF thus 
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took charge of a party coalition rooted in different regions (Clapham 
2009, 184f; Young 2004, 35ff; Vaughan 2011, 626ff).2 The EPRDF and 
particularly its TPLF members remained influential in the security forces 
and the army (Lyons 2011, 11). The EPRDF has a key role in economic 
activities through its influence in parastatal companies,3 party-affiliated 
companies4 and cooperatives (Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011; Furtado 
and Smith 2009; Altenburg 2010). Beyond the core elite, the EPRDF’s 
main constituency are peasants; the EPRDF sees neither the (relatively 
small) private sector nor the urban middle classes in Addis Ababa as its 
natural allies (Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011, 26).
Territorial integrity constitutes an important challenge to the Ethiopian 
leadership. In a multi-ethnic state and within a region prone to insecurity, 
state failure and violent conflicts, national unity is one of the main pillars 
of the EPRDF’s legitimacy. Between 1998 and 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea 
fought a war, during which about 100,000 people were killed and one 
million displaced. Since then, the conflict has remained deadlocked 
(Clapham 2009, 186).5 Domestically, the government maintains its 
monopoly on power over most of the territory, except for the Ogaden 
region close to the border with Somalia where the government has been 
fighting a counter-insurgency campaign (Abbink 2009, 20).
While the Ethiopian leadership needs substantial means to sustain its 
relatively broad support base, the government has little access to natural 
resources to generate revenues. Some oil and natural gas deposits may be 
situated in the Ogaden region. However, prospecting has only progressed 
slowly, not least due to the difficult natural environment and insecurity in 
that region.
In light of these interrelated challenges, the Ethiopian government has 
a fundamental preference for building effective state institutions to gener-
ate revenues and provide public goods. However, the following sections 
will show how imminent threats to regime survival during the past decade 
further shaped the government’s survival strategy and its willingness to 
engage with the EU.
4.2  Ethiopia rEluctantly Engaging with thE Eu 
in thE Early 2000S
The EU’s relations with Ethiopia were limited in the 1990s. However, 
after the end of the war with Eritrea, in light of Ethiopia’s strategic impor-
tance in the war on terror after 9/11, and due to the Ethiopian govern-
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ment’s willingness to align with the priorities of the MDGs and the 
international aid effectiveness agenda, the EU intensified its cooperation 
with Ethiopia in the early 2000s. In parallel, support for governance 
reforms became more important in the EU’s engagement with Ethiopia.
The EU’ Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005
 The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Government
Between 2000 and 2005, the EU adopted a broad strategy, promoting 
democratic government with some elements of democratic governance. The 
country strategy paper, signed by the EU and Ethiopia in 2002, reflects a 
broad understanding of good governance (Ethiopia and European 
Community 2002). The EU sought to promote input legitimacy by 
strengthening democratic institutions that hold the government 
 accountable to national and international laws, by supporting elections, 
justice sector reform and the independence of the judicial system. It pro-
moted output legitimacy by supporting public financial management and 
civil service reforms. The EU earmarked USD36 million in aid funds to 
advance these objectives (Table  4.1). Food security, transport, macro- 
economic reform, healthcare and education accounted for the largest shares 
of EU aid to Ethiopia (Ethiopia and European Community 2002, 2007).
Table 4.1 EU governance aid to Ethiopia 2000–2014 (in USD million and in 
per cent)
Ethiopia 2000–2005 2006–2010 2011–2014
Total governance aid 36.02 48.29 49.03
Total aid (all sectors) 1437.36 1578.41 639.64
Governance aid/share in total EU aid 2.5% 3.1% 7.7%
Output legitimacy 22.82 21.17 22.48
Input legitimacy 13.19 27.12 26.55
Output legitimacy/share total in governance aid 63.4% 43.8% 45.8%
Input legitimacy/share total in governance aid 36.6% 56.2% 54.2%
Source: Author’s compilation, based on OECD DAC Aid statistics (2016) (Query for EU institutions; 
‘total governance aid’ includes all aid reported under the category ‘151:I5a: Government & Civil Society-
general, Total’ to the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System. ‘Output legitimacy’ includes public sector 
and administrative management, public finance management, decentralisation and support to subnational 
government, anti-corruption organisations and institutions; ‘input legitimacy’ includes legal and judicial 
development, democratic participation and civil society, elections, legislature and political parties, media 
and freedom of information, human rights, women’s equality. Data accessible at http://stats.oecd.org; 
last access: 5 October 2016)
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In the early 2000s, the EU hardly used the transnational channel. The 
country strategy paper presented civil society organisations as important 
partners in promoting governance reforms in Ethiopia. Yet, only little 
aid was allocated to support civil society actors. With funds from the 
Ninth EDF, the EU started building up a small Civil Society Fund to 
strengthen NGOs’ capacities for service delivery, human rights, gover-
nance and conflict prevention and to empower them vis-à-vis state actors 
(Ethiopia and European Community 2002; MWH, ODI, and ECDPM 
2004, 40f). Civil society organisations that promoted human rights and 
helped prepare the 2005 elections received some assistance through the 
EIDHR (European Commission and Ethiopia 2009, see also Table 4.3).6 
Compared to other traditional donors, the EU was not very active in 
defending the cause of civil society organisations (MWH, ODI, and 
ECDPM 2004, 40).
 The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Critical
Similar to Rwanda, the EU also adopted a cooperative-critical strategy in 
Ethiopia in the early 2000s. The EU made governance reforms a key issue 
during both the formal political dialogue meetings that were launched in 
2001 and its aid policy dialogues (Ethiopia and European Community 
2008).
In 2004, the EU and other donors agreed to substantially increase the 
share of aid channelled through budget support (Schmidt 2005). Besides, 
the EU publicly raised concerns about the governance situation and issued 
several critical statements regarding the human rights situation, for 
instance, in the UN Human Rights Commission (Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 EU statements and démarches related to governance reforms 
2000–2012
2000–2005 2006–2012 Total
Positive Critical Positive Critical
EU public statements on governance reforms 3 8 3 7 21
Démarches – 5 3  8
Source: Author’s compilation, based on EU annual human rights reports and documents published by the 
Council of the EU
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The Ethiopian Government’s Responsiveness: Reluctant 
Engagement Between 2000 and 2005
The Ethiopian government reluctantly started to engage with the EU in 
the implementation of governance instruments in the early 2000s. It has 
been slightly less willing to engage than Rwanda, but more forthcoming 
than Angola.
 Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues
The government agreed to launch a formal Article 8 political dialogue in 
2001. Until 2005, Ethiopia agreed to hold dialogues on a regular basis 
and to send high-level representatives. Dialogues took place twice a year 
with Prime Minister Meles and twice a year with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (Ethiopia and European Community 2007). Dialogues covered a 
broad range of issues including human rights, governance and democrati-
sation, the establishment of democratic institutions such as the Ombudsman 
and the Human Rights Commission, the upcoming elections in 2005, the 
death penalty or the ratification of the Rome statute. Regional peace and 
security issues, notably Ethiopia’s relations with Eritrea, also figured 
prominently in the dialogue (Ethiopia and European Community 2007). 
Official documents indicate that both the EU and the Ethiopian govern-
ment considered the quality of political dialogue to be relatively good and 
steadily improving: It was perceived to be open and mutually beneficial 
(European Commission and Ethiopia 2002). Ethiopia explicitly high-
lighted the importance it has been attaching to political dialogue 
(European Union 2004).
In the early 2000s, the Ethiopian government agreed—albeit very 
reluctantly—to address governance issues as part of its aid policy dialogues 
with donors. Similar to Rwanda, Ethiopia and the EU started to institu-
tionalise different formats of aid policy dialogues alongside commitments 
made under the international aid effectiveness agenda (Furtado and Smith 
2009). However, Ethiopia was clearly less willing to address governance 
reforms as part of these aid policy dialogues than Rwanda. For instance, 
the Ethiopian government was very reluctant to engage in questions 
related to governance reforms during the budget support policy dialogue. 
Only after the first two dialogue meetings did the government agree at 
least to address questions related to public financial management reforms 
or the fight against corruption and the atmosphere of the dialogue subse-
quently improved (Schmidt 2005, 61f; 101f). Moreover, similar to 
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Rwanda, the EU and other donors initiated specific dialogue formats to 
better coordinate their aid to governance-related sectors, such as justice 
reform, civil society organisations or democratic institutions. In contrast 
to Rwanda, Ethiopia refused to engage with donors in these meetings 
(DAG 2005b).
 Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid
In the early 2000s, the Ethiopian government reluctantly agreed to engage 
in the implementation of governance aid and inclusion of positive condi-
tionality in its engagement with the EU.
The government hesitated to include indicators related to democratic 
reforms in its agreement with the EU and other donors on direct budget 
support. The EU and other donors insisted on introducing indicators on 
elections and human rights (Schmidt 2005; Bergthaller and Küblböck 
2009). Yet, the government objected to these requests and the final agree-
ment that was signed in April 2004 had no targets related to democratic 
reforms (Schmidt 2005).
Ethiopia was reluctant to cooperate with the EU on the implementa-
tion of governance aid. Annual reports on the implementation of EU aid 
and secondary sources indicate that the implementation of governance aid 
faced considerable difficulties. Similar to Rwanda, the Ethiopian govern-
ment was willing to engage in the implementation of aid geared at sup-
porting the effectiveness of government institutions. Compared to 
Rwanda, Ethiopia was less willing to cooperate on the implementation of 
aid targeted to support democratic reforms.
One case in point is the justice sector. While the government insisted that 
the EU should support the justice sector by funding the Public Service Capacity 
Administration Programme (PSCAP), which also entails capacity- building for 
justice institutions, the EU was hesitant to increase support for justice sector 
reform through PSCAP, as this programme mostly aims at strengthening tech-
nical and financial capacities rather than the independence of the judicial sys-
tem. As a result of these diverging preferences, most of the EU’s aid earmarked 
for justice sector reform between 2000 and 2005 was not disbursed.7
Another example is the EU’s assistance for democratic institutions. 
With support from the EU and other donors, the government developed 
the legal foundation for establishing a Human Rights Commission and an 
Ombudsman’s office in the late 1990s (MWH, ODI, and ECDPM 2004). 
The Ethiopian parliament passed the relevant legislation in July 2000. The 
EU and other donors subsequently urged the authorities to proceed in 
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appointing the Commissioner and the Ombudsman (European 
Commission and Ethiopia 2004). Yet it took until late 2004 for both to 
be appointed, only a few months ahead of the 2005 parliamentary elec-
tions (Government of Ethiopia and United Nations Development 
Programme 2007). Some observers argue that the delay resulted from the 
government’s reluctance to support these institutions, as it had to expect 
criticism for its human rights record (Rahmato and Ayenew 2004, 42f).
The government was clearly reluctant to engage with the EU in the 
implementation of aid geared towards civil society organisations. The EU 
issued feasibility studies to design a strategy on how to support civil soci-
ety in Ethiopia, but the proposed Civil Society Fund could only be 
launched in 2006 (Ethiopia and European Community 2002; European 
Union 2004).
We can conclude that between 2000 and 2005, the EU sought to pro-
mote democratic government. The EU aimed at promoting input legiti-
macy by strengthening democratic institutions that hold the government 
accountable to national and international laws, by supporting elections, 
justice sector reform and the independence of the judicial system. The 
transnational channel did not play a prominent role in the EU’s strategies. 
The EU mostly used public statements and declarations to criticise the 
governance situation in the country. The Ethiopian government started to 
reluctantly engage. Whereas the government became more forthcoming 
in cooperating with the EU ahead of the 2005 parliamentary elections, the 
post-election crisis marked the end of this period.
The Ethiopian Government’s Survival Strategies
 Strong Threats to Regime Survival: A Split in the Ruling Elite
In the early 2000s, the EU’s strategies to support governance reforms in 
Ethiopia coincided with a period of domestic instability, a reorganisation 
of the regime’s support base and a restructuring of the relationship 
between the EPRDF and the state. Disagreements within the TPLF, and 
more generally the EPRDF, about the war with Eritrea (1998–2000) 
caused a split in the TPLF central committee in 2001 (Tadesse and Young 
2003; Tronvoll 2009). A majority within the TPLF favoured an aggressive 
military strategy towards Eritrea to assert Ethiopia’s strong position on 
the Horn of Africa and to demonstrate that Ethiopia does not give in to 
Western pressure. Instead, Prime Minister Meles supported a moderate 
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approach and a negotiated settlement of the border dispute rather than 
the elimination of the Eritrean regime by military means. Meles was appar-
ently more vigilant about the economic and diplomatic repercussions that 
the war had on Ethiopia and the regime’s stability (Tadesse and Young 
2003, 396; Tronvoll 2009, 465). The crisis positioned Meles as the undis-
puted ideological leader of the party and the government.
 Survival Strategies I: Subordinating the Party to the State
In response to the split in the TPLF central committee, the Ethiopian 
leadership embarked on a state modernisation programme and carefully 
allowed for political liberalisation ahead of the 2005 general elections. 
The 2001 split in the TPLF leadership thus did not only affect power 
relations within the EPRDF but also altered the relationship between the 
EPRDF, the state and society (Tronvoll 2009, 466; Tadesse and Young 
2003, 401).
The split in the central committee and the expulsion of the dissidents 
were followed by a comprehensive ‘cleansing’ of the political and military 
apparatus during which thousands of their (suspected) supporters were 
eliminated (Tronvoll 2009, 465). The way that internal disagreements 
were handled alienated important segments of the population in Tigray—
Prime Minister Meles’ core support base—where many of the dissidents 
were popular due to their participation in the armed struggle against the 
Derg and the Eritrean war (Tronvoll 2009, 466).
After the 2001 split, the EPRDF leadership carefully introduced several 
measures to enhance formal state institutions and to secure the pre- 
eminence of the state over the party. To bolster the EPRDF’s power base 
in rural areas, local state structures were reinforced to bring the state closer 
to the people and to make government service provision more effective. 
The district level (Woreda) received more influence in implementing social 
services and spending financial resources that were formerly managed by 
the regions (Furtado and Smith 2009; Peterson 2010, 9f). On the other 
hand, power and control of the local and regional level was again more 
strongly centralised within the state and in Addis Ababa (Vaughan 2011, 
629ff).
Among the measures to strengthen the state, ‘capacity-building’ gained 
particular prominence. The leadership developed a comprehensive civil 
service reform programme that entailed reforms related to urban manage-
ment, greater prevalence of information technology, the justice sector and 
tax and public financial management. This civil service reform programme 
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was later developed into the PSCAP project that the government jointly 
managed with the World Bank, which the EU and other donors supported 
(Vaughan 2011, 630f; Peterson 2010). Similar to Rwanda, some experts 
point out that external support for tax and public financial management 
reform in Ethiopia was more successful than in other African countries 
because these reforms were designed by the government and not by the 
donors (Peterson 2010). Overall, the government’s reforms quickly 
showed results. In the early 2000s, the effectiveness of the Ethiopian gov-
ernment considerably improved if measured in terms of Ethiopia’s ranking 
in the WGI (Fig. 4.1).
New government institutions such as the Federal Ethics and Anti- 
corruption Commission of Ethiopia (FEAC) were created in the wake of 
the split in the central committee. One of the FEAC’s first measures was 
to purge high-level party members on the basis of corruption charges. 
Corruption charges have therefore been widely perceived among the gen-
eral public as politically selective (Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011, 30). 
In the early 2000s, the level of corruption did not improve as a result of 
building up institutions to fight against it (Fig. 4.1).
Tadesse and Young (2003, 401) recapitulate the measures induced 
after the party split: ‘As a result of the defeat of the dissidents, the state is 
now unquestionably the dominant organ of governance in Ethiopia and 
the party is assuming the role of servant to the state’.
 Survival Strategies II: Managing Arenas of Contestation and Low- 
Intensity Coercion
Opposition parties had boycotted the parliamentary elections in 1995. 
The 2000 parliamentary elections were therefore the first elections where 
opposition parties participated. While the government firmly controlled 
political spaces, the opposition was relatively unorganised. Opposition 
parties therefore clearly did not constitute a viable threat to the ruling 
EPRDF in 2000. They only gained 12 seats in the House of Represen-
tatives, indicating the EPRDF’s strong grip on power (Tronvoll 2009, 
454, 464).
In the early 2000s, the Ethiopian government used measures of low- 
intensity coercion to limit opportunities for the media, civil society organ-
isations or opposition parties to challenge the EPRDF. The regime change 
in 1991 had clearly not been accompanied by higher levels of political 
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Fig. 4.1 Government effectiveness and control of corruption in Ethiopia
Source: Author’s compilation, based on World Bank (2016b), Worldwide Governance 
Indicators
intensity coercion to limit the chances of defecting party members and 
other opponents to mobilise mass support.
Just ahead of the 2005 elections, the Ethiopian government slightly 
opened up political spaces. The campaign for the 2005 parliamentary 
elections saw a relatively free debate and slightly more openness than 
previous elections, generating a spirit of optimism (Abbink 2006, 176; 
Tronvoll 2009, 454f; Aalen and Tronvoll 2009, 194ff). The Ethiopian 
government invited a number of international observers, including 
those from the EU. They noted shortcomings with regard to respect for 
human rights, the rule of law and basic democratic principles during the 
election campaign. However, opposition parties had unprecedented 
possibilities to engage, particularly in Addis Ababa and other urban 
areas. Furthermore, the opposition was much better organised and 
stronger than during the previous elections in the mid-1990s and in 
2000 (Tronvoll 2009, 464).
In the years between 2000 and 2005, the EU and other donors’ 
demands for political liberalisation only partially aligned with the EPRDF’s 
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strategy to reorganise state-party relations. Those parts of EU governance 
aid geared towards strengthening effective government—for instance, sup-
port for anti-corruption institutions, public financial management or 
decentralisation—were largely in line with government priorities. However, 
other activities that were more clearly targeted towards democratic govern-
ment caused considerable adaptational pressure. It is surprising that the 
Ethiopian government still, albeit reluctantly, started to engage with the 
EU in these activities. One therefore also needs to consider Ethiopia’s 
interest in engaging with the EU ‘beyond’ governance reforms.
Ethiopia’s Economic Dependence on the EU Between 2000 
and 2005
Ethiopia has been strongly dependent on development aid. It has histori-
cally received low aid volumes compared to other African countries. As it 
has never been colonised, it had no special relationship with a former 
colonial power (Furtado and Smith 2009). Aid flows increased when the 
EPRDF came to power in 1991. However, during the Ethiopian–Eritrean 
war, most donors went back to limiting assistance to humanitarian aid. 
Since Ethiopia viewed Eritrea as the aggressor, the Ethiopian government 
felt it was punished unjustly (Furtado and Smith 2009).
The end of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 coincided 
with the beginning of reforms in the international aid system. Similar to 
the Rwandan President Kagame, Prime Minister Meles also took a very 
active stance in the international aid effectiveness agenda from the very 
beginning and sought to use the reform dynamic to attract greater aid 
flows (Furtado and Smith 2009). In the early 2000s, donors rapidly scaled 
up aid and the government’s aid dependence increased considerably. The 
share of aid in GNI peaked at 19 per cent in 2003 (Fig. 4.2). Grants con-
stituted the second-largest share of government revenue between 2000 
and 2005, after trade taxes.
The EU institutions were one of the largest donors to Ethiopia between 
2000 and 2005, providing about 17 per cent of total DAC donors’ aid 
(Fig. 4.3). Moreover, the modalities by which the EU provided aid largely 
matched the preferences of the Ethiopian government. In 2002, shortly 
after the end of the war, the EU resumed general budget support. Similar 
to Rwanda, the EU was one of the driving forces among the budget sup-
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port donors to negotiate a new harmonised budget support contract with 
the Ethiopian government (Schmidt 2005; Bergthaller and Küblböck 
2009). In 2004, only one year before the 2005 elections, the EU and 
other donors reached an agreement with the Ethiopian government on a 
new budget support contract. The share of aid channelled through budget 
support was supposed to rise considerably as a consequence of the agree-
ment (Schmidt 2005; Bergthaller and Küblböck 2009).
Between 2000 and 2005, the EU had been the most important destina-
tion for Ethiopia’s exports. Ethiopia exported more to the EU than to the 
rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Exports to the USA were marginal (Fig. 4.4). 
Moreover, companies from Europe—if taken together—were the largest 
investors in Ethiopia. Trade and investments, however, constituted a small 
share of GDP.
In the early 2000s, when the EU’s support for governance reforms did 
not entail substantial costs, Ethiopia’s access to EU development aid and 




















































Fig. 4.2 Net ODA as a share of GNI in Ethiopia
Source: Author’s compilation, based on World Bank (2016a), World Development Indicators
 ETHIOPIA 
112 
engaging in governance reforms, which explains why the Ethiopian gov-
ernment did reluctantly start engaging with the EU.
China: Limited Engagement Between 2000 and 2005
At the turn of the century, when the EU started to make support for gov-
ernance reforms a more prominent issue in its cooperation with Ethiopia, 
the government had very little access to economic cooperation with China. 
China was no alternative partner.
Ethiopia has not only actively sought to strengthen economic coop-
eration with the EU and other traditional partners but also with China 
and other emerging economies. Ethiopia’s external relations strategy 
identified China as one of its key partners as early as 2002 (Information 
2002). Moreover, according to Ethiopian and Chinese officials, 
Ethiopia was a driving force behind the FOCAC meetings from the 
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Fig. 4.3 ODA to Ethiopia, selected donors (disbursements in USD million)
Source: OECD CRS aid statistics (2016), author’s compilation
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Ethiopia co-hosted the third meeting that took place in Beijing in 
October 2006.
The Ethiopian government’s attempts to reinforce its relations with 
China did not immediately result in closer economic cooperation. In the 
1990s, economic exchange mostly consisted of a few aid projects, for 
instance, to improve water supply (Hawkins et  al. 2010). In the early 
2000s, the Chinese government financed some road projects and other 
infrastructure development in Addis Ababa, and it sent medical teams. But 
Chinese aid remained limited. Chinese direct investments and bilateral 
trade were also insignificant in the early 2000s (Fig. 4.4). According to the 
MOFCOM, Chinese investment stocks in Ethiopia stood at less than 
USD50 million in 2005.
The EPRDF and the Communist Party of China established relations 
shortly after the EPRDF came to power in 1991. However, if measured in 
terms of the number of bilateral visits, contact has been relatively limited 





































Fig. 4.4 Ethiopia’s exports to selected partners (in thousands of USD)
Source: Author’s compilation, based on UNCTAD statistics (2016)
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4.3  thE 2005 ElEction criSiS: a turning point 
in Eu-Ethiopia rElationS
In 2005, the EPRDF leadership was for the second time seriously chal-
lenged. In contrast to the party split in 2001, this time it was not by mem-
bers of the core elite, but by the political opposition outside the 
EPRDF. The parliamentary elections in May 2005 thus marked a water-
shed for the Ethiopian government and for the EU’s strategies for engag-
ing with Ethiopia.
After a doubtful process of recounting and revoting in some constitu-
encies, the national electoral board declared an EPRDF victory. Yet, 
according to the official figures the opposition gained about one-third of 
the votes. The Coalition for Unity and Democracy, the largest opposition 
party, received about 20 per cent of the seats, the United Ethiopian 
Democratic Forces most of the other 10 per cent (Tronvoll 2009, 455). 
When the National Electoral Board announced the results, turmoil broke 


































Fig. 4.5 Annual bilateral visits EPRDF–CCP
Source: Author’s compilation, based on analysis of New Reports; International Department 
of the Chinese Communist Party
C. HACKENESCH
 115
and 20,000–30,000 opposition members and sympathisers were jailed 
(Tronvoll 2009, 455; Abbink 2006).8
The EU’s Good Governance Strategy
The Ethiopian government’s response to the crisis took the EU and other 
donors by surprise. After the end of the war with Eritrea, Ethiopia was 
perceived by donors as a ‘model pupil’. Ethiopia made progress in poverty 
reduction and increased spending in social sectors, in line with the inter-
national development paradigm as it had evolved with the MDG agenda. 
The government emphasised the importance of good governance in its 
relations with donors; initiatives such as the PSCAP programme suggested 
that the government indeed had a strong interest in capacity-building. 
Moreover, it very actively engaged in the international aid effectiveness 
agenda, the G8 meetings and other international fora (Furtado and Smith 
2009).
In response to the crisis, the EU used a cooperative-conflictive approach. 
It tried to mediate (Abbink 2006), while also putting substantial pressure 
on the government. As the crisis escalated, the EU postponed a decision 
regarding a €155 million aid agreement for the transport sector in autumn 
2005. In December 2005, the EU decided to freeze the remaining €95 
million in budget support. Other donors also suspended their budget aid 
(Ethiopia and European Community 2008).
The Ethiopian Government’s Response: Indifference
The Ethiopian government showed little willingness to reconcile with the 
opposition in response to the EU and other donors’ pressure. Moreover, 
it refused to engage with the EU and suspended political and aid policy 
dialogues. Tim Clarke, head of the EU delegation summarises the 
situation:
The door is closed.…It takes two to tango. A dialogue requires trust and I 
can understand that on their side they were wounded. Suddenly the doors 
were closed, or at least half closed, and although we have been pushing for 
openness and a dialogue, we haven’t seen that happening as fast as we want.9




We are eager to engage the donor community in dialogue, but we would want 
to establish that dialogue on the basis of a number of principles…the first is 
predictability. Development assistance should not be turned on and off.10
The Costs and Benefits for Ethiopia of Ceasing to Engage 
with the EU
For the Ethiopian government, engaging with the EU and other donors 
during the crisis and complying with their demands to cease coercive mea-
sures and release political prisoners were perceived as a direct threat to 
regime survival.
The strong gains for the opposition during the elections took the 
EPRDF by surprise (Abbink 2006, 179f; Aalen and Tronvoll 2009, 196). 
In spite of irregularities in the run-up to the elections, on election day and 
during the vote counting, available data do not suggest that the opposi-
tion actually won the elections (Tronvoll 2009, 463). Still, the election 
results demonstrated that the EPRDF had considerably under-estimated 
the dissatisfaction with its political record and the perception within the 
population that economic achievements were poor and biased towards the 
EPRDF, particularly in rural areas. The elections confirmed that the 
EPRDF had little support from the middle class and in urban areas of 
Addis Ababa as well as from the private sector. However, particularly the 
loss of support from the peasants, its core power base, shocked the EPRDF 
(Abbink 2006, 179f; Arriola 2008). Due to the government’s control of 
the local level and its declared commitment to agricultural policies and 
rural development, it expected that the peasants and rural population—
who make up about 85 per cent of the total population—would vote for 
the EPRDF.  It had thus not expected that opening political spaces in 
urban areas would turn out to become a potential challenge to regime 
survival (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009, 197). Some point out that the EPRDF 
was so confident to emerge victorious in rural areas that it had barely cam-
paigned there prior to the elections (Lefort 2010, 440).11
In this context, the Ethiopian government perceived engaging with the 
EU as a direct threat to regime survival. In an open letter published in the 
Ethiopian Herald on 28 August 2005, Prime Minister Meles criticised 
that the presence of the EU election observer mission had encouraged 
opposition demonstrations and that the EU had thus contributed to fuel-
ling the crisis. The EU election observer mission was perceived to be sid-
ing with the opposition candidates and thereby bolstering the  opposition’s 
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domestic legitimacy. Moreover, preliminary results from the election 
observer mission were leaked before the government published its final 
results. The opposition used the mission’s report to claim having won the 
elections.
On the other hand, the Ethiopian government had reason to expect 
that donors would not cut aid altogether, not least because Ethiopia had 
become an important international partner for the EU institutions and 
some member states such as the UK during the previous years (Furtado 
and Smith 2009). Indeed, the EU institutions did not reduce aid funds, 
but channelled budget support through other aid modalities with stronger 
earmarking and monitoring procedures attached. Yet, the usage of aid as a 
lever for change put the Ethiopian government in a precarious situation—
at least in the short- to medium-term. Not only had aid dependence con-
siderably increased during the previous years; the shift towards general 
budget support also meant that as a result of the EU withholding funds, 
the government could not cover parts of its expenditure. Moreover, 
threats to cut budget support funds came in the midst of the Ethiopian 
budget planning process and thus exposed the government to a great deal 
of uncertainty (Bergthaller and Küblböck 2009).
China’s Support During the 2005 Election Crisis:  
Reducing Donor Pressure
Largely unnoticed by the EU and other traditional donors, China 
extended its first substantial loan to Ethiopia in early 2006, a few weeks 
after the EU and other donors had decided to freeze budget support. 
Alongside the EU and other traditional donors’ decision to suspend 
general budget support and before the Ethiopian government agreed 
with donors that budget aid should be rechannelled to a new pro-
gramme, China offered Ethiopia a loan facility. In January 2006, 
Ethiopia’s Minister of Finance, Sufyan Ahmad, travelled to China 
(BBC 2006).12 China extended a mixed loan facility, amounting to 
USD500 million and consisting of grants, interest-free loans and 
concessional loans. The Ethiopian government presented a list with 
potential projects; but the precise activities financed with the loan were 
agreed upon only later. The volume of USD500 million equalled the 
volume of funds that the Ethiopian government would have been losing 
if the EU and other donors had not only withheld but actually cut 
development aid. Relatively unobserved by the EU and other tradi-
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tional donors,13 economic cooperation with China thereby reduced 
Ethiopia’s dependence on its traditional partners at a critical point in 
time.
4.4  Ethiopia rEluctantly Engaging with thE Eu 
in thE latE 2000S DESpitE china’S Strong prESEncE
Between 2006 and 2010, the EU broadened its approach towards pro-
moting democratic governance and has again adopted a cooperative-critical 
strategy. The Ethiopian government, in turn, was highly reluctant to 
engage in governance reforms.
EU Good Governance Strategies and Ethiopia’s Responsiveness
 The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Governance
After the 2005 election crisis, the EU redoubled its efforts to promote 
input legitimacy. Governance reforms became a more important issue in 
EU–Ethiopia relations. In the country strategy paper, governance reforms 
were highlighted as an important area for bilateral relations; support for 
governance and macro-economic reform became the third focal sector of 
the EU’s aid to Ethiopia.14 The EU sought to promote elections, justice 
sector reform, the independence of the judiciary and the involvement of 
civil society organisations (Ethiopia and European Community 2007; 
annual joint reviews EU aid to Ethiopia, various years).
OECD DAC data indicate that the EU has slightly increased the vol-
ume of aid that it has allocated to governance reforms since 2006 
(Table  4.1). Whereas in the early 2000s the EU had spent most of its 
governance aid on output legitimacy, it has committed most of its gover-
nance aid to input-related reforms since the mid-2000s.
In pushing its good governance agenda, the EU has increasingly relied on 
the transnational channel. The EU finally launched the Civil Society Fund, 
financed through the EDF (about €10 million for 2008–2013). The fund 
seeks to support the capacities of NGOs with a view to empowering them to 
engage in dialogue on policy and political reforms with the government at 
the national, regional and local level (Ethiopia and European Community 
2007). The EU has also sought to enable NGOs to participate in the politi-
cal dialogue between the EU and the Ethiopian government. Beyond direct 
assistance and the inclusion of civil society organisations in its dialogue with 
the government, the EU has pushed for improvements in the institutional 
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environment in which Ethiopian NGOs operate. The EU raised concerns 
when the Ethiopian government issued a new NGO law shortly before the 
2010 parliamentary elections, because the law was perceived to restrict the 
space of civil society organisations to engage in governance issues.
 The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Critical
After the election crisis, the EU resumed its strategy of promoting gover-
nance reforms through a cooperative-critical strategy. The EU made several 
attempts to strengthen political dialogue and address governance reforms as 
part of aid policy dialogues. In parallel, the EU continued to put pressure 
on Ethiopia, signalling to the government that the EU does not agree with 
the governance situation. In contrast to Rwanda, the EU allocated only a 
medium-sized governance incentive tranche to Ethiopia in 2006. It argued 
that budget support could only be resumed once the governance situation 
had improved, even though Ethiopia meets all other eligibility criteria 
(Ethiopia and European Community 2008). In the mid- term review for the 
10th EDF, the EU justified its decision not to increase EDF funds by refer-
ring to the difficult governance situation. The EU made several critical pub-
lic statements (Table 4.2). It criticised the closing of an independent journal, 
raised concerns that the new civil society law substantially limits spaces for 
civil society, and that the 2010 parliamentary elections did not meet inter-
national standards. However, the EU clearly did not move beyond a ‘coop-
erative-critical strategy’: the EU did not reduce aid and it did not threaten 
to reduce aid if the governance situation was not improving.
Ethiopia’s Responsiveness Between 2006 and 2010: 
Reluctant Engagement
Immediately after the 2005 election crisis, the Ethiopian government was 
almost indifferent towards EU demands to engage in governance reforms. 
Only towards the 2010 elections did the government again agree to at 
least reluctantly engage. It was clearly more willing to engage with the EU 
on effective as opposed to democratic governance. In the late 2000s, 
Ethiopia was visibly less open for cooperation than Rwanda but more 
forthcoming than Angola.
 Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Political Dialogue
Even though formal Article 8 political dialogue eventually resumed at the 
end of 2006, it did not take place very often in the following years. In 
contrast to Rwanda, Ethiopia has been definitely more reluctant to engage 
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in dialogue since the mid-2000s. Between 2007 and 2010, the Ethiopian 
government held dialogue only once and sometimes twice a year (Ethiopia 
and European Community 2007). During those meetings, Ethiopia 
engaged at the highest political level—with the prime minister or the min-
ister of foreign affairs. In the course of dialogue meetings, the government 
agreed to address a broad range of issues, including the human rights situ-
ation, media reforms, the rule of law, economic governance issues, migra-
tion as well as regional peace and security. The government also discussed 
sensitive and difficult issues, such as the new civil society law or the 2010 
election process.
Participants and observers of the political dialogue meetings describe 
the atmosphere as frank; the government has been willing to address sensi-
tive issues even if no consensus could be reached.15 However, some 
European participants and observers perceive the dialogue as having very 
little impact on the government’s position. Ethiopia has not agreed with 
the EU on concrete reform objectives during dialogue meetings. While 
democratic governance issues had been brought onto the agenda mainly 
at the request of the EU, the Ethiopian side appears to have been more 
interested in discussing regional peace and security issues.16
 Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Aid Policy Dialogues
The Ethiopian government reluctantly agreed to discuss governance 
reforms during aid policy dialogues. Statements by interviewees, public 
documentation of these meetings and secondary literature suggest that 
Ethiopia was clearly less prepared to institutionalise aid policy dialogues 
on governance reforms with the EU and other donors between 2006 and 
2011 than Rwanda.
One case in point are the high-level forum (HLF) meetings. They 
brought together the government and donors between one and four times 
a year. The government accepted making governance issues a topic on the 
agenda, for instance, after the proclamation of the new civil society law 
(DAG 2011). The HLF meetings, however, mostly provide a forum for 
the EU and other donors to convey messages to the government, rather 
than to actually engage in dialogue (Furtado and Smith 2009).
More importantly, the Ethiopian government has not agreed to set up 
a specific governance dialogue with the EU and other donors.17 Aid policy 
dialogues related to healthcare, education or transport take place regularly 
and are perceived to be functioning fairly well (Furtado and Smith 2009). 
Yet, despite the EU and other donors’ explicit demand for it, Ethiopia 
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refused to set up a specific governance aid dialogue.18 Relevant line minis-
tries, such as the Ministry of Justice, also showed no great interest in set-
ting up regular dialogues with the EU and other donors (DAG 2012, 25; 
European Commission 2009).
Finally, the shifting of modalities from direct budget support to the 
World Bank-administered Protection of Basic Services (PBS) programme 
closed another potential channel for dialogue on governance reforms. 
Even though budget support dialogue mostly focused on overall 
 macro- economic issues, it also gave an opportunity for the EU and other 
donors to address issues of democratic governance. Policy dialogue under 
the new PBS programme instead mostly focused on budget issues at the 
regional and local levels (von der Heijden 2007, 3; ECO Consult et al. 
2012). Some observers argue that this setting allowed the government to 
keep donors at arm’s length and avoid dialogue on sensitive issues. The 
government has therefore also not appeared to be too interested in the 
resumption of general budget support (Bergthaller and Küblböck 2009; 
von der Heijden 2007).
 Ethiopia’s Responsiveness: Positive Conditionality and Governance Aid
Between 2006 and 2010, the Ethiopian government has remained very 
reluctant to engage in the implementation of EU governance aid and to 
include positive conditionality in its engagement with the EU.
The Ethiopian government has been highly reluctant to develop a com-
prehensive ‘governance action plan’ to comply with the EU’s requirements 
for receiving a ‘governance incentive tranche’. The EU’s request for a gov-
ernance action plan came at a point in time when the relationship between 
the government and donors was particularly tense as a result of the 2005 
election crisis. The government was also in a process of drafting its new 
poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP). At least partly in response to 
donor pressure, the government finally agreed to include some objectives 
related to governance reforms in its PRSP. These objectives were also used 
as a basis for the governance action plan for the EU (DAG 2005a, 2006, 
2009). EU officials argue that the governance incentive tranche thus con-
tributed to convincing the government to include governance indicators in 
the new PRSP.19 The government’s definition of ‘governance reforms’, 
however, was quite narrow and limited to capacity-building of government 
institutions (Government of Ethiopia 2006; Ethiopia and European 
Community 2007). Ethiopia’s governance action plan was clearly less 
ambitious than in the case of Rwanda.
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After the election crisis, the Ethiopian government only reluctantly 
engaged with the EU and other donors in the implementation of gover-
nance aid. Interviews with EU and Ethiopian officials, an analysis of annual 
reports on the implementation of EU aid as well as an independent evalu-
ation of EU aid, indicate that the implementation of governance aid met 
with considerable challenges. The government remained open for engag-
ing with the EU in the implementation of aid geared to support the effec-
tiveness of government institutions. However, compared to the early 
2000s, it was even less willing to implement aid targeted at supporting the 
democratic quality of decision-making processes.
Consider the example of the PSCAP project. It became Ethiopia’s flag-
ship programme for reinforcing the effectiveness of government institu-
tions at the regional and local level. Among others, the programme has 
sought to promote civil service reform, strengthen revenue and tax admin-
istration, information and communication technology development as 
well justice sector reform. Observers highlight that the government had a 
strong interest in implementing this programme, particularly components 
related to the effectiveness of government institutions.20 In contrast, those 
PSCAP projects related to input legitimacy such as justice sector reform 
made limited progress.21
Another illustration is the support for democratic institutions. The 
Ethiopian government agreed to allocate €3 million to the democratic 
institutions programme, which it managed jointly with the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). The objective of the programme is to 
strengthen the capacities of the Human Rights Commission, the Federal 
Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission of Ethiopia or the parliament. The 
EU and other donors would have preferred to use aid to strengthen the 
independence of these institutions and to empower them to hold the gov-
ernment accountable.22 Ethiopia, in turn, had a clear preference for concen-
trating on the technical and institutional capacities of these institutions.
The Ethiopian government was very hesitant to invite another EU elec-
tion observer mission for the 2010 parliamentary elections. It finally 
allowed a mission to monitor these elections. At the same time, it has not 
authorised the mission to present its final report in Addis Ababa —as had 
been planned (European Union 2010). In a press statement, the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticised that the election observer mission 
had ‘chosen to publish a report which is nothing but a preconceived and 
biased political analysis on Ethiopia’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010). 
The EU thus could only present its report to an international audience in 
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Brussels in November 2010. Ethiopia is the first country where the gov-
ernment prevented EU election observers from presenting their final 
report to the domestic audience in the host country.
Most visible and debated was probably Ethiopia’s resistance to accept 
aid geared towards supporting civil society organisations. The new civil 
society law, the Proclamation on Charities and Societies (CSO law), passed 
by parliament in 2009, initially put the EU’s (and other donors’) aid to 
civil society at risk entirely. For instance, the CSO law considerably chal-
lenged the implementation of the Civil Society Fund that the EU had set 
up. The CSO law restricts the amount of international funds for Ethiopian 
NGOs engaging on human rights, democracy or the rule of law to 10 per 
cent of their budget. Only after difficult negotiations did the Ethiopian 
government finally agree to grant the EU a legal exemption for the EU 
Civil Society Fund by considering it Ethiopian national funding.23
The civil society law also affected EU support channelled through the 
EIDHR.  As assistance through EU budget lines is considered interna-
tional funding, the CSO law reduced the EU’s possibilities to use EIDHR 
funds to support civil society in Ethiopia. The volume of EIDHR funds 
had already dropped between 2006 and 2010 (Table 4.3) and reduced 
further after 2010 due to the CSO law. Furthermore, the Ethiopian gov-
ernment has been very hesitant to accept aid for civil society organisations 
spent through other projects, such as the Protection of Basic Services pro-
gramme. The implementation of the PBS’ civil society component faced 
considerable difficulties.24
We can conclude from this review that governance reforms have become 
a more important but also much contested issue in EU–Ethiopia relations 
between 2006 and 2010. The EU has slightly broadened its approach 
from democratic government to democratic governance. Moreover, similar 
to the early 2000s, the EU used a cooperative-critical strategy. The 
Ethiopian government, in turn, was highly reluctant to engage with the 
EU and other donors in the aftermath of the 2005 election crisis. The 
Table 4.3 EIDHR projects in Ethiopia
2000–2005 2006–2010 Total
Volume in USD 4,489,651 1,970,890 6,460,541
Number of projects 11 23 34
Source: Author’s compilation, based on EU compendia EIDHR projects, various years (1995–2012)
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government only hesitantly resumed political dialogue. Compared to the 
early 2000s, it has accepted higher volumes of EU aid to be spent on gov-
ernance reforms, but it has sought to direct governance aid towards 
capacity- building of government institutions to strengthen their efficiency 
rather than empowering them to fulfil their role in policy-making pro-
cesses. Government initiatives such as the civil society law had a direct and 
negative effect for EU attempts to empower civil society organisations to 
hold the government accountable.
The Ethiopian Government’s Survival Strategies
After the 2005 elections and the resulting political crisis, public support 
for the government was at an all-time low. According to Gallup polls, only 
32 per cent trusted the government in 2007 (Gallup 2013). To regain 
stability and prevent further challenges from the opposition, the govern-
ment sought to broaden its support base and to reinforce the influence of 
the party at the local and regional levels. Moreover, the government intro-
duced a series of legal measures to restrict political spaces.
 Survival Strategies I: Subordinating the State to the Party
Shortly after the elections, the EPRDF started to reinforce its party 
structures. It expanded its membership from 760,000 in 2005 to about 
four million members in 2008 and five million by 2010 (Aalen and 
Tronvoll 2009, 203; Vaughan 2011, 633). With a view to both increas-
ing compliance of party members and coopting opponents, the EPRDF 
conditioned access to state employment and public services on party 
membership (Tronvoll 2009, 469; International Crisis Group 2009). At 
the rural level, the EPRDF coopted the leading farmers to expand its 
power base among the peasants (Lefort 2007). Mass youth and women’s 
organisations and trade unions were revived and expanded, forging a 
link between the party, the state and the people (Vaughan 2011, 634; 
Lyons 2011, 10). Furthermore, the Ethiopian government made less 
effort to invest in the effectiveness of state institutions; in contrast to 
Rwanda, the level of government effectiveness stagnated after 2007 
(Fig. 4.1).
In the years between 2006 and 2010, the Ethiopian government 
expanded its investments in social services, not unlike Rwanda. After the 
election crisis, government spending on social services and infrastructure 
rose to over 60 per cent of government expenditure. For instance, the 
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share of healthcare in government spending increased substantially from 
about 11 per cent in 2006 to about 19 per cent in 2011, according to the 
World Development Indicators.
However, in contrast to Rwanda, along with growing investments in 
public services, Ethiopia also expanded state employment in the social sec-
tors. According to figures from the Ministry of Health and Education, the 
number of teachers and health education workers more than doubled 
from about 120,000 in 2004/2005 to over 250,000 by 2010 (Vaughan 
2011, 643f). At the same time, access to basic services and university edu-
cation has at least partly been conditioned to EPRDF membership (Abbink 
2009, 17). Reports by Human Rights Watch (2010) and media reports 
(BBC 2011; IRIN 2013) argue that access to food aid and basic govern-
ment services has been used to generate support for the EPRDF. In con-
trast to Rwanda, despite higher government spending, public satisfaction 
with social services remained quite low according to Gallup polls. In 2007, 
only 19 per cent were confident in the healthcare system; only 43 per cent 
were satisfied with the education system (Gallup 2013).
After the elections, the government faced a considerable dilemma. On 
the one hand, it needed to make more public investments in order to 
regain popular support. On the other hand, it could not easily raise more 
taxes to finance public expenditure. In a country where per capita GNI 
was as low as USD280 in 2008, the tax base is arguably highly limited. 
Furthermore, in light of the crisis, the government could not alienate stra-
tegic support groups any further by increasing taxes. In the first few years 
after the elections, the government reduced presumptive taxes to 
strengthen public support (Prichard 2010, 259f). Between 2005 and 
2007, overall tax revenues fell sharply, at least in part due to the reluctance 
of the government to punish tax evasion (Prichard 2010). Only after 2008 
did the government again make efforts to increase tax revenue (Prichard 
2010, 262) and direct and indirect taxes rose considerably.
In light of the 2005 crisis, economic growth has become an even more 
important pillar of the regime’s legitimacy. The Ethiopian government’s 
poverty reduction strategy papers, published shortly after the 2005 elec-
tion crisis and then again in 2010, put a much stronger emphasis on eco-
nomic growth and investments in large-scale infrastructure, such as roads, 
power generation and telecommunications, than previous government 
strategies. Furthermore, heated discussions on the official growth rate fig-
ures between the opposition, the government, the World Bank and other 
donors illustrate how important economic growth is to the regime as a 
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pillar of its legitimacy.25 Whereas government figures suggest that growth 
rates have been high since 2005, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and members of the opposition openly questioned these figures (EIU 2012).
 Survival Strategies II: Managing Arenas of Contestation and Using 
Low-Intensity Coercion
Along with strengthening party structures and increasing public expendi-
ture, the government reduced political spaces through a series of new 
laws. The press law (2008), party law (2008), anti-terror law (2009), and 
particularly the civil society law (2009) have considerably limited the free-
dom of opposition parties, the media and civil society organisations. For 
example, the CSO law requires that NGOs have to register with the newly 
established Charities and Societies Agency. Organisations that receive 
more than 10 per cent of their funding from abroad are not allowed to 
engage in human rights, conflict resolution, justice and law enforcement 
activities. As most local NGOs rely heavily on international funding, the 
law has a tremendous impact. Two prominent civil society organisations—
the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) and the 
Ethiopian Bar Association (Ethiopian association for law professionals) 
faced particularly severe restrictions (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009, 199–202).
Moreover, in light of the 2005 election crisis, winning subsequent elec-
tions with substantive majorities was important for the government to 
regain stability. The local (Kebele) and district (Woreda) elections were 
widely perceived as a ‘test run’ for the government. They were at first 
delayed but then finally held in 2008. During these local elections, the 
opposition did not pose any considerable challenge for the EPRDF, partly 
because the opposition failed to reorganise and partly because the govern-
ment had tightened its grip on local administrative structures (Aalen and 
Tronvoll 2009, 202–203). The EPRDF thus won the local elections with 
an overwhelming majority.
The run-up to the 2010 elections was marked by a tense atmosphere 
and severe restrictions on civil society organisations’ ability to campaign. 
The civil society, anti-terror and media laws (see above) were passed rela-
tively shortly before the elections and allowed the government to limit 
political spaces. On the other hand, the main opposition parties were also 
less organised than ahead of the 2005 elections. The government eventu-
ally won the elections in a landslide victory and secured the EPRDF all but 
two seats in parliament. This almost Stalinist outcome signalled to opposi-
tion members or anyone among the elite who might have considered 
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establishing a political alternative that the ruling party had regained its 
strength (Vaughan 2011; Tronvoll 2010).
From the mid-2000s onwards, the EU’s good governance strategies 
have clearly diverged from the Ethiopian government’s preferences. The 
EU’s support for effective government still matched the preferences of the 
government. But improving the effectiveness of state institutions had 
become less important compared to expanding party structures and 
coopting regime opponents and followers through these structures. On 
the other hand, EU support for democratic government, for instance, by 
assisting the Human Rights Commission or the parliament, induced con-
siderable costs for the Ethiopian government. Moreover, the EU’s 
attempts to empower civil society actors clearly diverged from the govern-
ment’s preferences. Only by closely involving the government in the man-
agement of the Civil Society Fund, was the government eventually 
persuaded to give the EU an exemption, allowing it to support civil soci-
ety organisations. In light of the experience of the 2005 elections, inviting 
in another EU election observer mission for the 2010 elections could 
cause considerable threats to regime survival for the Ethiopian govern-
ment. The government’s strong reluctance to invite this observer mission 
and its decision not to allow the mission to present its final results in Addis 
Ababa demonstrates how fragile the government’s position still was ahead 
of the 2010 elections. At the same time, it also suggests that EU support 
for the elections was perceived as potentially being dangerous to regime 
survival.
Ethiopia’s Economic Dependence on the EU
Ethiopia’s economic dependence on the EU slightly increased following 
the election crisis. Ethiopia is fairly dependent on development aid, and 
the EU has remained one of its largest donors. Ethiopia’s exports to the 
EU increased and the EU continued to be an important source of direct 
investments. Moreover, due to considerable challenges from the opposi-
tion during the 2005 elections and very low popular support for the 
regime after the election crisis, output legitimacy through economic 
growth and the provision of social services has been even more important 
for the government since 2005 (see previous section). In this regard, aid, 
trade and investment from the EU (and other external actors) have become 




If measured as a share of government revenue, Ethiopia’s aid depen-
dence remained very high. Since 2006, Ethiopia has had more access to 
development aid. Between 2006 and 2010 grants still constituted the 
second-largest source of government revenue after trade taxes. However, 
the share of aid to GNI successively declined to 11 per cent in 2011, 
despite rising inflows of aid (Fig. 4.1).
Together with the USA, the World Bank and the UK, the EU institu-
tions are the largest donors to Ethiopia (Fig.  4.3). Between 2006 and 
2010, the EU institutions have again provided about 17 per cent of total 
DAC aid to Ethiopia. Compared to Rwanda, Ethiopia has a larger number 
of donors from which it receives development aid. Almost all EU member 
states are also involved in Ethiopia. The bulk of aid by European donors is 
provided by the EU institutions and the UK, and to a lesser extent by 
Germany, France and others. The EU as a whole (EU institutions plus 
member states) had been the largest donor to Ethiopia between 2006 and 
2010 (Fig.  4.3). For the EU institutions (and several member states), 
Ethiopia has emerged as one of the largest aid recipients in Africa and also 
worldwide. Even though the EU and other donors put considerable pres-
sure on the Ethiopian government during the 2005 election crisis, in the 
end, they did not reduce the financial volume of development aid. The EU 
institutions even slightly increased aid in the following years (Fig. 4.3).
Moreover, the modalities of how the EU provides development aid 
have largely converged with the preferences of the Ethiopian government. 
For instance, the EU has supported the PBS programme which has been 
quite important to the government. The PBS that replaced the direct 
budget support has functioned quite similarly to direct budget aid 
(Bergthaller and Küblböck 2009; Borchgrevink 2008), and the govern-
ment apparently did not have a strong interest in resuming budget sup-
port (ECO Consult et  al. 2012). PBS funds help the government in 
providing basic services at the local level. Similar to direct budget support, 
funds are channelled through the government. However, in contrast to 
budget support, PBS does not involve a high-level macro- economic dia-
logue with the government in Addis Ababa. Critics posit that PBS (and 
some other aid programmes) are used by the government to strengthen its 
grip on power (BBC 2011; IRIN 2013). Human Rights Watch (2010), 
for instance, argued that the provision of basic services at the local level is 
conditioned to support for the EPRDF. Some are critical that programmes, 
such as PBS, thereby boost the government’s authority structures, since 
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funds are directed at regional and local government institutions, most of 
them controlled by the ruling party (Human Rights Watch 2010).
For the Ethiopian government, economic cooperation with the EU 
beyond development aid was also attractive. Since 2006, the EU has con-
tinued to be the most important destination for Ethiopian exports 
(Fig.  4.4) and the second-largest source of its imports. Ethiopia still 
exports only a few products; almost 80 per cent of these are (unprocessed) 
agricultural goods, most of it coffee. According to UN Comtrade statistics 
(2010), Germany has been the largest destination for Ethiopia’s coffee 
exports ahead of Saudi Arabia and the USA. Ethiopia’s coffee export mar-
kets are comparatively diversified. In recent years, Ethiopia could open 
some, albeit very few, new export sectors with respect to the EU, notably 
horticulture (flowers).
Ethiopia did not attract high levels of direct investments between 2006 
and 2010. According to the World Development Indicators, direct invest-
ments accounted for less than 5 per cent of GDP. For most of the past 
decade, direct investments as a share of GDP were lower in Ethiopia than 
in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. If companies from EU member states 
were taken together, the EU would still be the largest source of direct 
investments (European Union 2012). However, no single EU member 
state is among the top10 investors in Ethiopia (unlike China, as we will 
see below).
To sum up, the EU kept its position as one of the most important 
donors to Ethiopia since 2006. The sectors to which the EU provides its 
aid and the modalities by which it provides aid, largely match the prefer-
ences of the Ethiopian government. The EU, taken as a whole, is still the 
largest market for Ethiopia’s exports (mainly coffee) and the largest source 
of investments. One can thus argue that in the late 2000s, the Ethiopian 
government even had a stronger interest in cooperating with the EU 
beyond governance reforms. After the election crisis, however, the EU’s 
demands to cooperate on governance reform clearly diverged from the 
preferences of the Ethiopian government. In contrast to the early 2000s, 
access to EU aid could thus only partially compensate for the cost that 
cooperation would have generated, explaining why the government only 
very reluctantly resumed cooperation on governance reforms. This argu-
ment, however, would be even stronger if one could control for alternative 
explanations, such as Ethiopia’s access to cooperation with China.
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China: Alternative Cooperation Partner Since 2006
China’s economic cooperation with Ethiopia has been rapidly expanding. 
By 2012, China had emerged as an alternative partner for the Ethiopian 
government. It does not only extend official flows on a par with EU aid. 
China also offers new trading opportunities and direct investments, much 
needed by the Ethiopian government to raise domestic revenues, promote 
economic growth and provide public goods. Moreover (and in contrast to 
Rwanda and Angola), China engages with Ethiopia in reforms of the rul-
ing party and other parts of the government’s survival strategy.
 China: Becoming an Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner
Since 2006, Ethiopia has gained considerable access to official flows from 
China. Chinese official flows do not only align with the Ethiopian 
 government’s preferences. They also target sectors and policy fields that 
receive less support from the EU and other traditional donors.
Chinese aid and loans have rapidly increased up to USD7 billion until 
2012 (Table 4.4). By 2014, loans further surged to a total of USD12.2 
billion, making Ethiopia the second-largest recipient of Chinese loans in 
Africa, after Angola (Brautigam and Hwang 2016). The former Chinese 
ambassador in Addis Ababa highlights that Ethiopia is the only African 
country that benefited from all eight FOCAC policy measures announced 
in Beijing in 2006 (Gu 2008); a clear indication of Ethiopia’s political 
importance in China’s Africa policy. Most of the projects and technical 
assistance provided under the FOCAC framework—such as rural schools, 
a malaria prevention centre, a technical and vocational training centre, an 
agriculture demonstration centre or scholarships for students to study in 
China—would be counted as aid under the OECD DAC definition.
Chinese official flows have also grown beyond the scope of these devel-
opment aid projects, particularly since 2008. Although preferential and 
commercial loans are extended below market rates, they would not be 
counted as aid in the OECD definition, as they are aimed at supporting 
Chinese exports or their level of concessionality is not low enough. 
According to Ethiopian officials, preferential and commercial loans are 
allocated to large-scale productive projects; they have only been provided 
since 2008. Most of the official flows are allocated to large-scale infra-
structure investments (Table 4.4). As part of the FOCAC measures, the 
EXIM Bank financed an expressway from Addis Ababa to Dukem with a 
USD350 million concessional loan. In 2006, the China Development 
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Table 4.4 Chinese official flows to Ethiopia 2006–2012
Year Type of project Financial volume
2000–2004 Road construction in Addis Ababa:
  Parts of the Addis Ring Road USD87 million
  Sino-Ethiopia Friendship Avenue –
2006 More than 11 projects financed under a mixed 
loan facility, including:
Mugher Cement factory; Fan Hydropower 
Station
Total: USD500 million 
(combination of grants, 
interest-free loan and 
concessional loan)
USD100 million
2006 ZTE investment in Ethiopian 
Telecommunication Corporation
USD1.5 billion (export 
seller’s loan, China 
Development Bank)
2006 Gotera highway in Addis Ababa China covers 75%
2006–2012 FOCAC projects: three rural schools, technical 
vocational training centre (2008), hospital 
(2008), agriculture demonstration centre 
(2008), anti-malaria treatment centre (2008), 
malaria medication, China-Ethio Polytechnical 
College (USD14 million) including teachers
G
Expressway Addis-Dukem USD350 million (CL)
2008–2012 Various hydro-power projects and transmission 
lines, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation
USD2–3 billion (PL, 
ComLo)
Office equipment for several Ethiopian 
ministries
African Union building USD200 million (G)
2010 Nine vessels for Ethiopia Shipping Lines (ESL) USD294 million, EXIM 
Bank covers 80%
2011 Energy projects (hydro, solar, biogas) and 
anti-malaria medication
Birr203 million, 127 of 
this G
Water supply project for Addis Ababa USD100 million loan
2011 During Meles’ visit in China, EXIM Bank 
announces loan for various projects
USD 500 million loan
2010–2011 Constructing parts of new railway system for 
Ethiopia Railway Corporation (ERC);
317 km Addis-Miseo CREEG
339 km CCECC
USD1.1 billion, part of it 
covered by China and 
GoE
USD1.2 billion total, 
60% Chinese soft loan
2011 37 km light railway system in Addis 
implemented for Addis City Roads Authority by 
CRECC
USD400 million total 
costs, China covers 60%, 
GoE rest





Bank granted a USD1.5 billion loan for telecommunication (as an export 
seller’s loan). Chinese policy banks, mostly the EXIM Bank, but increas-
ingly also the CDB and ICBC, have provided several loans to support 
hydro-power projects or transmission lines.
China extends some loans to Ethiopian parastatal companies—
Ethiopian Road Authority, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, 
Ethiopian Airlines, Ethiopian Shipping Lines, Ethiopia Telecommunication 
Corporation and the Ethiopia Railways Corporation (Table 4.4). Some 
of these public enterprises also receive development aid from traditional 
donors. For instance, the EU and several others support the Ethiopian 
Road Authority; the World Bank finances hydropower projects for the 
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation. However, many projects sup-
ported by China would not be funded by the EU and other traditional 
donors, because the required financial volume is too large or because 
their economic and social impact is contested (large-scale dams, for 
instance). Furthermore, China gives assistance to some parastatal compa-
nies that have not had access to official or private capital flows from other 
Table 4.4 (continued)
Year Type of project Financial volume
2012 Maintenance hangar for Ethiopian Airlines USD100 million, no 
information which bank, 
unclear G/L
2012 China extends USD612 million over first six 
months of the fiscal year for various projects; 
USD300 million master loan facility for GTP; 
USD100 million loan for water supply to Addis
2012 65 guest cars, 25 coaches Birr108 million (G)
2012 Infrastructure development (28 January 2012) 
not clear if this is for a range of projects. Early in 
2012, seven agreements are signed to cooperate 
on railway, sugar, telecommunication and 
currency exchange agreement with CDB
USD3 billion loan
Total volume of projects, very rough estimate: USD7 billion (excluding 2012 loan)
Source: Author’s compilation based on interviews conducted in Addis and Beijing, information from 
MOFED and MOFCOM, aid transparency initiative, BBC monitoring international reports and Ethiopian 
newspapers (Ethiopian News Agency, Ethiopian Herald, Addis Fortune, Ethiopian Capital)
G Grant, IFL interest-free loan, CL concessional loan, PL preferential loan, ComLo commercial loan. Most 
loans are provided by the EXIM Bank
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international actors such as Ethiopia Shipping Lines. While official figures 
are not available, interviews with Chinese officials indicate that for the 
Chinese EXIM Bank, Ethiopia has become one of the largest recipients 
of loans in Africa and one of the countries with the most diversified proj-
ect portfolio.26
Chinese support for infrastructure projects managed by Ethiopia’s 
parastatal companies gives the Ethiopian government access to strategic 
rents. Moreover, it expects that loans from China will play a key role in 
financing its ambitious development strategy, as outlined in the Growth 
and Transformation Plan.27 In light of the government’s strong focus on 
economic growth and infrastructure investments since 2005, official flows 
from China have become an important alternative to the EU and other 
donors’ development aid.
Since 2006, cooperation with China has not only yielded important 
official flows for the government’s investments in infrastructure. 
Engagement with China has also generated revenues through trade and, 
to some extent, direct investments. While the EU has traditionally been 
Ethiopia’s largest trading partner, trade structures have changed consider-
ably in the past few years. China was Ethiopia’s largest source of imports. 
Ethiopia imports electronic equipment, textiles, machinery and vehicles 
from China. On the other hand, China’s importance as an export destina-
tion has grown considerably, particularly since 2008 (Fig. 4.4). Given the 
pace at which exports have grown in recent years, China may overtake the 
EU as the main destination of exports in the next few years. Ethiopia’s 
exports to China (similar to those to the EU) mainly consist of raw materi-
als. China has not yet become a major market for coffee exports.28 
Ethiopia’s exports to China include traditional export goods, such as 
leather, grain and gum.
Trade with China has also generated new export sectors, notably for 
oilseeds. Within a few years, Ethiopia has become the largest grower of 
sesame seeds in Africa and one of the largest in the world.29 Oilseeds 
overtook coffee as Ethiopia’s largest export product in 2007. Oilseeds 
from Ethiopia are mostly exported to China.30 In contrast to Rwanda, in 
Ethiopia, trading with China has thus provided the government with an 
important windfall. Foreign currency earnings from sesame seed exports 
are put in a bank account at the state-owned Commercial Bank of 
Ethiopia; they are then transferred to an escrow account with the China 
EXIM Bank to pay back Chinese loans for construction projects.31 While 
the surge in sesame seed exports opens important additional sources of 
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revenues, concentrating on China as the main export market is not with-
out risks. Anecdotal evidence from interviews with Chinese traders sug-
gests that Ethiopia’s exports of sesame seeds faced difficulties in 
competing with China’s domestic production and are only imported in 
case of a poor sesame harvest in China.32
According to the MOFCOM (2010), Chinese investment stock in 
Ethiopia jumped from about USD100 million in 2006 to about USD360 
million in 2010. The Ethiopia Investment Agency estimates Chinese 
investments to be considerably higher (about USD1 billion). Between 
2005 and 2009, Chinese companies were the third largest foreign inves-
tors to Ethiopia, after Saudi Arabia and India, and ahead of Sudan and 
Turkey. Chinese companies mostly engage in manufacturing, and Chinese 
investments are spread across a wide range of projects (Geda and Meskel 
2009; Ethiopian Economic Association 2009). A special economic zone 
that has been established outside Addis Ababa is likely to attract more 
investments from China (and other countries). The CADFund, an equity 
fund managed by the China Development Bank, opened an office in Addis 
Ababa in 2010 and began supporting Chinese investment projects in 
Ethiopia, for instance, a glass factory. Chinese small- and medium- sized 
enterprises and private companies see the country as a promising market 
and a ‘launch pad’ for their engagement in the wider region (Geda and 
Meskel 2009; Ethiopian Economic Association 2009). According to 
Chinese officials and business representatives, Ethiopia is an important 
market for Chinese provincially and centrally state-owned construction 
companies—partly financed by Western donors.
Other emerging economies, such as India or Turkey, have also invested 
in Ethiopia. Figures are difficult to obtain. Interviews with the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the Indian embassy in 
Ethiopia and the Ethiopian embassy in India indicate that compared to 
China, India’s assistance is still small and concentrated in a few policy 
fields, such as education33 (see also Greenhill et al. 2013). Investments are 
concentrated in agriculture, and particularly the sugar industry, where the 
India EXIM Bank supports several projects totalling USD700 million 
(India EXIM Bank 2013). Turkey, Qatar or Saudi Arabia also boosted 
their investments in Ethiopia. Even though the Ethiopian government 
actively looks for support from other actors, China thus appears to be the 
most important partner among the emerging economies in terms of assis-
tance, trade and loans.
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 Attractiveness of the China ‘Model’ and Support for Survival Strategies
In public speeches, but also in internal party debates, Prime Minister 
Meles repeatedly emphasised that China’s development provides impor-
tant lessons for Ethiopia. From 2000 onwards, the Ethiopian govern-
ment’s development strategy has been strongly inspired by development 
trajectories of East Asian countries—particularly China and South Korea 
(Fourie 2012). In public speeches and internal party documents directed 
towards both a domestic and international audience, Prime Minister Meles 
emphasised the importance of learning from China in order to promote 
development in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian leadership has sought inspiration 
from China’s economic development trajectory as well as its political insti-
tutions. The learning process is facilitated by close cooperation between 
the Chinese and Ethiopian governments and ruling parties.
China gives some technical assistance to support the capacities of the 
Ethiopian government. However, this assistance differs from the EU’s 
governance aid. China offers training programmes for various segments of 
the Ethiopian elite. Representatives from Ethiopian regional and national 
administrations or the media are sent to China for between 10 days and 
one month. According to Chinese officials, between 2006 and 2010, 
around 200 Ethiopians took part in these programmes every year.34 After 
a government reshuffle, China may invite all newly appointed senior offi-
cials for a study tour.35 Many participants of these training and exchange 
programmes are greatly impressed by China’s economic development. At 
the same time, several participants describe these exchanges as ‘visiting 
tours’ rather than training courses. The courses are probably helpful for 
improving knowledge about China and fostering both a positive attitude 
among larger parts of the Ethiopian elite and a supportive environment 
for Sino-Ethiopian relations. As systematic analyses on their effects are still 
lacking, their impact is unclear. According to Chinese and Ethiopian offi-
cials, beyond training and advice, China also offers material assistance to 
some ministries, for instance, office equipment for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or the Ministry of Information. The volume of this aid was small 
between 2006 and 2012.
In contrast to the EU, the Chinese government has hardly relied on the 
transnational channel and engages very little with Ethiopian civil society 
organisations. Civil society organisations are not included in the negotia-
tion and implementation of Chinese projects. The Chinese government 
started to invite NGO representatives for short-term visiting tours. In 
private discussions, some representatives from Ethiopian NGOs have 
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voiced concern about Chinese engagement and highlight that China 
opens alternative sources of financial support that further empowers the 
government to the detriment of opposition forces. In the media and pub-
lic debates, however, the government does not allow for controversial dis-
cussions on China’s engagement, and criticism is raised in private 
conversations only.
 Party-to-Party Relations
In contrast to the EU’s cooperation with Rwanda, party-to-party coopera-
tion constitutes one important channel for China–Ethiopia relations. 
Since 2005, the number of party visits increased considerably. Between 
2006 and 2011, Ethiopia’s Minister of Information, Simon Bereket, was 
been the most prominent actor engaged in EPRDF relations with the 
CCP; he led most official EPRDF delegations to China.36
In 2005, shortly after the election crisis and alongside efforts to rein-
force the influence of the party, the EPRDF established an office for for-
eign relations and started to intensify its engagement with other ruling 
parties. According to Ethiopian officials, the CCP has become the most 
important international partner for the EPRDF. For the CCP, the EPRDF 
is also one of the most important partners in Africa. If measured in terms 
of the number of bilateral visits, the EPRDF clearly figures above the aver-
age for sub-Saharan Africa (Fig. 4.5). Ethiopia is also one of few African 
countries where the CCP has dispatched a representative to the Chinese 
embassy.
Upon request by the EPRDF, both parties signed a MoU in October 
2010 to further institutionalise and intensify party-to-party contacts. 
Not least in light of the EPRDF party reforms after the 2005 election 
crisis, for the EPRDF, party-to-party relations open an important chan-
nel to discuss experiences on development, the relationship between the 
party and the state, strategies on how to organise leadership succession, 
how to manage intraparty transition from one generation to the next or 
the role of mass movements, such as women’s and youth associations. 
As many of the party cadres who fought the liberation struggle are 
about to retire, maintaining loyalty and compliance within the party 
becomes a key concern for the EPRDF leadership. Upon request by the 
EPRDF, the CCP supported the establishment of the central party 
school. The CCP itself also has a strong interest in the relationship. 
Close party-to-party relations are perceived as an important foundation 
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to strengthen economic and political cooperation between the two 
countries. Moreover, due to Ethiopia’s political influence in the region, 
cooperation with the EPRDF allows the CCP to learn more about 
African politics in general.
4.5  BriEF BrEEzE oF changE in Eu–Ethiopia 
coopEration BEtwEEn 2011 anD 2014
After the 2010 elections, the EU slightly modified its good governance 
strategy. It continued to promote governance reforms by supporting dem-
ocratic governance. It continued to target not only the government, but 
also used the transnational channel, for instance, through the Civil Society 
Fund. The EU proceeded to support not only the effectiveness but also 
democratic quality of decision-making processes. However, at the same 
time, the EU shifted its strategy from cooperative-critical towards coopera-
tive. The EU became more hesitant in issuing critical public statements 
and using aid funds to exert pressure on the Ethiopian government to 
open political spaces and cease coercive measures. Instead, between 2011 
and 2014, the EU has mainly relied on political dialogue and governance 
aid to support reforms.
Between 2011 and 2014, the Ethiopian government has apparently 
once again become more forthcoming in engaging with the EU in gover-
nance reforms. It agreed to hold dialogue more frequently and to include 
the heads of relevant line ministries, such as the Minister of Justice or the 
Minister of Agriculture, depending on the specific topic under discussion. 
Moreover, the Ethiopian government has agreed to engage with the EU 
and other donors in a regular dialogue with civil society representatives 
(DAG 2012, 3).
What can explain Ethiopia’s renewed openness to cooperation? The 
landslide victory in the 2010 elections showed both the leadership and 
opposition parties that the EPRDF was clearly back in power. In light of 
the relatively secure position of the Ethiopian leadership and the EU’s 
modification of its good governance strategy, engaging in governance 
reforms with the EU was less challenging between 2011 and 2014 than it 
was before the 2010 elections. Moreover, although the sudden death of 
Prime Minister Meles in August 2012 could have put the party in a diffi-
cult position, the change in the leadership did not result in open power 
struggles or a split within the ruling party.
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China has become even more important as a cooperation partner since 
the 2010 elections. The Chinese government started to assist key sectors 
of Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan, such as railways, a light 
railway in Addis Ababa and additional hydro-power projects (Table 4.4). 
In the second half of 2012, China extended loans amounting to USD612 
million, making it the largest loan provider to Ethiopia (Tadesse 2012; 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 2013, 23). Financed by 
the CADFund, two Chinese companies set up a joint venture to invest 
USD2 billion to produce shoes in Ethiopia in 2012. The project created 
several thousand jobs and is one of the largest CADFund projects, accord-
ing to Chinese officials.37 Other emerging economies such as India have 
also become slightly more important in recent years. In addition to 
 previous loans for the development of the sugar industry, India has 
approved a loan of USD300 million for the development of the railway 
system (India EXIM Bank 2013). However, as cooperation on gover-
nance reforms was less costly between 2011 and 2014 compared to the 
period between 2006 and 2010, China’s growing presence had limited 
effects on the Ethiopian government’s openness to engage with the EU 
in governance reforms.
4.6  concluSionS
Ethiopia only reluctantly engaged with the EU in governance reforms in 
the early 2000s. It became slightly more open to cooperation ahead of the 
2005 elections. After the elections, Ethiopia was initially indifferent 
towards EU demands to cooperate. Towards the 2010 elections, the gov-
ernment again agreed to at least reluctantly engage. Only after the 2010 
elections has it again become more open. What explains Ethiopia’s overall 
reluctance and these slight changes over time?
Why Has Ethiopia Only Reluctantly Engaged in Governance 
Reforms Between 2000 and 2005?
Ethiopia’s willingness to reluctantly engage with the EU in governance 
reforms in the early 2000s can be explained by a partial convergence of the 
EU and the Ethiopian government’s preferences, Ethiopia’s high eco-
nomic dependence on the EU and the absence of alternative cooperation 
partners such as China.
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In the early 2000s, the EU’s strategies to promote effective and demo-
cratic government and to use a cooperative-critical strategy produced some 
benefits, but also caused difficulties for the Ethiopian government. EU 
demands to cooperate on governance reforms came at a time of political 
instability, caused by the split in the TPLF central committee after the war 
with Eritrea. The Ethiopian leadership’s response to strengthen state insti-
tutions, to introduce decentralisation and promote output legitimacy 
partly matched EU demands to cooperate on effective government. 
However, its strategy to use low-intensity coercion to reduce the risk that 
defecting members of the elite mobilise mass support made cooperation 
on democratic government quite costly. In contrast to Rwanda, ahead of 
the 2005 elections, the Ethiopian government cautiously opened up polit-
ical spaces for opposition parties, civil society and the media, allowing for 
some (limited) cooperation on democratic government.
In the early 2000s (and similar to Rwanda), the Ethiopian government 
also started to reach out to the international donor community—includ-
ing the EU—to attract higher levels of development aid. Prime Minister 
Meles actively embraced the international aid effectiveness agenda from 
the very beginning. The EU’s willingness to increase development aid to 
Ethiopia was highly welcome and gave incentives to the government to 
reluctantly engage in governance reforms, despite the costs involved. On 
the other hand, Ethiopia still had very limited access to official flows from 
China and other non-traditional donors in the early 2000s, which poten-
tially could have reduced Ethiopia’s interests in engaging with the EU.
The 2005 Elections: Cooperating with the EU on Governance 
Reforms Threatens Regime Survival
The 2005 elections marked a turning point for the stability of the regime 
as well as for Ethiopia’s openness to cooperate with the EU. During the 
2005 election crisis, cooperating with the EU generated a fundamental 
threat to regime survival. The relatively strong election result for the 
opposition caught the EPRDF by surprise and significantly altered domes-
tic political dynamics in Ethiopia. The government blamed cooperation 
with the EU for having contributed to the crisis. The EU election observer 
mission was accused of siding with the opposition, thereby encouraging 
the opposition to take its protests to the streets. Moreover, the EU and 
other donors’ decision to withhold budget support put significant pres-
sure on the government. During a period when the government had to set 
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up its budget and when output legitimacy became more important than 
ever, the EU and other donors’ decision to use aid funds as leverage put 
the government in a precarious situation.
Largely unnoticed by the EU and other traditional donors, the 2005 
election crisis marked the starting point for China’s closer economic and 
political cooperation with Ethiopia. Simultaneously with the EU and 
other donors’ decision to withhold general budget support funds, the 
Chinese government extended its first substantial loan facility to Ethiopia, 
whereby it significantly reduced the Ethiopian government’s vulnerability 
to the EU and other traditional donors’ pressure. However, in 2005 it was 
still unclear to the Ethiopian government to what extent this ad hoc 
engagement would result in better access to economic cooperation with 
China in the medium to long-term.
Why Ethiopia Continued to Reluctantly Engage Between 2006 
and the 2010 Elections
The 2005 election crisis had not only short-term effects but also increased 
the costs for the Ethiopian government to engage with the EU in the 
medium-term. In the aftermath of the 2005 election crisis, the Ethiopian 
government abruptly closed political spaces and expanded the influence of 
the EPRDF. The government used measures of low-intensity coercion, 
such as new laws on media, terrorism and civil society that substantially 
limited the freedom of the opposition. The EPRDF expanded its member-
ship base. It introduced measures to link access to civil service and some 
public goods to party membership to broaden its support base and improve 
compliance. At the same time, and as political spaces narrowed, state mod-
ernisation and the provision of public goods became even more important 
to secure regime stability. In this context, the EU’s decision to broaden its 
good governance strategies and to promote not only democratic govern-
ment but to also assist and empower civil society actors vis-à-vis the gov-
ernment entailed risks for the Ethiopian government. Moreover, the EU’s 
decision to combine cooperative with critical instruments, inflicted consid-
erable costs as EU criticism tied in with domestic reform pressure and 
regime instability.
As cooperation with the EU on governance reforms was challenging for 
the government after the 2005 election crisis, one would have expected 
that Ethiopia would be indifferent towards EU demands to engage. To 
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understand why the government still reluctantly engaged with the EU 
between 2006 and 2010, one thus needs to take into account its broader 
interests in cooperating with the EU.  While output legitimacy became 
even more important for the Ethiopian government, the EU remained 
one of the largest donors to Ethiopia, one of the most significant sources 
of direct investment and an important trading partner. The Ethiopian gov-
ernment thus could not ‘afford’ to ignore EU demands to cooperate on 
governance reforms despite the fundamental costs that cooperation 
entailed.
However, since the 2005 election crisis, China also successively emerged 
as an alternative economic cooperation partner, reducing Ethiopia’s 
dependence on the EU and other traditional donors. Moreover, China has 
become an important partner for the Ethiopian government to support its 
survival strategies and the main partner of the EPRDF to engage in party 
reforms. In the case of Ethiopia, China has thus clearly emerged as an 
alternative cooperation partner to the EU between 2005 and 2011.
In this context, one would have expected that Ethiopia would refuse to 
cooperate with the EU on governance reforms, when China emerges as an 
alternative cooperation partner. However, Ethiopia has continued to at 
least reluctantly engage, going against the argument that China’s presence 
in Africa substantially influences African governments’ willingness to 
cooperate with the EU on governance reforms.
Why Has Ethiopia Again Become More Forthcoming to Engage 
Between 2011 and 2014?
After the 2010 elections, the EU has continued to promote democratic 
governance. But it has also modified its strategy from a cooperative-critical 
towards a cooperative strategy. The Ethiopian government has again 
become slightly more forthcoming and willing to cooperate on gover-
nance reforms. However, the slight modifications in the EU’s strategy 
alone cannot account for the changes in the government’s responsiveness. 
Instead, this change can be explained by greater domestic regime stability. 
The 2010 elections brought a landslide victory for the EPRDF, winning 
all but two seats in parliament. This overwhelming victory signalled to 
both the regime and the opposition that it had (at least partly) regained its 
strength, also giving it more confidence to engage with the EU and other 




At least two counterfactual conjectures should be explored. First, what if 
the EU had continued to promote mostly democratic government or even 
narrowed its approach to effective government instead of broadening its 
good governance approach to democratic governance since 2006? In this 
case the Ethiopian government may have been more forthcoming in 
engaging with the EU.  Parts of the EU’s good governance approach 
matched the preferences of the Ethiopian government. EU attempts to 
strengthen the effectiveness of government institutions and support 
capacity-building, for instance, in the context of the PSCAP programme, 
was very welcome to the Ethiopian government. Moreover, Ethiopia may 
have been more willing to engage in political and aid policy dialogues on 
governance reforms, if the EU had issued fewer critical public statements. 
As one EU official describes the dilemma: ‘We can have a political dia-
logue meeting with the minister or we can publish a critical statement, but 
we can’t have both’.38 It can thus be argued that the Ethiopian govern-
ment might have been more active in engaging with the EU in governance 
reforms, if the EU had narrowed its good governance approach and had 
refrained from adopting a cooperative-critical strategy. However, this 
would also have considerably limited the EU’s means of influencing politi-
cal reforms.
Second, what if China had not emerged as an alternative cooperation 
partner since the mid-2000s? China’s growing role as a provider of official 
flows, a trading partner, a source of direct investments, and as a partner to 
cooperate on governance reforms has reduced the incentives for the 
Ethiopian government to engage with the EU. However, it seems unlikely 
that in the absence of China, the Ethiopian government would have been 
much more forthcoming and would have actively or even proactively 
engaged with the EU in governance reforms, given the high risk that this 
cooperation involved after the election crisis. This (again) illustrates the 
importance of the domestic survival strategies as the determining factor to 
explain differential response strategies towards EU demands to cooperate 
on governance reforms.
Outlook
As is the case with Rwanda, the example of Ethiopia demonstrates that the 
domestic logic of political survival in authoritarian regimes has important 
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consequences for what the EU can achieve with its good governance strat-
egy at a certain point in time. In Ethiopia, political spaces have also gradu-
ally reduced since the mid-2000s. However, Ethiopia was much less 
willing than Rwanda to engage with the EU (and other donors) in gover-
nance reforms. The Ethiopian government thus made it very hard for the 
EU (and other donors) to put governance reforms on the agenda of bilat-
eral relations. Given that the government considerably depends on output 
legitimacy for which EU aid also plays a prominent role, the EU institu-
tions—in close cooperation with EU member states and other donors—
might have used their leverage more strategically and applied more 
pressure on the government not to close political spaces further. Providing 
large sums of development aid to Ethiopia without exerting substantial 
pressure for political reforms, while the government gradually closes polit-
ical spaces and does not allow for any opposition, engagement of CSOs or 
debates in the media, raises serious questions regarding the EU’s contri-
bution to medium- to longer-term prospects of inclusive and sustainable 
development in the country.
Sadly enough, recent events in Ethiopia seem to confirm those sceptics 
who argue that authoritarian regimes that focus on strong institutions and 
public goods provision while reducing political spaces will not be stable in 
the medium to long-term. The 2015 parliamentary elections demon-
strated the EPRDF’s firm grip on power and a hardening of authoritarian 
rule: the EPRDF won all seats. This overwhelming victory thus signalled 
to the EPRDF and opposition members that the it has not lost its strength, 
in spite of the death of Prime Minister Meles in 2012. As formal channels 
to express dissatisfaction through the media, civil society engagement or 
opposition parties in parliament were no longer available, protesters took 
to the streets. The upsurge in demonstrations against the government 
since the end of 2014 indicates a strong dissatisfaction and public dissent 
with government policies. The government’s violent response illustrates 
the extent to which it is shaken by the protests.
These recent dynamics in Ethiopia thereby second the argument that 
the EU and other actors should not one-sidedly focus on enhancing the 
effectiveness of government institutions, but should in parallel promote 
the democratic quality of decision-making processes. In other words, 
these recent dynamics underscore the need for the EU to make support 
for democratic governance an integral part of its policies in order to posi-
tively contribute to sustainable and inclusive policies in the long run, par-
ticularly in cases where the EU at the same time provides large sums of 
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development aid and by doing so—in any case—has an effect on domestic 
politics.
notES
1. The EPRDF is a party coalition consisting of the TPLF, Amhara National 
Democratic Movement (ANDM), Oromo People’s Democratic Organization 
(OPDO) and Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDU). 
Parties closely affiliated with the EPRDF are SPDP, ANDP, BGPDP and 
GPUDM. Trigray represents only 6 per cent of the population.
2. However, in contrast to the TPLF that had fought the struggle against the 
Derg and already established new state structures in the liberated territo-
ries, other parties within the EPRDF coalition were more loosely anchored 
in their respective regions (Clapham 2009; Young 2004; Vaughan 2011).
3. In several key sectors such as transport, energy, telecommunication or ship-
ping, parastatal companies operate on behalf of the government. Not 
much information exists on most of these parastatal companies. Their bud-
get is not part of the state budget, which makes effective parliamentary 
oversight difficult. As one European donor official put it: ‘They [these 
companies] are a black box to us’.
4. Party-affiliated companies control important parts of the economy—par-
ticularly in Tigray region—buttressing the political power of the EPRDF 
(Abbink 2009, 11; Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011).
5. The government has not used the war to broaden its political support base, 
since it was largely fought within Tigray region (Clapham 2009, 186).
6. Reviewing the EIDHR projects in Ethiopia between 2000 and 2006 indi-
cates that the EU focused on strengthening media and press freedom, basic 
human rights and capacity-building of parliaments.
7. Interviews with officials from the EU and member states in Addis Ababa in 
October 2009 and November 2010.
8. Only the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces that had gained 52 seats, 
took up their positions; the Coalition for Unity and Democracy did not 
take up the seats in parliament and other elected offices, such as that of the 
Mayor of Addis Ababa (Tronvoll 2009, 458).
9. BBC News, 1 August 2006, The politics of aid in Ethiopia, online at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5233352.stm, last access on 1 January 2013.
10. Ibid.
11. Due to the restructuring of the party and particularly party-state relations 
after the leadership split in 2001, the capacity of the EPRDF to organise an 
election campaign at the local level was limited. Moreover, the purge of 
opposition forces from the ruling coalition in 2001 had delegitimised the 
EPRDF (Tronvoll 2009, 466f).
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12. Ethiopia’s minister for information and secretary-general of the EPRDF 
Simon Bereket had also been travelling to China in February 2006.
13. Various interviews with European donor officials suggest that European 
actors had no notice of the agreement between the Ethiopian government 
and China.
14. The CSP states that €49 million representing about 8 per cent of the 10th 
EDF should be allocated to democratic governance reforms. Of these €49 
million, the country strategy paper provides €29 million for supporting 
capacity-building of democratic institutions and the judicial system. Both 
in terms of its absolute volume and its relative share of overall EU assis-
tance to Ethiopia, aid for governance reforms has increased significantly 
compared to the Ninth EDF (Ethiopia and European Community 2002, 
2007).
15. Interviews with Ethiopian government officials in Addis Ababa in 
November 2010 and June 2013 and interviews with officials from the EU 
and member states in Addis Ababa in October 2009, November 2010 and 
June 2013 and in Brussels in April 2010 and December 2012.
16. Beyond Article 8 dialogue, the Ethiopian government agreed to meet with 
the Group of Ambassadors on a regular basis to discuss various issues of 
regional peace and security, economic development, but also governance 
reforms.
17. The discussion here and in the following is also based on interviews with 
Ethiopian government officials and EU and member states’ officials in 
Addis Ababa in October 2009 and November 2010 as well as with EU 
officials in Addis Ababa in June 2013.
18. See also DAG annual reports, various years. Relevant line ministries, such 
as the Ministry of Justice, have met with sub-groups to the donors’ gover-
nance technical working groups, that is, to work on justice sector reforms, 
human rights or civil society, but the government agreed to meet with 
donors only on an ad hoc basis and in response to specific requests (DAG 
2010, 16ff).
19. Interviews with EU officials in Addis Ababa in November and October 
2009.
20. Interviews with EU officials in Addis Ababa in November 2010 and in 
December 2012.
21. Only after lengthy negotiations did the government agree in 2009 to allo-
cate €4 million of the €10 million earmarked for supporting justice sector 
reform under the 10th EDF to strengthen the capacities of the ‘Justice 
Organs Professional Training Centre’ (European Commission 2009). 
Despite the EU’s requests, the Ministry of Justice has not been willing to 
combine the provision of technical and financial assistance for justice 
reform with a regular dialogue on such reforms (European Commission 
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2009). This was also confirmed during interviews with EU officials in 
Addis Ababa in November 2010.
22. Interviews with officials from the EU institutions, EU member states and 
other international donors in Addis Ababa in November 2010.
23. The objective of the Civil Society Fund is to strengthen the participation 
of NGOs in the dialogue between the EU and the Ethiopian government, 
for instance during the preparation and implementation of the National 
Indicative Programme (European Commission 2009).
24. Already during the negotiations to launch the PBS programme, the gov-
ernment rejected the civil society component (Furtado and Smith 2009). 
The new NGO law negatively affected support to civil society through this 
programme. Only recently had the government decided to consider aid 
through the PBS national funding, thereby giving national NGOs access to 
it (ECO Consult et al. 2012).
25. In 2012, the IMF suspended its programme over disagreements with the 
Ethiopian government about growth rates and about the ability of the 
government to generate enough capital needed for investments in infra-
structure (EIU 2012).
26. Interviews with Chinese officials in Beijing in July 2010, March 2011 and 
July 2013.
27. See also Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, press statement 
2011 ‘China plans to double its development assistance to Ethiopia’, 
online at http://www.mofed.gov.et/English/NewsandUpdates/Pages/
ChinaPlanstoDoubleitsDevelopmentAssistancetoEthiopia.aspx, last access 
3 June 2014.
28. Information based on United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database (2010).
29. See The Guardian 10 July 2013 ‘Ethiopia's sesame seed trade with 
China—a partnership of equals?’, online at http://www.theguardian.
com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jul/10/ethiopia-ses-
ame-seed-trade-china, last access on 3 June 2014.
30. China went from being a net exporter to a net importer of sesame seeds.
31. Brautigam quoted by Bloomberg, ‘Ethiopia’s bank-secured sesame seed- 
sales seen boosting exports’, 6 December 2012, online at http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-06/ethiopia-s-bank-secured-sesame-
seed-sales-seen-boosting-exports.html, last access on 3 June 2014.
32. Interviews with Chinese business men in Beijing in July 2010 and in Addis 
Ababa in December 2010.
33. Interviews were conducted in Delhi in July 2013 and in Addis Ababa in 
December 2010.
34. Interview with Chinese official in Addis Ababa in November 2010.
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35. This happened for instance in 2010 according to an Ethiopian senior gov-
ernment official; interview in Addis Ababa in November 2010.
36. This is shown by various press statements on relations between the CCP on 
the EPRDF as indicated on the website of the CCP International Bureau, 
online at http://www.idcpc.org.cn/, last access on 3 June 2014.
37. See also Capital Ethiopia ‘Chinese firm to spend $2 billion in leather sec-
tor’, 5 March 2012, online at http://www.capitalethiopia.com/, last 
access on 5 November 2012.
38. Interview with EU official in Addis Ababa in June 2013.
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The Angolan government started to very reluctantly engage with the EU 
in governance reforms in the early 2000s. Over time it has become increas-
ingly indifferent in its response to EU demands to cooperate.
This chapter demonstrates that—in contrast to Ethiopia and Rwanda—
Angola is an example of a country where the EU’s good governance strat-
egies mostly entail costs for the government. Due to specific structural 
conditions (notably the Angolan government’s access to abundant oil 
resources), the government has very little interest in building effective 
state institutions. Instead, in light of its access to easy revenues, it mostly 
uses state (and party) institutions to coopt regime supporters and oppo-
nents. The Angolan government faced little opposition in the first few 
years after the civil war. Since 2008, however, dissatisfaction within the 
party fermented and opposition outside of the party has grown. In 
response, the leadership has expanded party institutions, cooptation 
mechanisms and low-intensity coercion.
In this context, EU support for governance reforms was risky and gen-
erated almost no benefits. The Angolan government’s decision to still, 
albeit reluctantly, start engaging in governance reforms in the early 2000s 
can be explained by its interest in receiving EU support for the reconstruc-
tion process. However, in 2004 when China appeared on the horizon as 
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an alternative economic cooperation partner and Angola’s interest in 
cooperating with the EU ‘beyond’ governance reforms faded away, the 
EU was left with no ‘carrots or sticks’ to persuade the Angolan govern-
ment to address governance issues.
The example of Angola thus illustrates the limitations of the EU’s good 
governance strategies in cases where the government has no genuine 
interest in cooperation and where it is not dependent on EU aid. Since the 
EU’s instruments to support governance reforms are mainly operation-
alised in the field of development policy, the EU is left with limited options 
to engage in these contexts.
5.1  Structural FactorS Shaping angola’S Survival 
StrategieS
After the end of the civil war in 2002, the MPLA under President Eduardo 
dos Santos fostered its position as the dominant political force in Angola. 
Almost 30 years of civil war left the country devastated, with basic infra-
structure destroyed and millions of people displaced. The government 
faced several challenges: it needed to transform the economy from a war- 
to a peace- time economy. It had to demonstrate that it was not only able 
to bring about peace but also an economic and social ‘peace dividend’ for 
its supporters. Furthermore, it needed to maintain support from key seg-
ments of the elite, such as the military and security forces, the MPLA party 
apparatus, the state oil company Sonangol and members of the presidential 
family.1
The Angolan government can rely on enormous revenues from oil 
exports. Some have argued that the ‘resource curse’ creates incentives for 
politicians to dismantle state institutions to seize rents, rather than to actu-
ally strengthen state institutions (Ross 1999). This argument also holds 
true in the case of Angola. The MPLA-governed state has often been 
described as a ‘successfully failed state’ (Soares de Oliveira 2011; Sogge 
2009). On the one hand, formal state institutions were (and still are) quite 
weak or absent. The state has not been fulfilling some of its most basic 
functions in terms of guaranteeing human security and delivering basic 
services to its citizens. On the other hand, the Angolan leadership has 
established a highly efficient oil industry capable of generating vast 
amounts of rent that are necessary for regime survival. During the civil 
war, the state-owned company Sonangol had already gained a positive 
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international reputation for its efficiency and aptitude in negotiating with 
international oil businesses (Soares de Oliveira 2015).
5.2  angola reluctantly engaging in governance 
reFormS in the early 2000S DeSpite china emerging
Until the end of the civil war in 2002, the EU’s engagement with Angola 
had been limited. Throughout the 1990s, the EU mostly provided 
humanitarian and food aid, depending on the intensity of the conflict and 
humanitarian crisis (Republic of Angola and European Community 2003). 
After the end of the war, the EU sought to establish closer relations, and 
regular EU development assistance quickly resumed.
The EU’s Good Governance Strategies Between 2000 and 2005
 The EU’s Approach: Promoting Democratic Government
In the first few years after the civil war, the EU institutions made some 
attempts to promote democratic government. The EU made support for 
governance reforms a key priority in its support of Angola’s peace and 
reconciliation process. The first country strategy paper signed by the 
EU and the Angolan government in early 2003 reflects the EU’s 
approach to promote democratic government (Republic of Angola and 
European Community 2003). The strategy paper highlights that, along 
with general capacity-building for government institutions and improve-
ments in the transparency and management of public finances, the 
organisation of parliamentary and presidential elections, improvements 
to the human rights situation and the rule of law constitute precondi-
tions for the success of Angola’s peace process (ibid). Even though the 
strategy paper mentions the need to empower civil society organisations 
and their role in holding the government accountable, the focus clearly 
lies on strengthening government and state institutions (ibid).
According to OECD DAC aid statistics, the EU’s financial commit-
ments to support governance reforms indeed increased considerably in the 
early 2000s. Despite the strong rhetorical emphasis on promoting demo-
cratic reforms, the EU committed more aid to support the effectiveness of 
government institutions (about 74 per cent) than their democratic 
accountability (about 26 per cent) (Table 5.1).
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Between 2000 and 2005, the EU clearly prioritised the intergovern-
mental over the transnational channel in its good governance strategy 
towards Angola.2 Assistance through the EIDHR to support NGOs 
was very limited (Table  5.4). The EU directly allocated only small 
amounts of aid from the EDF to strengthen NGO capacities (about €5 
million for 2002–2007) (Republic of Angola and European Community 
2003).
 The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative-Critical
The EU initially pursued a cooperative-critical strategy. In addition to 
political dialogue and governance aid, the EU used strategies of naming 
and shaming and some material incentives to pressure the Angolan gov-
ernment to accelerate political reforms. The EU made several non-public 
démarches to raise concerns regarding the human rights situation and to 
address governance issues (Table 5.2). When the EU modified its com-
mon position in June 2002, it urged the government to advance demo-
cratic reforms, to hold free and fair parliamentary and presidential 
elections, to allow more spaces for civil society actors and to address the 
humanitarian crisis. The EU also made critical public statements in the 
UN and other international fora, asking the Angolan government to hold 
elections, and criticising its human rights record.
Table 5.1 EU governance aid commitments to Angola (in USD million and in 
percent)
Angola 2000–2005 2006–2014
Total governance aid 18.80 72.09
Total aid (all sectors) 603.15 375.04
Governance aid/share in total EU aid 3.1% 19.2%
Output legitimacy 13.95 41.68
Input legitimacy 4.85 30.41
Output legitimacy/share in total governance aid 74.2% 57.8%
Input legitimacy/share in total governance aid 25.8% 42.2%
Source: Author’s compilation, based on OECD DAC aid statistics (2016) (Query for EU institutions; 
‘total governance aid’ includes all aid reported under the category ‘151:I5a: Government & Civil Society- 
general, Total’ to the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System. ‘Output legitimacy’ includes public sector 
and administrative management, public finance management, decentralisation and support to subnational 
government, anti-corruption organisations and institutions; ‘input legitimacy’ includes legal and judicial 
development, democratic participation and civil society, elections, legislature and political parties, media 
and freedom of information, human rights, women’s equality. Data accessible at http://stats.oecd.org; 
last accessed: 5 October 2016)
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In 2003, the Angolan President dos Santos sent a letter to the 
President of the European Commission asking support from the EU to 
organise an international donor conference to raise international funds 
for Angola’s reconstruction. The EU made his request conditional upon 
the signing of a framework agreement with the IMF which would have, 
among other stipulations, required the Angolan government to improve 
transparency of oil revenues and reduce corruption (Republic of Angola 
and European Community 2008). The EU did not consider initiating 
Article 96 negotiations in the first years after the end of the war 
(PARTICIP et al. 2006).3
2000–2005: Angola Started to Very Reluctantly Engage
In response to EU demands to cooperate on the implementation of gov-
ernance instruments, the Angolan government—albeit very reluctantly—
started to engage with the EU.
 Angola’s Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues
Relatively soon after the end of the civil war, at the end of 2003, the Angolan 
government agreed to initiate a formal Article 8 political dialogue. Between 
2003 and 2005, five meetings took place (Republic of Angola and European 
Community 2008). However, in contrast to Ethiopia and Rwanda, appar-
ently these meetings did not have a very high political priority for the 
Angolan government. The Angolan side was represented by the then vice 
minister of foreign affairs, George Rebelo Chicoti, who became the main 
interlocutor for the EU. The Angolan government has not opened up this 
formal dialogue to include representatives from other line ministries, and 
has been reluctant to discuss issues related to democratic or effective 
Table 5.2 EU statements and démarches related to governance reforms 
2000–2012
2000–2005 2006–2012 Total
Positive Critical Positive Critical
EU public statements on governance 
reforms
4 11 5 – 20
Démarches – 6 – 2 8
Source: Author’s compilation, based on EU annual human rights reports, documents published by the 
Council of the EU
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 governance with the EU (much more reluctant than either Ethiopia or 
Rwanda). Some interviewees, EU documents and information from an 
independent evaluation suggest that the more the Angolan government 
gained the impression that the key objective of the dialogue was to discuss 
issues related to human rights, democratic reforms or the transparency of 
government finances, the more it lost interest in the dialogue (ECO Consult 
et al. 2009).
Beyond political dialogue, the Angolan government was indifferent 
towards the EU’s demands to address governance reforms as part of aid 
policy dialogues. In contrast to Ethiopia and Rwanda, in Angola aid policy 
dialogues have only been very loosely institutionalised. According to 
European officials, the government was hesitant to speak about gover-
nance reforms within the existing aid policy dialogue formats.
 Angola’s Responsiveness: Governance Aid and Positive Conditionality
In the early 2000s, the Angolan government started to reluctantly engage 
with the EU in the implementation of aid targeted at supporting gover-
nance reforms. As the following analysis will document, the government 
was more willing to accept aid geared towards the support of human and 
administrative capacities of government institutions, than for transpar-
ency, the fight against corruption or the democratic quality of the decision- 
making processes.
The Angolan government signed the EU country strategy paper that 
put a strong emphasis on good governance, and it agreed to allocate large 
parts of the EU’s aid to support good governance, even though it had a 
strong preference for infrastructure development. Angola accepted some 
support for the Ministry of Planning in the process of designing a develop-
ment strategy for 2005–2006 and a long-term development plan (the 
‘Visao 2025’).4 It accepted some assistance to improve the capacities of 
the National Institute for Statistics and the National Assembly. It also 
agreed to set up projects that promoted decentralisation and governance 
at the regional level (ECO Consult et al. 2009). Furthermore, the govern-
ment engaged with the EU in the implementation of aid allocated to sup-
port planning and budgeting capacities of ministries responsible for social 
policies at the national and provincial level (ECO Consult et al. 2009).
Yet, the analysis of joint annual reports on the implementation of EU 
aid to Angola, interviews with EU officials and independent evaluations of 
the EU’s aid programmes in Angola indicate that apart from these few 
measures, the government was unwilling to implement good governance 
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programmes.5 Most of the EU’s funds earmarked for governance reforms 
could therefore not be disbursed. The government was not prepared to 
sign and implement a programme of about €5 million that the EU had 
designed to support the election process (European Community and 
Republic of Angola 2007, 10). The government did not agree with the 
EU about designing a large programme to support the capacities of the 
judicial system and to improve access to justice (PARTICIP et al. 2006; 
European Community and Republic of Angola 2007); it merely agreed to 
launch a project that supports regional cooperation on justice reform 
among Portuguese-speaking countries. The government was unwilling to 
design projects with a view to supporting public financial management 
and transparency of government funds (PARTICIP et  al. 2006; ECO 
Consult et al. 2009).
The Angolan government was also reluctant to engage with the EU in 
the implementation of assistance allocated to support the capacities of civil 
society organisations. The identification and implementation of direct 
assistance to NGOs encountered difficulties, as programmes financed 
under the EDF have to be agreed upon by both the EU and the Angolan 
government (ECO Consult et al. 2009).
We can conclude that, similar to Ethiopia and Rwanda, in Angola the 
EU also sought to promote democratic government in the early 2000s. In 
its public statements, the country strategy paper, through political dialogue 
and the allocation of governance aid, the EU expressed the importance it 
attaches to holding elections, respect for human rights and reform of the 
justice sector as well as improvements to the transparency of  government 
finances. The EU clearly prioritised the intergovernmental over the trans-
national channel to support governance reforms and allocated only small 
amounts of aid to support NGOs. Moreover, again similar to Ethiopia and 
Rwanda, the EU also adopted a cooperative-critical strategy.
In response, the Angolan government hesitantly engaged. Already by 
the early 2000s, Angola was much more reluctant to respond to the EU’s 
demands than Ethiopia and particularly Rwanda. The government hesi-
tantly agreed to initiate formal political dialogue in the early 2000s, even 
if meetings subsequently took place irregularly and only at the level of the 
vice minister of foreign affairs. The government reluctantly started to 
engage in the implementation of some aid projects geared towards sup-
porting governance reforms. It was indifferent towards the EU and other 




The Angolan Government’s Survival Strategies
 Little Domestic Opposition and Challenge to Regime Survival
The Angolan government faced little challenge from the domestic 
opposition in the first few years after the end of the civil war. With the 
MPLA’s clear military victory and the death of Jonas Savimbi, the 
leader of the opposition party UNITA, the MPLA could consolidate its 
power largely unchallenged. A return to armed conflict was relatively 
unlikely. The MPLA-led government quickly restored its monopoly on 
power and extended the reach of the state throughout the country. 
Only some disputes with separatist movements in the Cabinda province 
still persist. Moreover, the opposition party UNITA was clearly not in a 
position to politically challenge the MPLA as it was disorganised inter-
nally (Orre 2010).
In light of the physical destruction of the country and the traditionally 
weak civil society, societal opposition was also weak and unlikely to emerge 
in the first few years after the war. As one observer put it: ‘…Angolans 
[were] exhausted after four decades of conflict and keen on predictability 
in their lives’ (Soares de Oliveira 2011, 293). Within the ruling elite, 
President dos Santos was largely unchallenged in the early 2000s.
 Using State Institutions and the Party for Cooptation
At the end of the civil war, the Angolan leadership had to rebuild its sup-
port base and restructure the economy from a war- to a peace-time econ-
omy. The leadership established informal state institutions to carefully 
balance different power centres in order to centralise access to rents and 
power. Moreover, it used the party as an instrument of cooptation. Both 
arguments will be further explored in the following sections.
The MPLA plays a major role in Angola as both the main instrument to 
keep the leadership in power and as a vehicle for cooptation. Rents to 
coopt regime supporters are channelled through party structures. At the 
same time, President dos Santos has carefully balanced other informal and 
formal power houses against the party to prevent it from becoming too 
powerful. The former chief of the state-owned oil company Sonangol, 
Manuel Vicente, for instance, has a limited powerbase within the party 
(Roque 2011) and thus did not constitute a strong rival to President dos 
Santos.
In the first few years after the war, the Angolan leadership made some 
efforts to reinforce state institutions at the regional and local level to 
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expand its reach. Developing a civil administration in other urban centres 
and the rural areas was also a political imperative for the government 
(Power 2011). However, these measures contributed only slightly to 
improvements in the effectiveness of the government. If measured accord-
ing to the WGI, the government’s effectiveness only improved slightly in 
the early 2000s. It remained significantly below the average of sub-Saha-
ran African countries (Fig. 5.2 below), and was clearly worse than Ethiopia 
and Rwanda.
In addition to formal government structures, the president created new 
informal government structures to centralise resources and balance differ-
ent factions. Under the auspices of the presidency, a shadow government 
was responsible for policy formulation and policy implementation in key 
areas such as security or international relations. Its two main bodies were 
the Civilian House and Military House (Roque 2011). Within the Military 
House, the president established the Office of National Reconstruction 
(GRN) in 2004. One of the main objectives of the GRN was to launch 
prestigious projects, such as a new airport and railway lines. The GRN 
quickly became the most important institution for managing infrastructure 
reconstruction, and thus also for deciding on how the loans extended by 
the China International Fund should be allocated, which will be discussed 
more in detail below. These informal state structures allowed the president 
to reduce the influence of the formal government institutions, that is, the 
Ministry of Finance (which would have been responsible for the manage-
ment of credit lines). And it allowed the president to use investments in 
infrastructure more strategically to reward and coopt regime supporters 
(Croese 2011; Corkin 2013; Manning 2011, 12).
The Angolan government strongly prioritised investment in the recon-
struction of basic infrastructure. Investment in large-scale, physical infra-
structure became the priority during the first period of post-war 
reconstruction between 2002 and the 2008 elections. The devastation of 
basic infrastructure can hardly be overstated (World Bank 2005). Roads, 
railways, bridges, electricity and so on were largely destroyed by the war. 
In Luanda, hardly any investments had been made during the war (Power 
2011). Infrastructure investments were clearly much needed.
Yet, at the same time, large investments in infrastructure also constitute 
a formidable instrument of cooptation. In the absence of budgetary over-
sight, procurement remained opaque, and companies were selected on the 
basis of their political connections rather than quality and efficiency 
(Soares de Oliveira 2011). Quality control also remained limited and some 
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were critical that infrastructure investments have been hugely expensive, 
but failed to deliver value for money (ibid). According to the World Bank 
(2011), public expenditure heavily favoured the urban areas (particularly 
Luanda), instead of the poor and the victims of war.
 Managing Arenas of Contestation: Elections
The government has also built up formal democratic institutions after the 
end of the civil war. The first parliamentary and presidential elections were 
supposed to take place in 2006. Yet, despite pressure from the EU and 
other international actors, the government postponed the parliamentary 
elections several times, before they were finally held in 2008. No date was 
announced for the first presidential elections. Some observers argue that 
the government first wanted to make sure that it was in a position to win 
the elections with a large majority (Hon et al. 2010, xx; Corkin 2013).
Due to the Angolan government’s limited efforts in strengthening the 
effectiveness and democratic quality of decision-making processes, coop-
erating with the EU on governance reforms was challenging and involved 
very few benefits. It is thus not surprising that the government had been 
very hesitant to engage with the EU. Instead, it seems rather surprising 
that Angola has started to engage with the EU at all. Focusing only on 
Angola’s survival strategies cannot explain why the government, at least 
reluctantly, cooperated with the EU in the early 2000s. The next sections 
will therefore analyse both the Angolan government’s broader interests in 
engaging with the EU and the influence of China.
Angola’s Economic Dependence on the EU
In the case of Angola, the EU has clearly faced difficulties in establishing 
itself as an attractive cooperation partner. When Angola approached the 
EU for support in the reconstruction process, the EU probably missed an 
opportunity to set incentives for cooperation.
Angola is not aid dependent. The Angolan government relies almost 
exclusively on resource rents; oil revenues account for almost all govern-
ment revenues. Development aid as a share of GNI peaked at about 7 per 
cent in 2004, when donors increased their aid funds to assist Angola’s 
post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation (Fig. 5.1). Even though the 
EU has been one of the largest donors to Angola (Table 5.3), in light of 
Angola’s low dependence on development aid, its interest in EU aid has 





















Fig. 5.1 Net ODA as a share of GNI in Angola
Source: Author’s compilation, based on World Bank (2016a), World Development Indicators
Table 5.3 EU aid as a share of total DAC donors’ aid (in USD million and in 
per cent)
2000–2005 2006–2013
DAC aid total 2355 million 1891 million
EU institutions aid total 419 million 362 million
EU share of total DAC aid 18% 19%
Source: Author’s compilation, based on OECD Development Assistance Committee CRS Aid statistics 
(2016)
Despite Angola’s generally low aid dependence, at least in the early 
2000s, the government had a clear interest in receiving support from the 
EU. At that time, the EU (as a whole) was still the second-largest destina-
tion for Angolan oil after the USA (Fig.  5.3). More importantly, the 
Angolan government urgently needed financial assistance from interna-
tional partners for the reconstruction of the country after the end of the 
civil war (Soares de Oliveira 2011, 299; Corkin 2013, 41). Angola 
expected that the international community would shoulder parts of the 
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burden of reconstruction, given the involvement of international actors in 
the war (Corkin 2013, 41). Back then, Angola also had difficulties raising 
funds in the international capital markets and from Western countries, 
because negotiations with the Paris Club creditors were not yet concluded 
and Angola still had USD2 billion in outstanding debts. Furthermore, 
international oil prices at that time were moderate and Angola’s oil pro-
duction was still comparatively low. In this context, the Angolan govern-
ment repeatedly asked the international community, and notably the EU, 
to organise an international donor conference to mobilise international 
support for the reconstruction process, but without success.
The EU hesitated to actively support a donor conference before negotia-
tions between Angola and the IMF had succeeded. After the war, interna-
tional NGOs such as Global Witness (2002) published influential reports 
that suggested that billions of dollars in oil revenues had gone missing. A 
consensus emerged within the international community that Angola should 
address the issue of transparency before external financial support could 
(again) be extended (Soares de Oliveira 2011, 300). Moreover, at that time 
economic interests of EU member states in Angola were still quite limited. 
For instance, trade and investment relations with Angola’s former colonial 
power Portugal were negligible. In 2000 Angola was only the tenth export 
destination for Portuguese goods and services, and Portuguese companies 
had invested as little as USD40 million (Seabra and Gorjão 2011). As one 
EU official put it: ‘At that time, member states did not yet see the strategic 
importance of Angola’.6
The Angolan government was unwilling to comply with the EU and 
other international actors’ demands to commit to greater transparency in 
the management of its revenues and to subject itself to IMF conditions.7 
Instead, the EU’s attempts to condition support for a donor conference to 
an agreement between Angola and the IMF was strongly criticised by the 
Angolan government. Several observers and officials felt that this situation 
created an atmosphere of alienation between the government and the EU, 
which also affected relations in the following years.
To summarise, even though the EU has been an important donor to 
Angola, this does not make it an attractive partner for the Angolan gov-
ernment in light of Angola’s very low aid dependency. In the early 2000s, 
the Angolan government had some interest in engaging with the EU 
because it was hoping for the EU’s support in organising an international 
donor conference that would provide assistance for its reconstruction 
efforts. Despite the costs that cooperation on governance reforms entailed, 
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the Angolan government thus decided to at least reluctantly start engag-
ing with the EU.
China: Becoming an Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner
China needs natural resources and Angola wants development.
President dos Santos during the visit of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 
Angola in 20068
This short statement nicely captures Angola and China’s interests in 
their relationship. Both sides are primarily interested in economic coop-
eration. And the relationship is quite interdependent—in contrast to 
China’s relations with most other African countries and similar to the 
EU’s relations with Angola.
Chinese relations with Angola can be characterised as ‘a marriage of 
convenience’ (Corkin 2011; Power and Alves 2012). Both sides have a 
strong and very pragmatic interest in the relationship. For China, Angola 
has become one of its most important economic cooperation partners in 
Africa, not only due to the importance of oil exports. At least partly as a 
result of the oil-for-infrastructure deals, Angola also generates huge busi-
ness opportunities for Chinese construction, telecommunication and 
other companies. For the Angolan government, in turn, cooperating with 
China has significantly bolstered Angola’s independence from the EU and 
other Western actors.
During the civil war, China had mostly supported the UNITA, at times 
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and only shortly 
the MPLA. Until the late 1990s, China’s trade, aid and other economic 
cooperation with Angola was limited, similar to China’s relations with 
other African countries. Only after the turn of the century did China–
Angola relations rapidly become more intense. The end of the Angolan 
civil war in 2002 coincided with the launch of China’s ‘going out’ policy, 
which paved the way for closer economic and political cooperation with 
African countries in general and Angola in particular.
In 2003, shortly after the end of the civil war and in the midst of the 
difficult negotiations between the Angolan government and the IMF, the 
EU and other traditional partners, the EXIM Bank started negotiating a 
loan contract with the Angolan government. In March 2004, a USD2 
 billion loan was signed. As Soares de Oliveira (2011, 301) put it: ‘One 
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[cannot] underestimate the extent to which the Chinese credit mattered 
in 2004, or the symbolic role of the Chinese arrival in the broader trans-
formation of Angolan external relations’.
Due to the timing and the size of the loan as well as its linkage to infra-
structure investments and its medium-term effects, it was highly impor-
tant for both the domestic strategies of the Angolan government and its 
relations with China, the EU and other partners. First, the agreement with 
the Chinese EXIM Bank allowed the Angolan government to break off 
negotiations with the IMF and to stop asking the EU and other donors to 
organise a donor conference (Traub 2006). The volume of the loan prob-
ably exceeded the amount of support that the Angolan government had 
expected from traditional partners. Second, the EXIM Bank loan had a 
catalytic effect, because it once again gave the government access to inter-
national commercial loans (Corkin 2013, 152; Traub 2006). Third, the 
Chinese loan was reserved for key public investment projects in the con-
struction and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, telecommunication 
and agrobusiness within the framework of the Angolan government’s 
national reconstruction programme. The EXIM Bank loans thus became 
a major source of funding for the government’s public investment pro-
gramme. Fourth, the timing and the Chinese offer to provide not only a 
line of credit, but to also deliver much-needed infrastructure projects, 
closely matched the Angolan government’s need to launch infrastructure 
rehabilitation. The Chinese loan was perceived by the Angolan leadership 
as a quick and convenient answer to the country’s basic infrastructure 
problems. Timely delivery was paramount: most Chinese projects were 
due to be implemented before the parliamentary elections, ‘thus adding 
prestige and bolstering the MPLA government’s credentials of delivery’ 
(Burke et al. 2007, see also Corkin 2013, 154 for a similar argument).
The loans also had considerable advantages for President dos Santos’ 
efforts to bolster his own influence. In 2004, he decided to set up the 
GRN to manage the Chinese loans and thus to shift responsibility from 
the Ministry of Finance to informal, ‘shadow government’ structures 
directly under his authority. The loans gave the president access to an 
important flow of resources for cooptation and to secure his power posi-
tion vis-à-vis potential political rivals (Soares de Oliveira 2011, 301; 
Corkin 2013, 131ff). Marques de Morais (2011b), a civil society activist 
and outspoken critic of the Angolan government, argues: ‘The concentra-
tion of power in the presidency has turned Sino- Angolan relations into a 
new stream for looting’.
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Between 2004 and 2006, the EXIM Bank loan financed about 100 con-
tracts in energy, water, transport, agriculture, healthcare and education. At 
least partly in response to international pressure, information on the spe-
cific projects funded under the loan agreement was published on the web-
site of the Angolan Ministry of Finance.9 The projects were implemented 
by Chinese, mostly state-owned, companies. The Angolan government 
negotiated a clause that up to 30 per cent of the value of a project had to 
be sub-contracted to Angolan companies (Africa-Asia Confidential 2009b).
After 2003, economic cooperation between China and Angola intensi-
fied. China rapidly became the second-largest destination for Angola’s oil 
exports (Fig. 5.3). At the same time, Chinese direct investments in Angola 
remained limited in the early 2000s. Development assistance also played a 
marginal role in China’s relations with Angola, much different from 
Rwanda and Ethiopia. Angola has received some aid: China sends medical 
teams to Angola, provides some scholarships for Angolan students to 
study in China and has funded turnkey infrastructure projects, such as 
schools and a hospital. Yet, the volume of Chinese aid is not only small 
compared to its overall economic engagement; according to Chinese offi-
cials it is also small compared to the volume of aid that other African 
countries receive.10
Cooperating with China has significantly bolstered the Angolan gov-
ernment’s independence from the EU and other Western actors since 
2004. China extended important volumes of loans at a crucial point in 
time when the EU and others sought to condition their assistance on 
greater transparency of government revenues. China has not only offered 
important financial flows and has become the second-largest destination 
for Angolan oil exports, it also delivered inexpensive infrastructure and 
labour that were crucial for the Angolan government’s reconstruction 
efforts after the civil war and ahead of the 2008 elections.
5.3  the late 2000S: angola largely inDiFFerent 
towarDS eu DemanDS to engage on governance 
reFormS even though the eu narrowS itS StrategieS
Between 2006 and 2014, support for governance reforms has remained a 
prominent issue on the EU’s agenda. However, the Angolan government 




EU Good Governance Strategies and Angola’s Responsiveness
 The EU’s Approach: Promoting Effective Government
After 2006, the EU narrowed its good governance strategies to support-
ing effective government. Even though parliamentary elections were post-
poned, presidential elections had not been held and constitutional reform 
was still pending, the EU toned down its rhetorical demands for demo-
cratic reforms. The subsequent country strategy paper signed by the EU 
and the Angolan government in 2008 was less outspoken about the need 
for democratic reforms than the previous one. Instead, the strategy 
acknowledged that Angola made progress towards democratisation since 
the end of the civil war, for instance, in preparing for the elections 
(Republic of Angola and European Community 2008, 14f).
Support to governance reforms became an even more prominent issue 
in the EU’s aid to Angola. The EU made aid to governance reforms the 
first focal sector of its aid programme. Funding earmarked for governance 
reforms increased to 20 per cent (€40 million) of the €214 million in aid 
that the EU planned to spend in Angola between 2008 and 2013 (Republic 
of Angola and European Community 2008, 47). However, the EU has 
also modified its definition of good governance, adopting a very narrow 
understanding of effective government. Between 2006 and 2014, about 60 
per cent of the EU’s governance aid to Angola were allocated for enhanc-
ing the effectiveness and efficiency of government institutions rather than 
the democratic quality of decision-making processes (Table 5.1). Aid allo-
cated with a view to supporting governance reforms should strengthen the 
human and administrative capacities of the government rather than the 
accountability of government institutions or the transparency of govern-
ment finances (Republic of Angola and European Community 2008).
The main activity between 2006 and 2014 that falls into the category 
of promoting democratic government was the EU’s support of parliamen-
tary elections. The EU sent an election observer mission to monitor the 
2008 elections (European Union 2008). Its final report found that the 
elections were free and fair and highlighted how peacefully they were con-
ducted. The EU did not send a regular observer mission to the subsequent 
parliamentary elections that were held in September 2012. Instead, it only 
dispatched an expert team that was to collect information about the elec-
tion process for EU internal purposes.
The EU continued to be very reluctant to use the transnational chan-
nel. Between 2006 and 2010, EU funding from the EIDHR increased 
slightly (Table 5.4). Through the EIDHR, the EU aimed at fostering 
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freedom of expression and contributing to national reconciliation as 
well as the election process. An evaluation of the EIDHR projects criti-
cises that funds have predominantly been used for ‘promotional’ activi-
ties (Foley et  al. 2010). In contrast, the EU has been reluctant to 
support interventions that either monitor Angola’s human rights record 
with a view to holding the Angolan government accountable to inter-
national human rights norms or that empower the political opposition 
(ibid).
The EU mainly supported the PAANE programme which was 
launched in 2007 and entered a second phase in 2010 (European 
Commission 2010). PAANE strengthens the capacities of NGOs to par-
ticipate in the decentralisation process (ECO Consult et al. 2009, 156). 
The project also seeks to both strengthen capacities of CSOs to engage 
in dialogue with government institutions and to build networks among 
CSOs, particularly at the local and regional levels. The project’s strategy 
paper points out that as EDF funds depend on an explicit agreement 
between the EU and the Angolan government, politically more sensitive 
interventions should be financed through the EIDHR (European 
Commission 2010, 14).
A final example of the EU’s reluctance to promote democratic gover-
nance is its support for the civil society forum that was held at the end 
of 2009 in Benguela. Whereas the EU had provided some financial sup-
port to the conference, it did not send a high-level delegation to the 
opening of the conference, in order to avoid conflicts with the Angolan 
government.11
 The EU’s Instruments: Cooperative Strategy
Between 2006 and 2014, the EU merely pursued a cooperative strategy, 
relying mostly on political dialogue and governance aid. The EU did not 
use negative incentives to exert pressure on the Angolan government.
The EU made efforts to improve the implementation of its cooperative 
instruments. Most importantly, it made several attempts to foster a formal 
Table 5.4 EIDHR projects in Angola 2000–2010
2000–2005 2006–2010 Total
Volume in USD 3,302,701 5,646,841 8,949,542
Number of projects 11 31 42
Source: Author’s compilation, based on EU compendia EIDHR projects, various years
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Article 8 political dialogue with the Angolan government (European 
Union 2010, 2011; Republic of Angola and European Community 2008). 
In 2009, the EU proposed to launch a Joint Way Forward together with 
the Angolan government (European Union 2010). The objective of the 
Joint Way Forward is to strengthen political dialogue and political 
 cooperation between the EU and Angola on issues of ‘mutual interest’, 
such as cooperation in energy or peace and security. Yet, the EU has also 
suggested include dialogue on governance reforms. With Nigeria and 
Cape Verde, Angola is one of only three African countries to which the 
EU has proposed upgrading its relationships through a Joint Way Forward 
in the late 2000s.
By contrast, between 2006 and 2014, the EU clearly refrained from 
using negative material or non-material incentives to put pressure and 
openly criticise the Angolan government. Those few public statements 
that the EU made after 2006 (for instance, after the 2008 parliamentary 
elections) laud the government for its progress on governance reforms. 
The EU did not make public statements or declarations to urge the 
Angolan government to promote democratic reforms (Table 5.2). Nor 
did it make statements at the UN to comment on the human rights situ-
ation. The EU did not comment on the new constitution that the parlia-
ment voted into effect in early 2010 and that gives substantially more 
power to the president. The EU did not comment on a critical IMF 
(2012) report which argued that several billions of dollars of govern-
ment funds had gone missing. Critical reports published by Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch or Global Witness also did not 
prompt the EU to issue critical statements to signal its concern.
Angola Remained Largely Indifferent to Demands 
for Cooperation from 2006 to 2014
Even though the EU considerably toned down its demands and merely 
sought to promote effective government, the Angolan government has 
been increasingly indifferent towards the EU’s initiatives to cooperate on 
governance reforms since 2006.
 Angola’s Responsiveness: Political and Aid Policy Dialogues
In contrast to Ethiopia and particularly Rwanda, Angola has increasingly 
ignored the EU’s requests to intensify formal Article 8 political dialogue. 
Meetings took place irregularly and have even lost momentum over time. 
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In 2006 and 2007, meetings took place about three times a year; one 
meeting was convened in the summer of 2008 (ECO Consult et al. 2009). 
Between the summers of 2008 and 2012, however, political dialogue did 
not take place.12 In those meetings that did happen between 2006 and 
2008, only the Angolan vice minister of foreign affairs was present. 
Whereas the meetings were reportedly held in a cordially atmosphere and 
allowed for open exchange, discussions did not foster tangible results, and 
the impact of the dialogue on the position of the government was reported 
to have been small (ECO Consult et al. 2009). Interviewees suggest that 
the Angolan government was very hesitant to discuss issues related to gov-
ernance reforms, which it did not perceive as a dialogue at eye level. 
Instead, the government has been more interested in discussing regional 
peace and security issues or the ban on the Angolan airline TAAG flying to 
the EU.13
The Angolan government has also been indifferent towards the EU’s 
demands to engage in political dialogue within the framework of the Joint 
Way Forward. Interviewees suggest that Angola was initially not very 
enthusiastic regarding the EU’s proposal to launch the Joint Way Forward 
as an instrument to revitalise political dialogue and to upgrade its relation-
ship with the EU.14 In 2012, the Angolan government eventually agreed 
to sign the Joint Way Forward—three years after the EU had launched its 
initiative and shortly ahead of the parliamentary elections in September 
2012.15 The first high-level dialogue meeting took place immediately fol-
lowing the signing of the document. The first ministerial meeting took 
place two years later in October 2014; issues of democracy and good gov-
ernance were also addressed.16
Similar to the early 2000s, the government has not been willing to 
address governance issues as part of its aid policy dialogue with the EU 
and other donors. In contrast to Ethiopia and Rwanda, Angola has not 
been actively engaged in the international aid effectiveness agenda. For 
instance, Angola is one of very few developing countries that have not 
signed the Paris Declaration in 2005, in which donor and recipient coun-
tries agreed on basic principles and standards for development coopera-
tion. Meetings between the government and donors to discuss general 
issues of aid cooperation take place on a relatively regular basis. However, 
aid coordination structures between the Angolan government and 
donors are weak compared to other African (aid-dependent) countries. 




 Angola’s Responsiveness: Governance Aid and Positive Conditionality
In contrast to Ethiopia and particularly Rwanda, Angola has further been 
reluctant to engage with the EU in other instruments that seek to foster 
cooperation on governance reforms, such as the EU’s governance incen-
tive tranche. It has not been willing to draft a governance action plan for 
the EU, but instead referred the EU to already existing development strat-
egies containing short sections with governance reform objectives. The 
EU then took the lead and drafted a plan, based on the poverty reduction 
strategy and the Angolan government’s development strategy for 
2007–2008 (Republic of Angola and European Community 2008, 40). 
The objectives and targets identified in the governance action plan were 
vague and—if at all—process oriented rather than specifying the outcome 
that should be achieved (Republic of Angola and European Community 
2008, 40–42). During the following years, Angola made very limited 
progress in implementing the governance action plan. An analysis pre-
pared for the EU’s midterm review found that until 2009 only nine out of 
35 targets had been achieved. The government has clearly been reluctant 
to use the governance action plan or its national development strategies as 
a framework for political or aid policy dialogue (Republic of Angola and 
European Community 2008).
Compared to the period between 2002 and 2005, Angola has been 
even more reluctant and to some extent indifferent towards EU attempts 
to engage in the implementation of governance aid. Only reluctantly and 
after lengthy negotiations did the government sign the country strategy 
paper and the national indicative programme for the 10th EDF (Republic 
of Angola and European Community 2008). One EU official suggested 
that this reluctance can be explained because the government perceived 
the strategy as being too critical regarding the governance situation in 
Angola and placed too much emphasis on aiding governance reforms 
rather than supporting the rebuilding of basic infrastructure.17
The analysis of joint annual reports on the implementation of EU aid to 
Angola, an independent evaluation of EU aid to Angola as well as interviews 
with officials suggest that the government has been clearly reluctant and 
often indifferent towards EU demands to implement aid funds earmarked 
for supporting governance reforms. Whereas it accepted some aid to 
strengthen the human and administrative capacities of government institu-
tions, it ignored EU attempts to cooperate on the implementation of aid to 
improve the transparency of government finances or the democratic quality 
of decision-making processes. Several examples illustrate this assessment.
C. HACKENESCH
 169
In line with the objective of the country strategy paper to allocate 
parts of EU governance aid to justice reform, the EU proposed a pro-
gramme to improve access to justice but had to wait longtime for a 
response from the Ministry of Justice (European Community and 
Republic of Angola 2009). The government did not respond at all to the 
EU’s proposals to allocate some aid to enhance the capacities of the 
Ministry of Finance. A project to support the human and administrative 
capacities of the Ministry of Trade took a long time to be negotiated. A 
programme to support public administration reform was first cancelled 
by the National Authorising Officer, before the EU and the government 
eventually reached an agreement. The project that the EU and the 
Angolan government agreed upon seeks to support the capacities of the 
Ministry of Planning in managing the implementation of EU aid funds 
and strengthening donor coordination; it provides assistance to the 
National Institute of Statistics and promotes regional integration within 
the South African Development Community (SADC) (European 
Commission 2010). The project thus has a focus on promoting (a very 
narrow definition of) effective government. The single most visible activ-
ity of the Angolan government to engage with the EU in governance 
reforms was the 2008 EU election observer mission that the government 
agreed to (European Union 2008).
We can conclude that, in contrast to Ethiopia and Rwanda, the EU’s 
strategy in Angola shifted from promoting democratic government towards 
promoting a narrow definition of effective government that focuses mostly 
on the capacity-building of government institutions rather than the 
 transparency of government finances. In its support of governance reforms, 
the EU continued to prioritise the intergovernmental over the transna-
tional channel. After 2006, no instances of the EU using material or non- 
material negative incentives to put pressure on the Angolan government 
could be observed.
In contrast to Ethiopia and particularly Rwanda, the Angolan govern-
ment has been increasingly indifferent towards the EU’s demands to 
engage in governance reforms since 2006. It has been indifferent towards 
the EU’s requests to engage in formal political dialogue under Article 8 of 
the Cotonou Agreement. It took three years to agree to sign the Joint Way 
Forward; a clear indication of its limited interest in political dialogue. The 
government has not agreed to engage in aid policy dialogues to discuss 
governance reforms with the EU. It has been largely indifferent towards 
the EU’s request to draft a governance action plan to become eligible for 
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a governance incentive tranche. It has been unwilling to engage with the 
EU in the implementation of governance aid; most projects have not been 
launched or were substantially delayed. The implementation of direct aid 
to NGOs has also faced difficulties.
The Angolan Government’s Survival Strategies
 Mounting Opposition from Outside and Within the Ruling Elite
Since the mid-2000s, opposition from outside and within the ruling elite 
has gradually become more pressing. Particularly since 2009, the Angolan 
leadership has faced substantially more opposition.
Opposition from beyond the leadership’s support coalition has become 
stronger since the 2008 elections. For the first time since independence in 
1975, anti-government demonstrations took place in Luanda in 2011 and 
2012 (Croese 2013; Roque 2013). These demonstrations were to some 
extent influenced by the Arab Spring, and fuelled by the economic crisis in 
Angola and the limited effects of the government’s policies on the lives of 
ordinary Angolans. Some of the mostly young and urban protesters urged 
President dos Santos to step down. Most importantly, among them were 
not only members of the opposition but also some descendants of high- 
ranking MPLA members (ibid). Some war veterans and other members of 
the security apparatus also took to the streets to protest about unpaid pen-
sions. Even though demonstrations remained largely peaceful and did not 
escalate into a full-scale mass movement, they indicated the growing dis-
satisfaction with the social and economic performance of the regime 
(Croese 2013; Watch 2012). Popular discontent with the government is 
not least evident in public opinion polls.18 According to Gallup polls 
(2013), only 23 per cent of Angolans had ‘confidence in the national gov-
ernment’ in 2011, and only 16 per cent showed ‘approval of the country’s 
leadership’.
Dissatisfaction also fermented within the MPLA itself. Several high-level 
figures in the MPLA defected and joined the opposition, thereby weaken-
ing the position of the leadership. One indicator for growing discontent 
within the party was the delay in the process of drafting a new constitution. 
Even though the 2008 elections won the government a firm majority in 
parliament, the new constitution was not passed until 2010. Some observ-
ers further argue that the delays in publishing the party list for the 2012 
elections were a sign of ongoing disputes within the party.19
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 Boosting the Ruling Party as a Vehicle for Cooptation
After 2006, the government continued to use a combination of coopta-
tion and low-intensity coercion to solicit support. The government used 
funds from oil revenues to maintain support from party members and the 
military.
The landslide victory for the MPLA in the 2008 elections and the 
resulting dominance of the parliament allowed the MPLA government to 
work towards a modification of the constitution. The new constitution 
which was passed early in 2010, gives the president an even more powerful 
position than before (Orre 2010, 13).20 The constitution abolishes direct 
presidential elections. The candidate at the head of the party list that wins 
most votes in the general elections automatically becomes president. The 
new constitution thereby allowed President dos Santos to remain in office 
without being subject to voters’ opinions. One can argue that the consti-
tution formalises de facto power structures and the all-powerful position 
of the president (Orre 2010).
In response to the growing challenges from within and outside of the 
elite, the Angolan leadership further expanded the ruling party. Party 
membership had already increased massively from about 60,000 in 1990 
to about four million in 2004 (Soares de Oliveira 2011). Ahead of the 
2012 elections, the MPLA was planning to recruit another two million 
party members (Roque 2011, 5). In a country of about 20 million 
 inhabitants, this is a quite significant figure. Expanding the party member-
ship has created ample opportunities of top-down cooptation. Observers 
are critical that the MPLA has gained significant influence over the state. 
Angolans refer to the growing influence of the MPLA on public and pri-
vate life as ‘partidarizacao’ or ‘party-isation’ (Schubert 2010, 659). During 
the past few years, MPLA- owned companies acquired most of the free 
press and established new media outlets (Marques de Morais 2010). 
Moreover, the party created ‘special committees’ that are involved in all 
areas of society. These allow for conditioning service delivery and career 
prospects on loyalty with the party (Roque 2013, 2).
 Using Formal and Informal State Institutions for Cooptation Rather 
than Provision of Public Services
Between 2009 and 2012, the leadership continued to substantially rely on 
formal as well as informal government structures. The GRN was disman-
tled in 2010, but its responsibilities in managing the domestic infrastruc-
ture investments were not transferred (back) to the Ministry of Finance. 
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Instead, a new institution within the national oil company Sonangol was 
set up (Corkin 2013, 131).
Between 2009 and 2012, the Angolan leadership only made subtle 
efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of formal state institutions. In 2010, 
the government started to introduce a tax reform to boost non-oil reve-
nues (Anderson 2013). Reform steps were to include an overhaul of the 
administrative structure and notably preparations for the creation of an 
integrated revenue authority. Observers contend that the reform is at least 
partly driven by pressure from the IMF rather than a genuine domestic 
interest of the Angolan government (Anderson 2013, 2). Moreover, the 
government has introduced some measures to make public finance more 
transparent. Observers view these measures as ‘window dressing’ to com-
ply with IMF conditionality and improve Angola’s international standing 
rather than home-grown reforms in which the government has a genuine 
interest (Soares de Oliveira 2012). International indices, such as the WGI, 
suggest that rather than increasing, the effectiveness of the Angolan gov-
ernment has decreased between 2009 and 2014 (Fig. 5.2). The Angolan 
government’s effectiveness remains significantly below the sub-Saharan 
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Fig. 5.2 Government effectiveness and control of corruption in Angola
Source: World Bank (2016b), Worldwide Governance Indicators; author’s compilation
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The Angolan government continues to use state institutions as a means 
for cooptation by channelling private goods, spoils and perks rather than 
for providing public goods and improving public services. A closer analysis 
of spending on infrastructure, the military and social services suggests that 
the government has a strong interest in using the state to coopt regime 
opponents and supporters rather than to provide effective services to the 
broader population.
One case in point is the government’s substantial investments in physi-
cal infrastructure. Between 2009 and 2012, investments in housing were 
a government priority (Croese 2011, 16). In the run-up to the 2008 elec-
tions, the MPLA had promised that one million affordable houses would 
be built by 2012 to respond to the needs of a rapidly growing population 
and to skyrocketing housing prices.21 The slogan for the election cam-
paign was: ‘Angola é um canteiro de obras’, which was to say that all of 
Angola represents a construction site for public works (Marques de Morais 
2011a). Total public investments in infrastructure (roads, power, railways 
and housing) grew by tremendous rates of 14 per cent of GDP or USD4.3 
billion per year (World Bank 2011). However, an astonishing USD1.3 
billion of the investments or 5 per cent of GDP per year is lost due to 
‘inefficiencies’ (ibid; Soares de Oliveira 2011). With regard to the 
 infrastructure investments, Soares de Oliveira (2011, 295) thus points out 
that ‘many of the policies pursued by the government seem designed to 
maximise rentierism and minimise oversight’. Examples include presti-
gious projects such as the rebuilding of Luanda’s seaside boardwalk, foot-
ball stadiums and luxury government buildings (Power 2011).
In contrast to Ethiopia and Rwanda, the Angolan government contin-
ues to spend considerable parts of its budget on the military. Even though 
the government does not face an immediate external security threat22 and 
the civil war ended more than a decade ago, the government still spends 
17 per cent of its budget (ACTSA 2013), or about 4 per cent of GDP 
(SIPRI 2013) on the military. Military spending even increased from 
about USD1.5 billion in 2002 at the end of the war to USD3.8 billion in 
2012 (SIPRI 2013). In 2015, Angola was the country with the largest 
defence budget in sub-Saharan Africa. The government has not demobil-
ised the 120,000 strong army, and army generals were allowed to engage 
in resource extraction and land grabbing (Power 2011).
Moreover, the government continues to invest relatively little in other 
types of public goods, such as healthcare and education. Angola’s public 
investments in healthcare as a share of government expenditures continue 
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to be considerably below the average in sub-Saharan Africa and also lower 
than in Ethiopia and Rwanda, according to the WDI. Moreover, part of 
the government expenditure in healthcare and education has been spent 
on scholarships and healthcare subsidies abroad for members of the elite 
rather than on improving services in Angola and for the wider population. 
Even though Angola has become an upper middle-income country with a 
per capita GNI as high as USD4800, little progress has been made regard-
ing basic human development during the past decade. Angola ranks near 
the bottom on the Human Development Index: at position 148 of 186 in 
2012 (United Nations Development Programme 2013).
On the other hand, Angola is one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world. According to the WGI, the level of corruption in Angola has even 
gone up since the end of the civil war, and particularly since 2006 
(Fig. 5.2). The government’s discourse on the fight against corruption has 
become more prominent since 2009 (Marques de Morais 2010), but 
apparently this has so far not resulted in practical improvements. According 
to Gallup polls (2013), 87 per cent of the population consider govern-
ment corruption to be widespread. In its Corruption Perception Index, 
Transparency International ranked Angola at position 163 of 168 coun-
tries in 2015.
The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and Global 
Witness (2011) found that despite improvements in the transparency of 
government revenues, serious discrepancies between accounts of the 
Ministry of Finance and Sonangol remain. In 2012, the IMF also reported 
that an astonishing USD32 billion of Angola’s state funds went missing in 
the past few years. After some discussions with the Angolan government, 
the IMF reduced the discrepancy by USD27.8 billion and argued that this 
difference could be explained as ‘quasi-fiscal operations’ by Sonangol. 
However, the remaining (and still considerable) gap of USD4.2 billion 
could not be accounted for by the Angolan government.23
 Low-intensity Coercion and Managing Arenas of Contestation
The first parliamentary elections were finally held in 2008, after having 
been postponed several times. As expected, the government gained a 
large majority with little difficulty. The MPLA secured 191 of 220 seats 
in the National Assembly and won about 81 per cent of the votes. The 
main opposition party UNITA got only 10 per cent. The 2008 elections 
thereby strongly reinforced the position of the MPLA.  Even though 
the playing field ahead of the elections was not level, it substantially 
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increased the government’s domestic (and international) legitimacy 
(Roque 2009).
In contrast, in light of mounting public dissatisfaction and a stronger 
opposition, the Angolan leadership faced more severe challenges in 2012. 
The MPLA gained a mere 71 per cent of the votes. The main opposition 
party UNITA won about 18 per cent. This reduction in votes for the 
MPLA suggests that the MPLA was no longer able to fully dominate the 
electoral arena. Particularly in Luanda, the MPLA’s traditional strong-
hold, UNITA and the newly formed  Broad Convergence for the Salvation 
of Angola—Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE) gained more than 40 per 
cent, essentially turning the MPLA from an urban-based into a rural- 
backed party (Croese 2013).
The leadership holds on to power by a mix of legal measures to limit 
spaces for civil society and critical opposition and informal measures of 
harassment and coercion as well as cooptation of critical figures. The lead-
ership has established its own ‘NGOs’. The most prominent examples are 
the foundations of the president and his daughter (Power 2011). Civil 
society actors may find themselves promoted to government or party 
commissions and receive spoils to silence criticism (Schubert 2010, 666). 
Members of UNITA are also coopted. Prominent examples include high- 
level UNITA figures who were appointed as ministers (Croese 2013). The 
president initiated major reshuffles of the cabinet and other key positions 
in the economy and the army in 2011.
At the same time, harassment and low-intensity coercion limit the space 
for civil society, the media and the opposition to engage. During the pro-
tests in 2011 and 2012, for instance, Angolan security forces violently 
suppressed demonstrations (Croese 2013; Watch 2012).
Between 2006 and 2014 cooperating with the EU on governance 
reforms would have been costly for the Angolan government, in spite of 
the EU’s decision to narrow its good governance strategy. It is thus not 
surprising that the Angolan government has ignored EU demands for 
cooperation in the second half of the decade. It faced stronger domestic 
opposition, particularly since 2009, and it responded by expanding the 
party and by relying even more strongly on cooptation. Even though the 
EU has, over time, shifted its good governance strategy towards a narrow 
understanding of good governance, EU support for governance reforms 
has not more strongly converged with the Angolan government’s prefer-
ences. Only EU support for the 2008 elections accrued some benefits for 
the government as it enhanced external legitimacy. When the domestic 
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opposition was much stronger ahead of the 2012 elections, the govern-
ment refused to accept EU assistance.
Angola’s Economic Dependence on the EU
Since the mid-2000s, the EU has not managed to set incentives that would 
have outweighed the costs of cooperating on governance reforms. In con-
trast to the EU’s relations with Ethiopia and Rwanda, Angola is clearly not 
dependent on EU aid. Moreover, the EU institutions face substantial dif-
ficulties in offering Angola attractive cooperation packages in other policy 
fields. Furthermore, EU member states have developed a substantial eco-
nomic interest in engaging with Angola, which has made it even more 
difficult to find a coherent European approach.
Between 2006 and 2014, aid accounted for less than 1 per cent of GNI, 
making Angola one of the least aid-dependent countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Fig. 5.1). Oil prices have boomed since 2005, and Angola has con-
siderably increased its oil production. While oil revenues traditionally con-
stituted a large share of government revenues, resource rents have 
skyrocketed since 2005. However, Angola’s dependence on oil also 
implied that the dip in oil prices and oil exports during the financial and 
economic crisis in 2009 had a strong and immediate effect on the Angolan 
government’s revenues. Between 2010 and 2013, oil revenues had again 
been on the rise. In 2014 oil prices fell sharply for a second time. After 
Nigeria, Angola is the second-largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa.
During the second half of the 2000s, EU member states and 
European commercial banks as well as other international actors have 
provided (commercial) lines of credit to Angola (Table  5.5). In the 
wake of the global financial and economic crises, the Angolan leader-
ship once again reached out more strongly to European and other 
international actors to secure financial support. In November 2009, 
negotiations with the IMF finally led to the signing of a standby loan 
agreement for USD1.4 billion. Earlier that year, President dos Santos 
also secured funding from several European countries, notably Spain, 
Portugal and Germany (Table 5.5).
However, the financial and economic crises also demonstrated that the 
EU institutions play a limited role in Angola’s relations with Europe. 
While EU member states extended lines of credit, what is mostly available 
as an instrument for bilateral cooperation to the EU institutions are aid 
funds from the EDF. The EU’s proposal to initiate a Joint Way Forward 
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Table 5.5 Selected credit lines to Angola (in USD)






Spain 600 million 2007
Belgium 500 million
Germany 1.7 billion 2009
Non-European
Canada EXIM 1 billion 2009
Brazil BNDES 5 billion Finance purchase of Brazilian 
goods and services
Total credits by 
2011



















Source: Author’s compilation, based on Vines et  al. (2009), Corkin (2013), Africa-Asia Confidential 
(2009b), India EXIM Bank (2013)
has been one attempt to overcome this discrepancy and to identify areas 
for cooperation ‘beyond’ a traditional donor–recipient relationship that 
would make the EU an attractive cooperation partner. Yet, its relevance 
and success remains to be seen.
Since the mid-2000s, the EU’s importance as a destination for Angolan 
oil exports has been on the rise (although nothing in comparison to exports 
to China) (Fig. 5.3). Yet, oil imports from Angola account for only about 
2 per cent of total European oil imports (Helly 2011). Oil imports from 
Angola are limited to a few EU member states. France, for instance, had 
imported very little oil from Angola for some time, mostly due to diplo-
matic disputes over French arms sales to Angola in the 1990s, also known 
as the ‘Angolagate scandal’. However, relations have improved in the mid-
2000s after high-level initiatives by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy. 
As a consequence, oil exports rapidly increased and France now imports 
between 8 and 15 per cent of its oil from Angola (Helly 2011).
Trade and investment relations with Angola’s former colonial power 










































Fig. 5.3 Angolan oil exports to selected partners (in USD thousands)
Source: Author’s compilation, based on UNCTAD statistics (2016)
had become the fourth largest destination for Portuguese exports and 
Portugal’s largest trading partner outside the EU. Portuguese investments 
in Angola have also surged. Not only the size of these figures is notable, 
but also that relations grew substantially close over a very short period of 
time (Seabra and Gorjão 2011).
Together with South Africa and Nigeria, Angola is one of the few coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa that themselves make significant investments 
abroad. Outward investment flows stood at about USD1 billion in 2010 
(African Development Bank et al. 2012). An important share of invest-
ments (most of them by the national oil company Sonangol) is targeted at 
Europe, and notably Portugal. Investments are directed, for instance, 
towards the Portuguese banking sector and into real estate (Seabra and 
Gorjão 2011).24
The economic and financial crisis in 2008–2009 showed most clearly 
that Angola’s relations with the EU are not characterised by its economic 
dependence on the EU.  The crisis further accelerated changes in the 
underlying power structures in Angola–EU relations. Even though the 
crisis hit Angola quite hard due to plummeting oil prices, it hit Portugal 
C. HACKENESCH
 179
even harder. During the crisis, Portugal turned to Angola to attract more 
investments to cushion the consequences of the crisis, turning former 
(colonial-based) power relations upside down.25 Migration flows are one 
interesting indicator for the changing relationship: due to the economic 
depression back home, tens of thousands of job-seeking Portuguese 
moved to Angola in the first few years after the crisis.26
To summarise, since the mid-2000s, the EU had very little to no incentive 
to make the Angolan government address governance issues. The EU institu-
tions mostly relied on the EDF as an instrument to set incentives for coopera-
tion. Only recently has it launched the Joint Way Forward—an attempt to 
build a strategic partnership ‘beyond’ aid. Moreover, the EU institutions face 
difficulties in establishing the EU as an attractive partner and forging a truly 
European approach in light of some EU member states’ strong bilateral coop-
eration with Angola. Between the mid-2000s and 2012, the Angolan govern-
ment thus had little interest in engaging with the EU institutions. Cooperating 
with the EU ‘beyond’ governance reforms clearly provided no incentives that 
could have compensated for the costs of engaging in the implementation of 
good governance instruments.
China: Alternative Economic Cooperation Partner
From the mid-2000s onwards, China has further bolstered its position as a 
key economic partner for the Angolan government. The volume of credits 
provided by the China is quite substantial, adding up to at least USD14.5 
billion between 2004 and 2012 (Table 5.6), or up to USD21.2 billion 
until the end of 2014 (Brautigam and Hwang 2016). This is substantially 
more than Angola has received from any other international actor 
(Table 5.5). For China, in turn, Angola has become the largest recipient of 
loans in sub-Saharan Africa according to Chinese officials.
It remains unclear how much money the Hong Kong-based China 
International Fund (CIF) has given to Angola. The activities of the CIF 
and the connection between the fund and the Chinese government are 
highly opaque. Some studies suggest that this fund has advanced at least 
USD2.9 billion to Angola for infrastructure reconstruction (Levkowitz 
et al. 2009; Campos and Vines 2008). Many projects initiated by the fund 
faced problems in the implementation phase and were delayed or ran out 
of funding. Some of these were then taken over by the EXIM Bank. 
However, the Chinese government has been careful to distance itself from 
the fund and to argue that there is no direct link between the activities of 
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Table 5.6 Chinese loans to Angola 2002–2012 (excluding CIF funds)
Year Volume and 
bank
Purpose
March 2004 USD2 billion, 
EXIM
Infrastructure construction and renovation
July 2007 USD500 
million, EXIM
Financing of completion of some of the projects started 





Financing of projects as part of the government’s public 
infrastructure programme






2009 (?) USD1.5 
billion, CDB
Commercial line of credit, not oil-backed, mostly for 
development of infrastructure and agriculture
2010 USD500 
million, CDB
USD 400 million with Ministry of Finance to address 
food security and improve urban planning; USD100 





Total: EXIM Bank: USD10.5 billion; total Chinese financing (all banks): USD14.5 
billionb
Source: Author’s compilation, based on Campos and Vines (2008), Corkin (2013)
aSee China Development Bank press statement, 21 November 2010, CDB will continue to support 
China-Africa Pragmatic cooperation, online at http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/NewsInfo.
asp?NewsId=3479, last access on 3 June 2014
bThe figure is confirmed by the Chinese ambassador to Angola Zhang Bolun, see Agence France Press, 
‘China lends Angola $15 bn but creates few jobs’, 6 March 2011, online at http://www.google.com/
hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hCrBvXg-npPKNuU_xAnyT4MhL2GA?docId=CNG.b56cef2e1a991
5852221926863a725ed.421&hl=en, last access 3 April 2013
the fund and those of the Chinese government (Corkin 2013, 134ff).27 At 
the same time, through its joint venture with Sonangol, the CIF functions 
as an intermediary for Angola’s oil exports to China.28
During the economic and financial crisis, China remained an important 
partner for the Angolan government. Dos Santos travelled to China in 
December 2008 to negotiate a new loan package that was for the first time 
not to be backed by oil but to be based on a government guarantee.29 
Beyond the EXIM Bank, other Chinese policy banks, such as the China 
Development Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
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have started to extend loans to the Angolan government for large-scale 
infrastructure projects (Table  5.6). Even though the financial and eco-
nomic crisis required the Angolan government to reach out more strongly 
to other international actors and to increasingly diversify its external rela-
tions, the crisis also reemphasised the importance of China as an economic 
cooperation partner (see also Corkin 2013, 153).
This continued interest in their mutual relations is also visible in the 
Angolan government’s political outreach to China. In 2010, the Angolan 
government approached China to initiate a strategic partnership. President 
dos Santos mentioned the strategic partnership with China in his ‘state of 
the nation’ speech in October 2010, sending a clear signal that he attaches 
great importance to relations with China (Alves 2011, 138f). During the 
visit of the Chinese vice president (and now president) Xi Jinping to 
Luanda in November 2010, several areas for cooperation were identified: 
infrastructure, energy and mining, agriculture, finance and technology.30
China continues to support projects that are particularly important to 
the Angolan leadership. One prominent example is the ‘one million houses 
project’. The Chinese CITIC Group signed a MoU with the GRN for the 
construction of Chinese- financed social housing near Luanda (in Kilamba 
Kiaxi municipality) at a cost of USD3.5 billion (Croese 2011, 19; Marques 
de Morais 2011a). In the 2008 elections, the promise of building afford-
able houses was deemed crucial for the MPLA’s electoral success. The 
government was thus under pressure to deliver on its promise in order to 
easily win the 2012 elections as well. However, by 2012, the project was 
barely half-finished and it became clear that the houses would not be 
affordable for ordinary Angolans (Croese 2011).
In light of China’s rapidly growing engagement with Angola, public 
dissatisfaction among Angolans regarding the developmental benefits of 
Chinese loans has been mounting in recent years. In a context where most 
of the basic infrastructure was destroyed after the long civil war, China’s 
support for national reconstruction is certainly greatly needed. However, 
Chinese companies have been accused of delivering low-quality infrastruc-
ture. The General Hospital in Luanda is a case in point31: In June 2010, 
shortly after it opened, it had to be evacuated because the building was 
developing dangerous cracks (Marques de Morais 2011a). Similarly, some 
of the newly paved roads and rehabilitated railways are said to be quickly 
washed away. Representatives from international companies working 
together with Chinese state-owned companies argue that in some cases 
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the poor quality results from poor supervision, which would have been the 
responsibility of the Angolans.32
Angolan civil society and other domestic actors have criticised the high 
number of Chinese workers employed by Chinese companies and the high 
volume of construction material imported from China.33 Concerns were 
raised that China’s support for the reconstruction process ultimately cre-
ates little economic opportunities for Angolans, but excludes the wider 
society from the reconstruction process (Croese 2011, 24; Marques de 
Morais 2011b). During the past few years, incidents of violence and theft 
against Chinese workers and business people have reportedly become 
more frequent. According to Zhang Bolun, the Chinese ambassador to 
Angola, about 50 Chinese state-owned and 400 Chinese private compa-
nies were operating in Angola in 2010.34 The number of Chinese workers 
staying in Angola was estimated to range somewhere between 60,000 and 
70,000.35
Sino-Angolan bilateral trade has grown tremendously during the past 
decade. The rise of China as a major cooperation partner for Angola has 
thus fundamentally transformed Angola’s traditional trade relations. 
Overall, Sino-Angolan trade remains dominated by Angolan oil exports to 
China. In 2007, China has overtaken the USA as Angola’s most important 
destination for oil exports (Fig. 5.3). The economic and financial crises 
and dropping oil prices in 2008 caused a slight dip in the value of Angola’s 
oil exports to China (and other countries). In 2011, Angola was exporting 
about 40 per cent of its oil to China (EIA 2012). Because China has 
become the largest oil importer worldwide in 2013 and the US oil imports 
are likely to further decrease, the importance of China as a destination for 
Angolan oil exports is likely to grow more in the future.36 In 2010, China 
has also overtaken Portugal as the major source of Angola’s imports. In 
contrast to most other African countries, and particularly to Ethiopia and 
Rwanda, China’s trade relations with Angola are much more interdepen-
dent—Angola has become the second-largest source of Chinese oil 
imports, sometimes even surpassing Saudi Arabia (EIA 2012). Angola is 
China’s most important trading partner in Africa, accounting for about 
half of all African exports to China.
Chinese direct investments in Angola have been mostly concentrated 
in the oil sector. However, despite these significant investments, Chinese 
oil companies did not develop a prominent stake in Angola’s oil industry 
between 2000 and 2014.37 Sinopec secured stakes in the oil block 18, and 
two of the major producing blocks (15 and 17) through its joint ventures 
with Sonangol. The entry of Sinopec into the Angolan oil industry was 
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facilitated by the oil-for-infrastructure deals, even though there is no for-
mal, direct link between those transactions (Alves 2011). However, rela-
tions quickly soured. After the entry of Sinopec in the Angolan oil sector, 
the size of the bonuses paid caused relations between Sinopec and 
Sonangol to harden. Moreover, Chinese support for the refinery in 
Lobito did not finally materialise, which led to a further deterioration of 
relations (Alves 2011; 159–166; Africa-Asia Confidential 2009a; Alves 
2012, 106ff).38
Angola’s economic cooperation with other emerging powers has gained 
prominence in recent years, but with none of these countries are relations 
as important as with China (Freemantle and Stevens 2011). Cultural and 
linguistic proximity between Brazil and Angola have facilitated Brazil’s 
investments and trading relations with Angola. Since Brazil has its own 
vast oil resources, oil imports from Angola have remained limited 
(Fig.  5.3). However, Brazil’s state-owned oil company Petrobras has 
developed technological expertise in deep water drilling, which is increas-
ingly relevant in Angola. Imports from Brazil are concentrated on agricul-
ture goods and soft commodities because Angola’s agricultural production 
is still limited. Brazil has also extended loans to invest in Angolan agricul-
ture, notably bio-fuels (Table 5.5). Angola’s relations with India are con-
centrated in the oil sector. Angola’s oil exports to India have grown in the 
past few years, particularly since 2009. In 2014 India imported as much 
oil from Angola as the USA (Fig. 5.3). However, India’s oil imports from 
Angola remain considerably below the amounts of oil imported by China. 
Moreover, India has not extended loans of any substance (Table 5.5).
 Limited Attractiveness of the ‘China Model’ and Little Cooperation 
on Survival Strategies
In the Angolan political discourse as well as in public debates in the (state-
controlled) media, Chinese political and economic development as a 
potential model for Angola has not been given a prominent role (see also 
Corkin 2013; Soares de Oliveira 2015). Instead, due to the colonial heri-
tage and persistently strong economic, political and cultural ties, the 
Angolan political elite is predominately oriented towards Brazil and 
Western countries (particularly Portugal). Findings from interviews with 
Angolan officials and remarks by other observers suggest that while the 
Angolan elite is generally impressed by China’s economic success and 
political stability, there is little profound engagement and analysis of what 
the Chinese (economic and political) reform process involves (Soares de 
Oliveira 2011, 298; Corkin 2013).
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The Chinese government has provided little technical assistance to sup-
port the Angolan government’s human and administrative capacities. The 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce supports short-term human resource 
training courses for Angolan government officials. Between 2003 and 
2008, 423 Angolan officials have been travelling to China for a week up 
to a month of short-term training (Alves 2011, 140).
As economic relations between China and Angola intensify, coopera-
tion on legal issues has become more important, particularly since 2010. 
In response to violence committed against Chinese workers in Angola, the 
Chinese and Angolan governments have started to cooperate more closely 
in law enforcement and on human rights issues. In 2011, the Chinese 
criminal investigation office and the Angolan ministries of home affairs 
and justice signed a bilateral agreement to cooperate more closely on 
fighting crime (ANGO Press 2012a). The Chinese embassy in Angola 
maintains contacts with the Angolan Human Rights Commission (ANGO 
Press 2012b), and the Angolan audit court has launched an exchange with 
its Chinese counterpart (ANGO Press 2012d). The Angolan minister for 
home affairs visited China in 2012. During his visit, he also gathered 
information on the Chinese prison and police system (ANGO Press 
2012e). The Angolan attorney-general has announced a closer working 
relationship with China.
 Party-to-Party Relations
Little cooperation happens between the Angolan and Chinese ruling par-
ties, and party-to-party relations do not seem to have played a prominent 
role in facilitating economic cooperation. The MPLA and the CCP meet 
about once a year, either in China or Angola (Fig. 5.4). However, com-
pared to Ethiopia and Rwanda as well as other African countries, the 
CCP’s contacts with the MPLA are quite limited.
This limited relevance of party-to-party contacts is striking in light of the 
importance of the bilateral economic relations. In other African countries, 
such as Sudan, where Chinese economic cooperation is also very close, 
party-to-party relations constitute an integral part and important pillar of 
bilateral relations. Historical factors may play an important role in explain-
ing the limited engagement. During the Angolan civil war, China has mostly 
supported the UNITA and at times the FNLA, the other opposition move-
ment. After the end of the civil war, the MPLA remained very sceptical 
towards the CCP.39 Limited party-to-party contacts thus seem to be a result 
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Fig. 5.4 Annual bilateral visits MPLA–CCP
Source: Author’s compilation, based on analysis of News Reports, International Department 
of the Communist Party of Chinese
5.4  concluSionS
In the early 2000s after the end of the civil war, the Angolan government 
started to reluctantly engage with the EU in governance reforms. However, 
since the mid-2000s, the government has increasingly been indifferent 
towards EU demands to cooperate on governance reforms.
Why Did Angola Start to Reluctantly Engage with the EU 
in Governance Reforms Between 2002 and 2005?
The Angolan government’s willingness to reluctantly start engaging with 
the EU in the aftermath of the civil war can be explained by its interest in 
cooperation ‘beyond’ governance reforms rather than an interest in engag-
ing in governance reforms per se.
In the first few years after the end of the civil war, the EU’s strategy 
to promote effective and democratic government and the EU’s adoption 
of a cooperative-critical strategy largely diverged from the preferences of 
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the Angolan government. Cooperation on governance reforms thus 
generated substantial costs and very few benefits. While the EU and 
other international actors urged the Angolan government to strengthen 
formal democratic institutions and hold elections, the government itself 
had a strong interest in pushing back the election date until the eco-
nomic reconstruction process had yielded positive outcomes for the 
wider population. Furthermore, the EU and other international actors’ 
pressure to improve the transparency of government revenues and 
spending, and to promote the fight against corruption, clearly diverged 
from the preferences of the ruling elite. After the end of the civil war, the 
Angolan leadership had to reorganise its strategies to coopt its political 
support base (i.e. the military). Oil revenues constituted an important 
instrument in this endeavour.
It thus seems surprising that the Angolan government started to engage 
with the EU in governance reforms after all. However, in the early 2000s, 
economic cooperation with the EU implied some benefits for the Angolan 
government that partly balanced out costs stemming from cooperation on 
governance reforms. Immediately after the end of the civil war, oil produc-
tion in Angola as well as international oil prices were relatively low. At that 
time the EU was the second-largest destination for Angolan oil after the 
USA. Furthermore, the Angolan government expected that the EU would 
support it in organising an international donor conference. It anticipated 
that this conference would mobilise significant volumes of revenue deemed 
crucial for the reconstruction process and medium-term economic devel-
opment. At the same time, the Angolan government still had very little 
access to economic cooperation with China in the early 2000s. China was 
not yet a major destination for Angolan imports or (oil) exports, and had 
not yet become an important source of official flows. The relative eco-
nomic dependence on the EU and expectations regarding future EU 
 support—in the absence of alternative cooperation partners such as 
China—thus explain why Angola started to, albeit reluctantly, engage with 
the EU in governance reforms in the early 2000s, in spite of the challenges 
that this cooperation entails.
Why Has Angola Increasingly Ignored EU Demands to Cooperate 
Between 2006 and 2014?
Between 2006 and 2014, the EU has significantly narrowed its good gov-
ernance approach, focusing mostly on effective government. Furthermore, 
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the EU refrained from exerting public pressure on the Angolan govern-
ment and merely adopted a cooperative strategy. However, even coopera-
tion based on a very narrow understanding of good governance entailed 
considerable costs for the Angolan government. It continued to strongly 
rely on spoils and perks to sustain support from its political support coali-
tion. Global Witness and the IMF criticised the fact that in recent years, 
billions of dollars in oil revenues were again unaccounted for. In this con-
text, cooperation with the EU—even a narrow definition of good gover-
nance limited to effective government institutions—was still costly. The 
government faced little opposition in the 2008 elections. Yet, it was con-
fronted with public protests and growing discontent before and after the 
2012 elections, making cooperation with the EU an even more challeng-
ing endeavour.
Moreover, and in contrast to the early 2000s, Angola had little interest 
in cooperating with the EU beyond governance reforms, which could 
potentially have compensated for the risks of engaging in governance 
reforms. The EU’s main instrument to engage with Angola is develop-
ment aid. But with rising oil production and rising international oil prices, 
development aid accounts for less than 1 per cent of gross national 
income. The EU has also been relatively marginal as a source of other 
official flows that the government could have used to further promote the 
economic reconstruction process. The EU’s relative importance as a des-
tination for Angolan exports and a source of imports has generally been 
very limited since the mid-2000s, even though some EU member states 
such as Portugal or France were able to intensify their relations with 
Angola. The EU offered the Angolan government a partnership that was 
to improve cooperation on energy as well as regional peace and security, 
and thus promote close relations beyond development aid. Yet, the 
Angolan government’s marked hesitation in signing the so-called Joint 
Way Forward suggests that it has been relatively unenthusiastic about this 
partnership.
Since the mid-2000s, China has emerged as one of Angola’s most 
important cooperation partners. China surpassed the USA as the largest 
destination of Angolan oil exports in 2007. Moreover, the Chinese EXIM 
Bank and, to a lesser extent the China Development Bank, have extended 
significant loans that allowed the Angolan government to not only fund its 
ambitious infrastructure reconstruction programme but to also deliver the 
infrastructure just before the elections in 2008 and 2012. China’s offer to 
provide oil-for-infrastructure loans came at a crucial point in time. The 
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loans not only affected the Angolan government’s interest in engaging 
with the IMF and in complying with IMF conditionality, they also had 
significant effects on cooperation with the EU in the following years. 
Beyond this close economic cooperation, China has not offered an alter-
native to cooperate on governance reforms. However, limited engage-
ment between the Chinese and Angolan ruling parties and limited 
technical assistance to strengthen government capacities seem to be a 
result of the Angolan government’s limited interest rather than China’s 
unwillingness to extend support.
What If…?
Under what conditions might Angola have been more active and willing 
to engage with the EU in governance reforms? First of all, if the EU had 
used a broader approach to promote governance reforms, that would 
probably not have made Angola more willing to engage. Since even the 
EU’s narrow good governance strategy entailed substantial costs, broad-
ening the EU’s governance strategy would have been unlikely to create a 
stronger interest on the Angolan side. However, the EU’s good gover-
nance instruments are almost exclusively operationalised in the context of 
its development policy and the framework of its development aid relations. 
Thus, one open question is to what extent a broader set of governance 
instruments (beyond aid) would have allowed for a closer cooperation on 
governance reforms.
Second, how important is Angola’s access to cooperation with China in 
explaining the government’s unwillingness to cooperate with the EU? Or, 
to put it differently, would Angola have been more willing to cooperate 
with the EU if China had not emerged as a close cooperation partner? In 
light of its considerable natural resource deposits, even in the absence of 
cooperation with China, Angola would probably not have been more 
interested in receiving EU development aid. However, the EU would by 
default have been more important as a trading partner and as a source of 
official flows. The question is whether and how the EU would have used 
this greater leverage, for instance, in light of the growing economic (and 
political) interests of some EU member states.
The case of Angola therefore illustrates the limitations of the ‘Chinese 
threat’ argument. Even though the Angolan government has received 
important financial flows from China that have made the government even 
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more independent of other international actors, finance from China 
( similar to financial support from the EU) is part of a broader set of 
domestic and international forces that have an impact on the preferences 
of African governments.
noteS
1. The ethnic base of the MPLA has traditionally mostly been the Mbundu 
who represent only about 10 per cent of the Angolan population. 
Furthermore, the party also has a considerable number of white and mes-
tico members. During the civil war, it was often perceived as mostly repre-
senting the urban population.
2. The EU channelled parts of its humanitarian aid through NGOs. Mostly 
international and some national NGOs have implemented the EU’s pro-
grammes in health, education or food security, particularly between 2002 
and 2004 when the presence of the Angolan government was not assured 
throughout the country and national NGOs were still very weak (ECO 
Consult et al. 2009; Republic of Angola and European Community 2008). 
Since the mid-2000s, NGOs have become less important to implement 
EU assistance to Angola. Instead, the EU has channelled most of its funds 
through government structures.
3. The European Parliament and some European NGOs had been asking to 
launch Article 96 negotiations.
4. Which projects the Angolan government has agreed to implement are ana-
lysed based on OECD DAC CRS statistics for aid ‘disbursements’, the EU 
Angola joint annual reviews (2002, 2003, 2007) and an independent eval-
uation (ECO Consult et al. 2009).
5. Interviews with officials from the EU, member states and the Angolan 
government were conducted in Luanda in November 2009, in Brussels in 
April 2010 and October 2012 and via phone with the EU delegation in 
Luanda in December 2012.
6. Interview with EU official in Brussels in April 2010
7. As Traub (2006) summarises his interviews with leading government offi-
cials at that time ‘[Angolan elites] are of the opinion that they have made 
real strides in tackling inflation, the deficit and exchange rates, while the 
IMF continued to demand reforms that would be economically risky and 
politically suicidal’.
8. Quoted in Campos and Vines (2008).
9. The Angolan Ministry of Finance has published information on the first 
two tranches of the EXIM Bank loans. A list with projects funded by the 
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first USD2 billion loans is available online at http://www.minfin.gv.ao/
docs/dspProjGov.htm, last access on 3 April 2015.
10. Interviews with Chinese officials in Beijing in July 2010 and July 2013.
11. With the closure of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights in 2008, the EU became the largest donor to civil society organisa-
tions in Angola (Foley et al. 2010).
12. Interviews with EU officials in Luanda in November 2009, in Brussels in 
April 2010 and October 2010 and with EU officials in Luanda via tele-
phone in December 2012.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. The Joint Way Forward document can be accessed at http://eeas.europa.
eu/archives/docs/angola/jwf_en.pdf
16. The press statement after the meeting can be found at http://eeas.europa.
eu/statements/docs/2014/141017_02_en.pdf
17. Interview with EU official in Brussels, October 2012.
18. Opinion polls have to be taken with great caution in a context where peo-
ple’s chances to express their views are restricted. However, they can still 
give some indication of public support for the government.
19. See statement by Markus Weimer, quoted in Business Week, ‘Oil-rich 
Angola’s ruling party split over succession’, 9 May 2012, online at http://
www.businessweek.com/news/2012-05-08/oil-rich-angola-s-ruling-
party-split-over-succession#p2, last access on 3 June 2014.
20. The president is head of state, commander-in-chief of the armed forces and 
appoints major posts, including the judiciary. As Orre (2010) explains, 
under the new constitution, it is almost impossible to remove the 
president.
21. Luanda has a reputation for being one of the most expensive capitals in the 
world.
22. Relations with the DRC remain tight but not up to the point of a military 
conflict.
23. See Reuters, 25 January 2012, ‘Angola finds most of its missing $32 
bln’, online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/25/ozatp-
imf-angola-idAFJOE80O00O20120125, last access on 3 June 2014.
24. See www.chinasourceblog.org, last access 5 May 2013.
25. See New York Times, ‘Fortunes and Tables, Turn for Portugal and Angola’, 
20 November 2011, online at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/
world/africa/portugals-financial-crisis-leads-it-back-to-angola.html?_r=0, 
last access on 3 June 2014.
26. See The Guardian, ‘Portuguese escape austerity and find a new El Dorado 
in Angola’, 16 September 2012, online at http://www.theguardian.com/
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world/2012/sep/16/portuguese-exodus-angola-el-dorado, last access 
on 3 June 2014.
27. See also the discussion between the American and Chinese ambassa-
dor in Luanda, released by Wikileaks (2009). New China Credit Line 
under Consideration, online at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/09LUANDA51_a.html, last access on 3 June 2013.
28. The Economist (2011), China International Fund, The Queensway 
Syndicate and the Africa trade, online at http://www.economist.com/
node/21525847, last access on 3 June 2014.
29. According to information released by Wikileaks (see Note no. 27 above) 
the Chinese ambassador reported details about dos Santos’ visit to China 
and negotiations on the loan to the US ambassador in Luanda. See also 
Africa-Asia Confidential (2008).
30. See Xinhua China ‘Angola set up strategic partnership’ CCTV news chan-
nel 19 November 2010.
31. Angola and China reached an agreement that the hospital should be rebuilt 
and a MoU was signed in 2012 (ANGO Press 2012c). Alves (2011, 139) 
argues that the hospital was an aid project (a grant) and had not been 
financed through the oil-for-infrastructure loans.
32. Interviews with business representatives in Luanda in November 2009.
33. Angolan companies in the cement and steel sector, for instance, complain that 
they cannot compete with Chinese companies as much of the material for the 
construction projects is still imported (Africa-Asia Confidential 2009a).
34. See Macauhub November 2010, online at http://www.macauhub.com.
mo/en/2010/11/19/over-50-chinese-state-companies-and-400-pri-
vate-firms-operate-in-angola/, last access on 10 December 2016.
35. See Wall Street Journal ‘Hostility towards Workers Cools Angola-China 
Relationship’, 10 August 2010 online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748704388504575418990791137242, last access on 
10 December 2016.
36. See Financial Times, 9 October 2013 ‘The new gas guzzler. China has 
overtaken the US as the world’s top oil importer. FT reporters examine the 
trends behind a historic shift’ online at  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/01ba1a04-2c24-11e3-acf4-00144feab7de.html#axzz37WngVdLR, 
last access on 15 July 2014.
37. Sinopec’s limited engagement as an operator in Angola’s oil industry can 
partly be explained by its lack of technology and experience in ultra-deep 
water oil exploration where most of Angola’s oil is explored.
38. Also beyond the oil sector, investments have increased in recent years. 
Some of those Chinese firms that initially come to Angola to implement 
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infrastructure under the oil-for-infrastructure deals remained in Angola 
after the completion of the project (Vines and Campos 2010).
39. On both sides, different representatives from the CCP and MPLA take 
part in the meetings. CCP representatives often have the chance to meet 
with dos Santos. CCP representatives often take part in national congresses 
and conferences when they visit Angola.
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Ideological and strategic competition between democracies and autocra-
cies has forcibly re-entered the international arena. Whether and, if so, 
how the presence of China affects the EU’s strategies of supporting gov-
ernance reforms in Africa is one key aspect in these debates.
This book started off with the empirical observation that the EU’s suc-
cess in using its good governance instruments and making African govern-
ments address good governance issues has varied markedly. In the early 
2000s, governments in Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda all began more or 
less reluctantly engaging with the EU on governance reforms. Since the 
mid-2000s, when China appeared on the horizon, the Rwandan govern-
ment has (pro) actively cooperated with the EU. The Ethiopian govern-
ment has remained reluctant in the face of EU demands to engage. The 
Angolan government has been largely indifferent towards the EU’s 
requests for cooperation. Against this backdrop, this book has dealt with 
two main questions. What explains the differences in African govern-
ments’ willingness to engage with the EU on governance reforms? To 
what extent does China’s presence affect African governments’ openness 
to engage with the EU?
The three case studies have provided explanations for why Angola, 
Ethiopia and Rwanda’s willingness to engage with the EU has changed 
between 2000 and 2014. This chapter summarises the main findings along 
the four variables that influence African governments’ responsiveness: EU 
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good governance strategies, African government’ survival strategies, eco-
nomic dependence on the EU and access to cooperation with China. The 
following sections discuss how the variables influence African govern-
ments’ openness to engage with the EU and how these findings relate to 
other research on EU good governance policies and authoritarian regimes. 
This chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the implications for 
future research and policy-making.
6.1  EU Good GovErnancE StratEGiES: not 
StratEGic EnoUGh
The EU has made support for governance reforms a stronger priority in its 
Africa policy. Comparing the EU’s engagement with Angola, Ethiopia and 
Rwanda demonstrates that the EU has adopted quite different good gov-
ernance strategies in its relations with individual African countries. The 
EU’s strategies can be analysed along two dimensions (see Chap. 2). The 
EU may put emphasis on a different content or substance of good gover-
nance and use a different channel to support governance reforms. In addi-
tion, it can choose different instruments and promote reforms through 
either a more conflictive or a more cooperative strategy. The content or 
substance of what the EU seeks to promote and the instruments the EU 
uses, both influence African governments’ openness to engage on gover-
nance reforms.
How has the EU tried to support good governance in Angola, Ethiopia 
and Rwanda? The EU’s strategies were initially strikingly similar. In the 
early 2000s, the EU adopted a relatively broad good governance approach 
and promoted democratic government in its relations with all three coun-
tries. It primarily relied on the intergovernmental channel and aimed at 
strengthening not only the effectiveness and transparency of decision- 
making processes, but also their democratic quality. The EU also used a 
very similar cooperative-critical strategy vis-à-vis all three countries. In all 
of them, it mainly relied on cooperative instruments such as political dia-
logue and good governance aid to promote reforms, but combined these 
cooperative instruments with material incentives and public shaming to 
pressure the three governments into introducing reforms (Table 6.1).
Since mid-2000s, the EU’s good governance strategies towards the 
three countries have varied markedly. In Angola, the EU has narrowed its 
understanding of good governance, addressing mainly the capacities of 
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government institutions. The EU’s approach has thus been increasingly 
limited to promoting effective government. Moreover, the EU has clearly 
refrained from using critical public statements (shaming) or material incen-
tives to put pressure on the Angolan government. It has shifted towards a 
cooperative strategy, relying mainly on dialogue and governance aid.
In Ethiopia, the EU has broadened its good governance approach 
slightly towards democratic governance. The EU provided more support 
to non-state actors to empower them vis-à-vis the government and con-
tinued attempts to promote not only the effectiveness, but also the demo-
cratic quality, of decision-making processes. After the 2005 election crisis, 
the EU used cooperative instruments, such as political dialogue and gov-
ernance aid, and continued to pressure the Ethiopian government through 
critical public statements and material incentives. Even though the EU 
has not used aid funds as leverage, since the mid-2000s it has been more 
critical vis-à-vis the Ethiopian government than towards Angola or 
Rwanda.
In Rwanda, relatively little change in the EU’s approach can be 
observed over time. Since 2005, the EU has continued to support not 
only the capacities of government institutions and the transparency of 
political processes, but also the democratic quality of decision-making 
processes, promoting democratic government. In Rwanda, the EU has not 
relied on cooperative instruments alone. Instead, it has even rewarded the 
Rwandan government by increasing development aid and using aid 
modalities such as direct budget support, signalling the government that 
the governance situation is seen positively. The EU changed its strategy 
only in 2012, when it put pressure on Rwanda to stop supporting rebel 
groups in the eastern provinces of the DRC by withholding and shifting 
direct budget-support funds to other aid modalities (Fig. 6.1).
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Changes in the EU’s policies towards Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda 
over time cannot easily explain variances in the responsiveness of African 
governments. The EU initially adopted very similar strategies. In response, 
all three African governments have reluctantly started to engage. However, 
despite striking similarities in the EU’s good governance strategies, in the 
early 2000s some differences could already be observed in the responsive-
ness of the three governments. Rwanda was slightly more forthcoming in 
engaging with the EU than Ethiopia. Angola was more hesitant in coop-
erating with the EU than Ethiopia. If the EU’s strategies were the key 
factor that would explain African governments’ responsiveness, one would 
have expected to find stronger similarities there in the early 2000s.
Modifications over time in both the EU’s good governance strategies 
and African governments’ responsiveness further suggest that the EU’s 
strategies are not the key factor to explain why African governments are 
willing to engage. In Rwanda, changes in the EU’s strategies over time 
seem to have some explanatory power in accounting for changes in the 
government’s responsiveness. While the EU continued to promote demo-
cratic government between 2000 and 2014, since the mid-2000s it has 
shifted its instruments towards a cooperative-rewarding strategy. One can 
argue that the EU has thereby increased the benefits and reduced the costs 
for the Rwandan government, making it easier for Rwanda to engage.
The cases of Angola and Ethiopia, however, exemplify that the EU’s 
good governance strategies have a limited influence on African govern-





























cooperative-critical instruments since the 2005 election crisis, it has also 
broadened its approach in promoting governance reforms, making it more 
difficult for the Ethiopian government to engage. Even since the election 
crisis, the Ethiopian government has continued to at least reluctantly 
engage with the EU; it has decided not to completely ignore EU demands 
for cooperation on governance reforms.
In Angola, the EU has narrowed its approach over time and has increas-
ingly refrained from exerting pressure, clearly reducing the costs for the 
Angolan government to engage. However, even though the EU has made 
it ‘easier’ for Angola to cooperate, the government has not become more 
responsive towards the EU. Instead, since 2006 it has largely ignored EU 
demands for cooperation on governance reforms. Changes in the EU’s 
strategy thus had no effect on the responsiveness of the Angolan 
government.
Finally, during a short period of time in Ethiopia (during the 2005 elec-
tion crisis) and Rwanda (in 2012), the EU used a relatively broad approach 
and cooperative-conflictive instruments to exert considerable pressure on 
both governments (notably budget-support suspensions). Nevertheless, 
despite similarities in the EU’s strategy towards Ethiopia in 2005 and 
Rwanda in 2012, the Ethiopian government was indifferent towards the 
EU’s demands for engagement during that period, whereas the Rwandan 
government has continued to actively cooperate with the EU.
The findings suggest that the EU’s good governance strategies as such 
have limited explanatory power in accounting for the differences in African 
governments’ responsiveness. This has been seen most clearly in the case 
of Angola. Even though the EU has narrowed its strategy over time, the 
government has become increasingly indifferent to engagement with the 
EU. This result is interesting in view of the fact that scholars investigating 
why the EU uses a certain type of instrument or strategy to promote gov-
ernance reforms in third countries often start by assuming that coherent 
and consistent EU good governance policies are a necessary condition for 
the effectiveness of the EU’s strategies (Jünemann and Knodt 2007; 
Börzel and Risse 2009; Kotzian et al. 2011; Wetzel and Orbie 2011; Del 
Biondo 2015). However, the empirics here illustrate that the specific strat-
egy that the EU adopts predicts the success of the EU’s policies less clearly 
than often assumed. Instead, much more attention needs to be paid to the 
‘receiving end’ of the EU’s engagement and to understanding the basic 
preferences and interests of governments in authoritarian regimes in 
engaging with the EU on governance reforms. The EU’s strategies thus 
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need to be analysed in conjunction with the survival strategies of African 
governments, their dependence on the EU and access to cooperation with 
other external actors, such as China.
6.2  QUitE divErSE: african dominant Party 
SyStEmS’ SUrvival StratEGiES
When African governments decide whether to engage with the EU on 
governance reforms, they assess the costs and benefits that cooperation 
with the EU entails in light of their domestic survival strategies. The analy-
sis demonstrates that the domestic survival strategies of governments in 
African authoritarian regimes are the key factor that influences the willing-
ness of these governments to cooperate with the EU.
The Survival Strategies of Dominant Party Regimes:  
Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda
Governments in African dominant party regimes employ different strate-
gies for increasing their chances of remaining in power. They can decide to 
invest in the party or the state to strengthen public goods provision or 
coopt regime opponents and supporters. They may use coercion to open 
or close political spaces. They may more or less successfully manage arenas 
of contestation, such as elections, to strengthen their domestic and inter-
national legitimacy and signal their firm grip on power to regime oppo-
nents. Strong state institutions or strong ruling parties are key for 
governments in dominant party systems to effectively manage arenas of 
contestation and use coercion to open or close political spaces. The spe-
cific strategies that governments choose are influenced first of all by struc-
tural factors, such as access to natural resources (like oil) or how the regime 
came to power. They are further shaped by situational factors, such as the 
type of threats from the opposition that governments face during a specific 
period.
 Angola: Using the Party and the State for Cooptation
Angola is a dominant party system in which the leadership has developed 
an extensive patronage network. The Angolan leadership can rely on vast 
revenues from oil exports that are relatively easy to extract and that require 
little cooperation from the party or the population. The leadership 
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 therefore has made relatively little efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of 
government institutions or invest in the institutionalisation of party struc-
tures. Instead, it uses formal and informal state institutions as well as the 
ruling party to provide spoils and perks to regime supporters and to coopt 
regime opponents. The leadership has at times even taken deliberate steps 
to weaken state institutions to reduce the chances of independent centres 
of power emerging. In addition to cooptation mechanisms, the govern-
ment relies on low-intensity coercion to prevent and respond to challenges 
from the opposition.
In the first few years after the end of the civil war, the Angolan leader-
ship experienced a period of relative stability with very few challenges 
from within the ruling elite or from the opposition outside the ruling 
party. Since the 2008 elections, however, dissatisfaction within the 
MPLA as well as in the broader population has been growing. Compared 
with the 2008 elections, the government thus faced more difficulties in 
winning the 2012 (and 2017) elections. In response to mounting dis-
satisfaction, the leadership invested even more in expanding the ruling 
party and using the party as an instrument of cooptation. With the drop 
in oil prices that started in 2014, the government’s financial means for 
sustaining the extensive patronage system are arguably fading away with 
unclear implications for the medium- to longer-term stability of the 
regime.
 Rwanda: Using Effective State Institutions for Public Goods Provision 
and Coercion
Unlike Angola, Rwanda is a dominant party system in which the leader-
ship has heavily invested in the effectiveness of government institutions to 
improve public goods provision. Since the mid-2000s, the Rwandan lead-
ership has been more active in this regard not only compared with Angola 
but also compared with Ethiopia and other African dominant party sys-
tems. At the same time, the Rwandan leadership has relied on low- intensity 
coercion to prevent challenges to regime survival and it has been success-
ful in managing arenas of contestation.
The Rwandan government faced challenges from within the ruling elite 
ahead of the 2003 elections. Since the mid-2000s, it has enjoyed a period 
of relative domestic stability with little challenges from political oppo-
nents. Some members of the ruling elite (notably the military and security 




Academic literature and policy debates on Rwanda are highly polarised. 
Scholars either criticise the authoritarian, repressive political regime (for 
example Reyntjens 2013) or they highlight Rwanda’s great progress in 
terms of poverty reduction and economic growth (for example Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi 2012). Here it is argued that political repression and 
public goods provision constitute two sides of the same coin. Rwanda is an 
example of those very few authoritarian, dominant party systems that 
invest in effective state institutions to improve public goods provision, 
while at the same time closing spaces for the media, civil society and oppo-
sition parties.
The Rwandan regime has emerged in a very specific context and under 
very specific structural conditions. Rwanda has scarce domestic resources 
and a very small territory. The ruling party originates from a military 
movement that had to fight against the génocidaires with little interna-
tional (financial or other material) support. It relies on a small political 
(still) ethnic-based support group. It is therefore no coincidence that it is 
in Rwanda that a strong authoritarian state with a rational-legal and meri-
tocratic bureaucracy has developed and that these state institutions are not 
only used for controlling the political arena but also for public goods 
provision.
 Ethiopia Somewhere ‘In-Between’: Party Expansion and Effective State, 
Public Goods, Cooptation and Coercion
Ethiopia is a dominant party system in which the government has also 
invested in the effectiveness of state institutions. Yet in light of strong 
challenges from the domestic opposition, the government modified its 
survival strategies in the mid-2000s, putting more emphasis on party 
expansion, cooptation and coercion.
In the early 2000s, the Ethiopian leadership adopted a strategy similar 
to that which the Rwandan government has used since 2006. In response 
to the split in the TPLF central committee in 2001, the Ethiopian gov-
ernment started to heavily invest in the effectiveness of government insti-
tutions with a view to improving public goods provision. At the same 
time, the government used low-intensity coercion to prevent an opposi-
tion from emerging. However, ahead of the 2005 elections, the Ethiopian 
leadership opened political spaces because it thought that it would be 
in a secure position. When the opposition made considerable gains in 
the elections and thereby threatened regime survival, the Ethiopian lead-
ership fundamentally altered its survival strategies. It started to invest 
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more strongly in expanding the ruling party. In parallel, state institutions 
were increasingly also used as instruments for cooptation.
Some of the structural conditions that impact the governments’ sur-
vival strategies are quite similar in Ethiopia and Rwanda: both have very 
limited access to revenues from natural resources and both parties came to 
power through a violent struggle during which they had little support 
from the international community. Instead, differences in Ethiopia’s and 
Rwanda’s survival strategies since the mid-2000s are caused by varying 
challenges to regime stability and threats from political opponents. In this 
regard, Ethiopian and Rwanda nicely illustrate how the domestic political 
game between the ruler and political opponents from inside or outside the 
ruling coalition is a key factor in the domestic politics of authoritarian 
regimes as well as their external relations.
Dominant Party Regimes’ Survival Strategies Meet EU Good 
Governance Strategies
Comparing Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda at first confirms the widely held 
assumption that cooperation on governance reforms can generate sub-
stantial costs for authoritarian governments. In some countries, such as 
Angola, cooperation does indeed cause difficulties and brings almost no 
benefits for the government. However, in other dominant party regimes, 
such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, cooperation can produce costs and benefits 
for the government.
 Angola: Mainly Costs in Engaging on Good Governance Reforms 
with the EU
In resource-rich, dominant party regimes like Angola that distribute spoils 
and perks to remain in power, cooperation on governance reforms chal-
lenges regime survival. The Angolan leadership has made few attempts to 
invest in formal state institutions, but relies to an important extent on 
informal state institutions and the party. In this context, cooperating with 
the EU, even on a narrow understanding of effective government that 
‘only’ involves reforms related to transparency, public financial manage-
ment, tax reform or the fight against corruption, would be risky. Despite 
the shift in the EU’s good governance strategy and the EU’s decision to 
narrow its approach to effective government and to not use conflictive 
instruments, cooperation has mostly incurred costs for the government. 
While the Angolan leadership at least partly governed through informal 
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state structures and the party, the EU mostly engages with formal state 
structures.
On the other hand, cooperation on democratic government would have 
been challenging for the Angolan government and hardly happened. The 
government was quite secure in its position ahead of the 2008 elections; 
in fact, it postponed the election date several times until it was expecting 
an easy victory. EU support for the elections therefore accrued some ben-
efits in the form of external legitimacy and improvements in international 
reputation. Ahead of the 2012 elections, however, the Angolan govern-
ment was under greater domestic pressure due to stronger public opposi-
tion and dissatisfaction within the MPLA.  In this context, cooperation 
with the EU on the elections would have potentially been costly, and 
therefore did not occur.
 Ethiopia and Rwanda: Costs and Benefits to Engage with the EU
Comparing Angola with Ethiopia and Rwanda demonstrates that in domi-
nant party regimes where governments have a strong genuine interest in 
building effective states, at least part of the EU’s good governance strate-
gies converges with the preferences of the governments.
Ethiopia and Rwanda both clearly have a stronger interest than Angola 
in building capable states that generate domestic (tax) revenues and pro-
vide public goods to a broader segment of society. In this context, EU 
support for effective government institutions aligns with the preferences of 
the government for state modernisation. However, the comparison of 
Ethiopia and Rwanda shows that the size of these benefits still varies over 
time. In Rwanda, cooperating with the EU on building an effective state 
was more attractive after 2005 than in the early 2000s. When the govern-
ment launched several reform programmes to strengthen the civil service, 
increase taxes, improve public financial management systems and reduce 
corruption, the government’s preferences strongly converged with the 
EU’s offer to support the effectiveness of government institutions.
In the case of Ethiopia, those elements of the EU’s approach that were 
geared towards strengthening the effectiveness of government institutions 
converged more strongly with the government’s preferences in the early 
2000s than after the 2005 election crisis. In response to the split within 
the TPLF central committee in 2001, the Ethiopian leadership launched a 
major reform programme to enhance the effectiveness of state institutions. 
The EU and other donors’ support for this programme was thus very 
welcomed by the Ethiopian government. After the 2005 election crisis, 
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building effective government institutions remained important for the 
Ethiopian leadership. However, state institutions and public goods provi-
sion were also increasingly used as mechanisms for cooptation, for instance, 
by expanding state employment.
At the same time, the Ethiopian leadership invested heavily in expand-
ing the reach of the party and conditioned access to basic social services 
(at least to some degree) to party membership. When international 
NGOs accused the Ethiopian government of using aid funds as an instru-
ment of cooptation, the EU and other donors came under considerable 
pressure. Investing in the party as an instrument of cooptation thus 
caused friction in EU–Ethiopia relations. In other words, the case of 
Ethiopia between 2005 and 2010 illustrates that even though the EU 
does not directly engage with the ruling party as part of its good gover-
nance strategies, the Ethiopian leadership’s decision to strengthen the 
reach of the party can still induce considerable tension for bilateral 
relations.
Furthermore, comparing Ethiopia and Rwanda reveals that in African 
dominant party regimes, EU attempts to promote both democratic gov-
ernment and democratic governance can induce various costs and some 
(few) benefits. These costs and benefits vary depending on the threat from 
the opposition that the government faces and the survival strategies it 
uses. Between 2000 and 2004, the EU’s strategies coincided with a period 
of instability in both Ethiopia and Rwanda. However, both governments’ 
response strategies varied. Whereas Rwanda closed political spaces to 
secure its election victory, Ethiopia—at least slightly—opened up. 
Cooperation on democratic government was thus very risky for Rwanda 
and easier for Ethiopia. After 2005, the EU’s demands to engage in gov-
ernance reforms were made during a time of regime stability in the case of 
Rwanda and regime instability in the case of Ethiopia. While both govern-
ments used similar strategies of low-intensity coercion, EU demands to 
engage in democratic government (and governance) have therefore 
inflicted substantial costs for the government in Ethiopia, but not in 
Rwanda. For instance, as the Rwandan government was quite sure of win-
ning the 2008 and 2010 parliamentary and presidential elections, it could 
engage with the EU. The Ethiopian government, instead, only agreed to 
cooperate during the 2010 elections, once it was sure to win by a substan-
tial majority.
Several conclusions emerge from this analysis. Cooperation on gover-
nance reforms can be risky—but also beneficial—for governments in African 
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dominant party regimes. Academic work on authoritarianism often assumes 
that the implementation of good governance instruments mostly produces 
costs (Wright 2009; Cornell 2012; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015; see also 
Andrews 2013). By contrast, this book has shown that support for gover-
nance reforms may also converge with the preferences of governments in 
dominant party systems. This phenomenon was most clearly illustrated in 
the case of Rwanda. This is an important point because it demonstrates that 
more attention needs to be paid to (negative) unintended effects of the EU 
and other external actors’ good governance policies.
By modifying its strategy, the EU can increase the incentives and disin-
centives for African governments to engage. However, the EU has not 
always been strategic in adjusting its good governance policies to the local 
dynamics and the domestic political game between the ruler and oppo-
nents. Analysing the EU’s good governance policies together with the 
survival strategies of African authoritarian regimes suggests that the EU 
often has not used the most appropriate strategy to support reforms. The 
EU at times exerts pressure and promotes a broad understanding of good 
governance when African governments have very little leeway to engage 
with the EU (for example, in the case of Ethiopia in the years following 
the 2005 election crisis). More importantly, the EU at times fails to use 
windows of opportunity to promote reforms when African governments 
have enough room to manoeuvre and engage with the EU (for example, 
in the case of Rwanda after 2005 when the government faced very little 
domestic political opposition). The EU, thereby, not only misses an 
opportunity to support the basic conditions that may contribute to demo-
cratic change in the medium- to longer-term perspective, but it also risks 
endorsing the regime in place.
The survival strategies have considerable explanatory power in account-
ing for differences across the three countries. However, they do not fully 
explain the variation in the three governments’ openness for engaging with 
the EU on governance reforms. The interaction of the EU’s strategies and 
African governments’ survival strategies elucidates why Ethiopia is less will-
ing to engage with the EU than Rwanda. Yet, by focussing merely on these 
two factors, one would expect that Ethiopia would not engage at all with 
the EU on governance reforms after 2005, given the high risks of coopera-
tion. Focussing on the survival strategies also cannot explain why Rwanda 
only reluctantly cooperated in the early 2000s, but then shifted its strategy 
towards proactive engagement after 2005. Moreover, it does not explain 
why Angola reluctantly engaged with the EU in the early 2000s, despite 
the low benefits and high costs that cooperation entailed at that time.
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6.3  Economic dEPEndEncE: lESS imPortant 
than thoUGht
African governments take their decisions whether to engage in governance 
reforms first of all by assessing the costs and benefits that this cooperation 
entails in light of their survival strategies. The incentives of cooperating 
with the EU on governance reforms are then further mitigated by African 
governments’ broader interests in cooperating with the EU.  The cases 
analysed here demonstrate that African countries’ economic dependence 
on the EU can tip the scale; it can increase or reduce the incentives for 
African governments to engage with the EU. However, economic depen-
dence is not an alternative explanation to African governments’ survival 
strategies. The empirics in this book do not suggest that African countries’ 
dependence on the EU is irrelevant. Yet, the relevance of that dependence 
hinges on African governments’ survival strategies.
In the early 2000s, Ethiopia and Rwanda were both quite depen-
dent on the EU, whereas Angola’s dependence was relatively low 
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Fig. 6.2 Economic dependence of Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda on the EU 
between 2000 and 2014
Source: Author’s compilation; ‘T’ stands for ‘time period’, for Rwanda T1: 2000–2005, 




Ethiopia. Aid as a share of GNI peaked at almost 20 per cent in Ethiopia 
in 2003, and at almost 25 per cent in Rwanda in 2004. The Ethiopian 
and Rwandan governments both actively embraced the emerging inter-
national aid effectiveness agenda to maximise access to international 
development aid flows. Furthermore, the EU was among their largest 
trading partners and an important source of direct investments for 
Ethiopia as well as Rwanda at that time. Yet, for both governments 
trade (and investments) still generated fewer revenues than aid. 
Moreover, as the EU has largely operationalised its good governance 
instruments in the area of aid, it has limited leverage to use dependence 
on trade and investments to set direct incentives for cooperating on 
governance reforms.
In the early 2000s, Rwanda’s dependence on the EU thus set incentives 
for the government to reluctantly start engaging in governance reforms, 
even though this type of activity was risky at that time. For Ethiopia, coop-
eration on governance reforms was also difficult in the early 2000s, as it 
was for Rwanda. In this regard, Ethiopia’s slightly lower dependence on 
the EU compared with Rwanda explains why, in the early 2000s, Ethiopia 
was slightly more reluctant to engage than Rwanda was.
For Angola, economic cooperation with the EU in the early 2000s 
provided some benefits and at least partly balanced out costs that coopera-
tion on governance reforms entailed. Unlike Ethiopia and Rwanda, Angola 
was clearly not dependent on aid at that time. However, even though aid 
as a share of GNI was quite low (only 4 per cent), the government reached 
out to the EU (and other Western donors) for support. After the end of 
the civil war, it urgently needed financial assistance for the reconstruction 
process. Angola turned to the EU, when the IMF and other Western 
actors were not willing to extend support.1 Moreover, in the early 2000s, 
the EU still had a comparatively large stake in trade with Angola; oil 
exports to the EU came second after the USA. This moderate dependence 
on the EU explains why the Angolan government started to at least reluc-
tantly engage in the implementation of governance instruments in the 
early 2000s.
Since the mid-2000s, Rwanda has remained strongly dependent on the 
EU. The EU kept its position as a key donor to Rwanda. The modalities 
by which the EU provided aid (budget support) and the sectors to which 
it directed aid (social services and infrastructure) have matched the 
Rwandan government’s preferences. The EU also continued to be the 
most important destination for Rwandan exports (until 2012) and source 
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of direct investments. In light of the shift in EU good governance  strategies 
towards a rewarding strategy and the low costs stemming from coopera-
tion on governance reforms between 2006 and 2014, high dependence on 
the EU can thus explain why the government not only actively but proac-
tively engaged with the EU. Only with the EU and other donors’ usage of 
negative conditionality and their shift from budget support to sector bud-
get support in the summer of 2012, have Rwanda’s interests in engaging 
with the EU begun decreasing.
Ethiopia’s dependence on the EU slightly increased in the mid-2000s. 
After the 2005 elections, output legitimacy became even more important 
to regime stability. The EU and other donors’ support for social services 
and infrastructure development therefore became even more relevant for 
the Ethiopian government after 2005. Moreover, the EU remained an 
important destination for Ethiopia’s exports, which slightly increased after 
2005. In light of the high risks that cooperation on governance reforms 
entailed after the 2005 elections, Ethiopia’s high level of EU dependence 
explains why the government did not ignore EU demands for cooperation 
on governance reforms, but at least reluctantly engaged.
In the case of Angola, dependence on the EU further decreased since 
2005. The share of aid to GNI dropped below 1 per cent. Even though 
the EU is one of the largest donors to Angola, development aid clearly 
provides no incentive that could balance out the costs that cooperation on 
governance reforms would entail for the Angolan government. Moreover, 
the EU’s relative importance as a destination for Angolan exports or as a 
source of loans has diminished rapidly. The EU has made some attempts 
to develop a more comprehensive partnership with Angola to offer incen-
tives for cooperation beyond aid. The EU’s proposal to initiate a ‘Joint 
Way Forward’ was meant to open new avenues for cooperation beyond 
the framework of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, for instance on 
energy and regional peace and security. Even though it is still early to 
judge the outcome, the Angolan government’s strong hesitation in sign-
ing the Joint Way Forward indicates the government’s limited interest in 
this type of partnership.
Comparing the economic dependence of Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda 
on the EU suggests that aid dependence is an important factor that influ-
ences African governments’ willingness to engage with the EU.  Some 
have argued that governments mainly cooperate on governance reforms to 
assure continued aid flows, but with little genuine interest in the particular 
reforms (Andrews 2013). This raises the question of how important the 
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three countries’ dependence on the EU is compared with their survival 
strategies in explaining their willingness to engage in governance reforms.
Findings from the case of Angola appear ambiguous. The EU has nar-
rowed its good governance approach and has become less critical towards 
the Angolan government. Changes in the Angolan government’s survival 
strategies over time have not made it more difficult to engage with the 
EU. At the same time, the government’s dependence on the EU decreased 
further. It is thus difficult to draw conclusions from the case of Angola 
regarding the relative importance of the government’s survival strategies 
compared with the government’s dependence on the EU.
The examples of Ethiopia and Rwanda, however, show compellingly 
that African countries’ dependence on the EU cannot fully explain their 
strategies, but needs to be considered in conjunction with and against the 
background of their own survival strategies. Ethiopia has become more 
dependent on the EU over time, but the government continued to only 
reluctantly engage with the EU on governance reforms between 2006 and 
2014. If the government’s aid dependence had been the main factor in 
explaining its willingness to engage, one would have expected the 
Ethiopian government to become more open to cooperation over time. 
Rwanda’s level of dependence on EU aid, on the other hand, remained 
similar between the early 2000s and 2014. However, the Rwandan gov-
ernment still decided to proactively engage with the EU after 2006. If 
Rwanda’s willingness to engage had been primarily driven by its depen-
dence on the EU, one would have expected Rwanda’s openness to coop-
eration to remain similar over time.
We can draw three main conclusions from this part of the analysis. First, 
in cases of strong aid dependency, the EU can use aid as an incentive to 
compensate for some of the costs that cooperating on governance reforms 
involves. This was observed most clearly in Ethiopia between 2005 and 
2010. Even though cooperation on governance reforms was risky for the 
Ethiopian government, it engaged with the EU—at least reluctantly. The 
importance of the EU as a donor to Ethiopia, the EU’s aid modalities and 
the choice of sectors to which it has targeted its aid arguably have made 
the EU’s overall cooperation package attractive enough for the Ethiopian 
government to hesitantly accept cooperation on governance reforms. 
Even if Ethiopia only ‘reluctantly’ engaged, this can be viewed as a success 
given the substantial challenges that cooperation on governance reforms 
entailed for the Ethiopian government in the post-2005 election period.
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Second, the EU’s good governance policies face strong limitations in 
countries where cooperation on governance reforms is costly for the 
target government and where aid dependence is low. This is most obvi-
ous in the case of Angola. The EU is basically left with no financial 
incentives to convince the government to address governance issues. 
Moreover, it has little means to set (material) incentives ‘beyond’ devel-
opment aid to convince the Angolan government to engage on gover-
nance reforms.
Third, African countries’ dependence on the EU is a factor that can ‘tip 
the balance’ and set additional incentives for cooperation. However, 
African countries’ dependence on the EU is not an alternative explanation 
to account for African governments’ willingness to cooperate on gover-
nance reforms. Instead, it needs to be analysed in conjunction with African 
governments’ survival strategies and the EU’s good governance strategies 
to account for different levels of responsiveness.
6.4  doES china mattEr? yES, BUt lESS 
than ExPEctEd
Finally, the analysis of China’s engagement with Angola, Ethiopia and 
Rwanda confounds the widely held belief in policy and academic debates 
that China made it more difficult for the EU to support governance 
reforms in Africa between 2000 and 2014. Even though China has 
emerged as an alternative partner in Ethiopia and to some extent Angola, 
this has had limited effects on the Ethiopian and Angolan governments’ 
willingness to engage with the EU on governance reforms.
Comparing Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda reveals that African govern-
ments’ access to cooperation with China has varied substantially between 
2000 and 2014, not only over time but also across the three countries. 
Depending on China’s economic and political interests in engaging with 
African countries, the opportunities presented to African governments 
differ considerably. The following sub-section will examine to what extent 
China’s economic cooperation with African countries has reduced African 
governments’ dependence on the EU and to what extent China engages 
with African countries on their survival strategies. It will then delve into 
the question of whether China’s engagement in Africa has affected African 




China: Reducing African Countries’ Economic Dependence 
on the EU in Some Cases
In the early 2000s, when the EU started to put governance reforms more 
prominently onto the agenda in its relations with African governments, 
African countries had little access to economic cooperation with China. 
Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda were no exception in this regard. For all 
three countries, levels of bilateral trade with China, access to Chinese 
development aid and other official flows, as well as direct investments from 
China were quite low at the turn of the millennium. However, China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Chinese govern-
ment’s launch of the ‘going out’ policy and its growing needs for energy 
resources created a number of (mostly economic) incentives for China to 
strengthen its engagement with African countries.
Since the mid-2000s, China’s economic relations with Angola, Ethiopia 
and Rwanda have intensified substantially. For all three countries, a spe-
cific point in time can be identified when relations started to become more 
important. In the case of Angola, that was in 2004 when China and Angola 
signed the first oil-for-infrastructure deal, and for Ethiopia it was in early 
2006 with the first master loan facility; and shortly after the Ethiopian 
government’s dispute with the EU and other international actors. China–
Rwanda relations deepened with the third meeting of the Forum for 
China-Africa Cooperation that took place in Beijing in October 2006. 
However, due to China’s specific economic and political interests in 
engaging with the three countries, the countries’ access to aid, official 
flows, trade and investments from China have differed considerably since 
the mid-2000s.
In the case of Angola, China has rapidly become a major economic 
cooperation partner, further reducing the country’s vulnerability to EU 
pressure. After 2004, China quickly emerged as Angola’s second-largest 
trading partner; in 2007, China overtook the USA as the largest destina-
tion for Angolan oil exports. China has become by far the largest source 
of official flows to Angola. Angola has become the most important recipi-
ent of Chinese loans in Africa. Chinese loans not only allowed the Angolan 
government to fund its ambitious infrastructure reconstruction pro-
gramme but also to deliver the infrastructure in time for the parliamentary 
elections in 2008 and in 2012, respectively.
The example of Angola, therefore, illustrates the pivotal role of resource 
interests as a driving force for closer economic cooperation between China 
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and African countries. Angola has emerged as the second-largest (at times 
largest) source of Chinese oil imports, also indicating the importance of 
Angola to China. China’s relations with Angola (not unlike the EU’s rela-
tions with Angola) are thus clearly interdependent. However, the case of 
Angola also highlights that China’s engagement and interests in Africa are 
not limited to resource interests. From the Chinese perspective, Angola 
has become an important market for Chinese (mostly state-owned) con-
struction companies. Moreover—and again not too different from the 
EU—Chinese officials view Angola as an important political and security 
actor within the wider region.
In the case of Ethiopia, China has also become a major source of official 
flows, an important destination for Ethiopia’s exports and a relatively 
important source of direct investments. China has become almost as 
important an economic partner for Ethiopia as the EU. China’s engage-
ment with Ethiopia thus considerably reduces Ethiopia’s vulnerability to 
EU pressure. The EXIM Bank supports large infrastructure projects; trade 
with China has opened new export markets and contributed to the diver-
sification of Ethiopia’s trade, and in doing so has generated important 
additional profits for the government. China has granted aid to support 
some high-profile government projects such as a railway, infrastructure 
development in Addis Ababa and a prestigious expressway.
As Ethiopia has exported few natural resources, the amount of 
Chinese official flows to Ethiopia seems surprising at first glance. But 
Ethiopia’s position on the Horn of Africa, the size of its (potential) 
market and its influence in African regional debates make the country 
an attractive partner for China. Hosting the African Union and thus 
representatives from all African countries, the visibility of China’s sup-
port in Addis Ababa has an immediate multiplier effect throughout the 
continent.2 According to Chinese and Ethiopian officials, the Ethiopian 
government has been one of the driving forces behind the FOCAC 
meetings on the African side (Taylor 2011). Chinese officials (like their 
European counterparts) view Ethiopia as a pole of relative stability 
within the Horn of Africa.
In contrast to Angola and Ethiopia, Rwanda has relatively little access 
to economic cooperation with China. China’s economic cooperation with 
Rwanda is small compared with its trade, official flows and investments in 
and with Angola and (to a lesser extent) Ethiopia. More importantly, from 
the perspective of the Rwandan government, China has not (yet) emerged 
as an economic cooperation partner that is as important as the EU or 
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Rwanda’s other traditional partners. China’s development aid to Rwanda 
has increased since 2006. However, China remains a relatively small to 
medium-sized donor when compared with the EU and other OECD 
DAC donors. Unlike Ethiopia and Angola, Chinese policy banks do not 
(yet) provide commercial or preferential loans for infrastructure develop-
ment to Rwanda. In 2011, China overtook the EU as the most important 
destination for Rwandan exports, but Rwanda still mostly exports its tra-
ditional commodities to China and has not (yet) been able to use coopera-
tion with China to diversify its exports (unlike Ethiopia). Even though 
China gave some assistance to Rwanda in 2012 during a period when the 
EU and other donors used budget-support funds to exert pressure on the 
Rwandan government, China’s support only slightly reduced Rwanda’s 
vulnerability to EU pressure.
What explains the stark difference in China’s engagement with Rwanda 
and Ethiopia, since both have little access to natural resources? China has 
fewer economic (and political) interests in engaging with Rwanda than it 
does with Ethiopia. As a landlocked country with a very densely crowded, 
but relatively small population, large Chinese state-owned companies have 
less incentive to invest in Rwanda. Even though regional economic inte-
gration has improved in recent years, cross-border trade remains costly, 
and Rwanda thus has difficulty positioning itself as a hub of the region. 
However, despite limited economic interests that China has in Rwanda, it 
is a medium-sized recipient of Chinese aid and receives more aid than 
what would be expected given the size of the country and its volumes of 
bilateral trade. This relative importance as an aid recipient can probably be 
explained by Rwanda’s political weight in Africa and President Kagame’s 
strong voice in international debates. Moreover, the Rwandan govern-
ment is perceived to be quite active in reaching out to China to make sure 
that all the available aid funds are used.
To sum up, between 2005 and 2014, China’s economic engagement 
with the three countries considerably reduced Ethiopia’s and Angola’s 
vulnerability to EU pressure. China has emerged as a major economic 
partner for Rwanda but has not (yet) become as important as the EU.
China as an Alternative Partner for Engaging with African 
Governments on Their Survival Strategies
In addition to reducing African governments’ dependence on the EU, 
China may also provide alternative support for African governments’ 
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 survival strategies. In the three countries analysed here, China’s assis-
tance for African governments’ survival strategies differs considerably. 
Only in the case of Ethiopia are party-to-party relations very close, and 
China has supported government measures to strengthen the effective-
ness of state institutions and the usage of low-intensity coercion. China’s 
engagement with Angola and Rwanda, instead, is limited to economic 
cooperation.
 Party-to-Party Relations
In contrast with the EU’s Africa policy, party-to-party contacts constitute 
an important pillar of Sino-African relations.3 Zhong Weiyun (2012), vice- 
director of the Africa Bureau of the International Department of the 
Central Committee of the CCP, explains the interest of the CCP and 
African ruling parties in bilateral relations:
African political parties, especially those ruling parties, hope to learn the 
experience of the CPC in party building and country construction. Many 
parties explicitly say that they want the CPC to train their senior leaders. 
The CPC has also carried out research into the experiences of African ruling 
parties that have a long history in order to improve its own party building in 
the new era. […] [African ruling parties] take part in workshops of different 
types and topics, including party building, economic development, poverty 
reduction, young people and women. The CPC also sends experts to some 
African countries on their request to brief them about China and the experi-
ence of the CPC.
Information on the relations between the CCP and ruling parties in 
individual African countries is generally difficult to obtain. Findings from 
a press review and interviews with Chinese and African officials suggest 
that the CCP has emerged as a prominent cooperation partner only in the 
case of the EPRDF. In the case of the Angolan MPLA, party-to-party 
contacts have remained very limited. For the RPF, exchange is more 
intense than with the MPLA, but more limited than with the EPRDF.
Contacts between the EPRDF and the CCP also appear to be quite 
close if analysed within the broader regional context. If measured in 
terms of the number of bilateral visits, the EPRDF is among the five most 
important African cooperation partners for the CCP (Fig. 6.3). The CCP 
has similarly frequent exchanges only with the ruling parties in South 



























































































































































party-to- party links with Rwanda figures in the medium range. Party-to-
party links with Angola figure at the lowest end of CCP contacts with any 
African party.
What explains these differences? Several tentative explanations may 
account for the variance that should be further tested and nuanced in 
future research. First, a cursory cross-country review suggests that historic 
relations and similar ideology play an important role. The CCP has the 
closest relations with some of those parties that it already supported during 
their liberation struggle, such as ruling parties in Zimbabwe and Namibia. 
In this regard, history also seems to play a role in the limited contacts 
between the MPLA and the CCP, as China supported the rival party 
UNITA during the civil war. Second, party-to-party contacts are closer in 
cases where African ruling parties have a strong interest in strengthening 
party institutions. For instance, as the EPRDF has been much more active 
than the MPLA in investing in inner-party reforms and expanding its sta-
tus as a ruling party, it seems to have a stronger genuine interest in party-
to- party exchanges with the CCP. On the other hand, limited contacts 
between the CCP and the MPLA (or the ruling party in Nigeria) seem to 
be an indication that economic interests are not a prominent factor to 
explain close party-to-party links. The CCP maintains relations with par-
ties in almost all countries, including relatively small ones like Benin, 
Burundi, Lesotho and Sierra Leone, where China has limited economic 
interests (Fig. 6.3).
 Other Forms of Support for African Governments’ Survival Strategies
In addition to engaging with the ruling party, the Chinese government 
could also support the effectiveness of government institutions or assist 
African governments’ strategies of using coercion and managing arenas of 
contestation. Comparing Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda illustrates that 
only in the case of Ethiopia has a close cooperation between ruling parties 
emerged and some technical support for the capacities of government 
institutions been provided. China’s engagement with African countries 
thus varies widely, not only in terms of economic engagement but also 
with regard to how China engages with African governments on their 
survival strategies.
In Ethiopia, China has supported the government’s measures to 
strengthen state institutions and its usage of low-intensity coercion 
(Chap. 4). Information from interviews with Ethiopian and Chinese offi-
cials and a press review suggest that Ethiopia received technical assistance 
for its state media and some (albeit limited) support for justice sector 
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reform.4 Ethiopia has also sent considerably greater numbers of govern-
ment officials to China for training than Rwanda or Angola.
In Angola, China has apparently given very little technical assistance to 
support the capacities of state institutions. Interviews, a press review and 
available secondary literature on China–Angola relations do not give any 
indication that, in addition to financing and constructing large infrastruc-
ture projects, China has provided substantial technical support to 
strengthen the administrative or human capacities of government institu-
tions. Growing economic interdependencies between Angola and China 
have sparked public protests in Angola against the high number of Chinese 
workers and companies, and Chinese businessmen have been attacked. In 
order to address these negative side-effects of growing interdependencies, 
some exchange in the area of human rights and justice reform has taken 
place (Chap. 5).
Finally, in the case of Rwanda, China has provided even less technical 
assistance to support the human or administrative capacities of govern-
ment institutions than in Angola (Chap. 3).
China: What Effects does it have on Cooperating with the EU 
on Governance Reforms?
Analysing China’s engagement with Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda in 
light of the EU’s demands to cooperate on governance reforms, the three 
governments’ survival strategies and their dependence on the EU suggest 
that China’s engagement has limited effects on African governments’ 
willingness to cooperate with the EU on governance reforms. Table 6.2 
summarises the main findings from the analysis on China’s cooperation 
with the three countries.
 Rwanda
Since the mid-2000s when China became a more important cooperation 
partner, the EU’s good governance strategies have largely converged with 
the Rwandan government’s preferences. One would thus expect any effect 
China has on the Rwandan government’s willingness to engage with the 
EU on governance reforms to be limited. Moreover, for Rwanda, China 
has become neither a substantial alternative partner for economic coopera-
tion, nor a partner for cooperating on the government’s survival strate-
gies. China only very recently has emerged as a more important economic 
cooperation partner. Even though China started to cooperate more closely 
in 2012, at a point in time when the EU put considerably more pressure 
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on Rwanda, official flows provided by China did not significantly reduce 
Rwanda’s dependence on the EU. The effect of China’s engagement in 
the Rwandan government’s decision to engage with the EU on gover-
nance reforms has therefore been weak.
 Angola
Assessing the impact of China’s engagement with Angola on the Angolan 
government’s willingness to cooperate with the EU on governance 
reforms is more challenging. Cooperating with the EU on governance 
reforms mainly incurred costs for the Angolan government. Moreover, for 
Angola, China has clearly emerged as an alternative cooperation partner, 
particularly in terms of economic cooperation. However, even in the 
absence of China as an alternative cooperation partner, the Angolan gov-
ernment’s dependence on the EU would have been limited. The Angolan 
government might not have been completely indifferent towards the EU’s 
demands to engage on governance reforms after 2005, but it is unlikely 
that in the absence of China it would have been much more forthcoming 
in cooperating with the EU.
 Ethiopia: A ‘Crucial Case’?
Of the three countries, Ethiopia represents a ‘crucial case’ (Gerring 2007, 
231). If the arguments set up in the theoretical framework hold, then 
Ethiopia is a case where we would expect China’s engagement to have 
affected the government’s willingness to cooperate with the EU on gover-
nance reforms (Table 6.2). In the case of Ethiopia, all facts central to the 
Table 6.2 Engaging with China—effect on the three governments’ willingness 
to cooperate on governance reforms
Does cooperation with China reduce economic 
dependence on the EU?
Yes No

















confirmation of the argument that China negatively affects EU good gov-
ernance support seem to be present. Not only is Ethiopia an example where 
China has become an alternative cooperation partner, but it is also a case 
where, since the mid-2000s, cooperating with the EU was very difficult for 
the government. The Ethiopian regime was facing significant challenges 
from the opposition during the 2005 election crisis, making cooperation an 
endeavour with potentially disruptive effects for regime survival. Between 
2006 and 2010, the EU broadened its good governance approach towards 
democratic governance and used a cooperative-critical strategy, making it 
riskier for the government to engage. At the same time, Ethiopia was largely 
dependent on EU aid and (to a lesser extent) on trade and investments.
In this specific context, one would expect that Ethiopia would refuse to 
cooperate with the EU on governance reforms, when China emerged as 
an alternative cooperation partner. However, Ethiopia has continued to at 
least reluctantly engage with the EU. The Ethiopian case thereby chal-
lenges the argument that China’s engagement with African countries has 
substantially influenced African governments’ willingness to cooperate 
with the EU on governance reforms. It suggests that access to cooperation 
with China has had limited effects on African governments’ willingness to 
engage on governance reforms.
We can thus gain several insights regarding the relevance of China. 
First, the case studies indicate that in some countries China has indeed 
already become an alternative cooperation partner for African govern-
ments, not only in terms of economic cooperation, but also as a partner to 
cooperate on African governments’ survival strategies. For Ethiopia, eco-
nomic cooperation with China is as important as its cooperation with the 
EU; for Angola, China is even more important as an economic coopera-
tion partner in terms of official flows, trade and investments; for Rwanda, 
China has only very recently become a considerable alternative partner. 
Only in the case of Ethiopia has China offered the government support for 
its survival strategies and closely engaged with the ruling party.
In addition, the analysis strongly suggests that between 2000 and 2014 
China’s cooperation with African countries did not negatively affect the 
EU’s good governance strategies. The study thus refutes assumptions 
widely held in policy and public debates that the rise of China has made it 
more difficult for the EU to make African governments address gover-
nance issues. If measured in terms of African governments’ openness for 
cooperating on governance reforms, the emergence of China has so far 
had little effect. Ethiopia in particular is a crucial case where one would 
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expect that the government’s strategy towards the EU would have changed 
when China became an alternative partner. However, this proposition 
could not be confirmed empirically. Instead, economic engagement with 
China is part of a broader set of domestic and international factors that 
impact on the preferences of African governments.
Finally, this finding ultimately implies that the EU’s strategy to support 
governance reforms through a cooperative approach, in which the EU 
seeks to establish active cooperation with African governments on gover-
nance reforms, has made the EU’s strategies less sensitive or vulnerable to 
the influence of China. The EU managed to establish at least some coop-
eration with governments in African dominant party regimes, where the 
EU’s strategies converged with the preferences of the government 
(Rwanda post-2005), or where the EU’s strategies diverged from the pref-
erences of the government, but where the EU could set financial incen-
tives for cooperation (Ethiopia post-2005). At the same time, we have 
seen that the EU is often not very strategic in adapting its good gover-
nance policies to the country context. In particular, the EU has not used 
windows of opportunity to promote reforms when African governments 
have faced little domestic pressure from opponents and have some leeway 
to engage (Rwanda post-2005). Instead of worrying about China, the EU 
should tap into the full potential of its own strategies.
6.5  SomE avEnUES for fUtUrE Work
Results from this analysis open several avenues for future work. Some 
relate to the debate on authoritarianism and the effectiveness of good 
governance support in authoritarian regimes. Others relate more specifi-
cally to the interaction between China’s rise and (the EU’s) good gover-
nance support.
A first issue for further investigation refers to the domestic politics of 
authoritarian regimes. While dominant party systems are the most promi-
nent type of authoritarian regime today (Hadenius and Teorell 2007; 
Magaloni and Kricheli 2010), they do not constitute a homogeneous 
group. The survival strategies of governments in dominant party systems 
differ widely, as we have seen for the cases of Angola, Ethiopia and Rwanda. 
Governments may choose to invest in building effective states or to expand 
party structures, they may use coercion to open or close political spaces, 
and they need to manage arenas of contestation. Moreover, the willingness 
of governments to engage with external actors in governance reforms var-
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ies considerably. Given this great variety within the group of party- based 
regimes, future research should invest in developing a new typology of 
authoritarian, dominant party systems, focussing on the role of the ruling 
party, the level of institutionalisation of the ruling party and its relation to 
the state and society. This typology would allow for better understanding 
the variety of dominant party regimes and explaining differences in their 
economic and social performance, conditions under which these regimes 
may or may not democratise, and differences in the external influence of 
the EU, China and others.
A second issue for future work relates to the domestic political game 
between the ruler and political opponents from inside or outside the rul-
ing coalition. This domestic game appears to be a crucial factor in the 
domestic politics of authoritarian regimes as well as their external rela-
tions. The domestic dynamic between the government and political oppo-
nents not only influences authoritarian governments’ survival strategies 
but also shapes governments’ interests in engaging with the EU, China or 
other external actors. This domestic political dynamic is not only relevant 
with regard to the willingness of African governments to engage on gov-
ernance reforms. It also matters for the EU and China’s engagement with 
authoritarian regimes in other policy fields. Experts on authoritarianism 
seek to understand the performance of authoritarian regimes regarding 
ecological sustainability (Wurster 2013; Pridham 1991), trade openness 
(Hankla and Kuthy 2011), the risk of civil conflict (Fjelde 2010) and the 
protection of foreign investments (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011). While 
they take the variety of authoritarianism as a starting point, they rarely 
investigate and compare the domestic incentives that are specific to 
authoritarian, dominant party systems. Findings of this book on the simi-
larities and differences of dominant party systems and the domestic inter-
action between the ruler and opponents are thus also relevant beyond 
research on the effectiveness of (the EU’s) good governance support in 
authoritarian regimes.
Another point for exploration refers to the tendency in the literature 
on EU good governance strategies to focus on exceptional situations 
where authoritarian regimes use high-intensity coercion as a measure of 
last resort to secure regime survival and where the EU and other donors 
use sanctions (Portela 2010; Del Biondo 2015; von Soest and Wahman 
2015) or budget-support suspensions (Faust et al. 2012; Molenaers et al. 
2015) to respond to imminent political crises. Consider situations like 
the 2005 election crisis in Ethiopia. Analysing this crisis through the lens 
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of the domestic logic of political survival corroborates arguments that 
expectations on what external actors can achieve in these exceptional situ-
ations must be modest. However, this book has also pointed out that 
governments in dominant party systems usually rely on low-intensity 
coercion to gradually open or close political spaces. Future research 
should therefore pay more attention to periods of relative domestic polit-
ical stability, when authoritarian governments rely on low-intensity coer-
cion. In such situations, donors may have considerably more leeway to 
decide which strategy to use, as they face little pressure from public opin-
ion and their own domestic constituencies to revert to sanctions or bud-
get support suspensions. We have seen that during periods when 
governments in dominant party regimes face little pressure from domes-
tic opponents, they are more likely to accept governance aid, engage in 
dialogue and allow civil society, the media or opposition parties more 
freedom, which may contribute to democratic reforms in the medium- to 
long-term.
Finally, in addition to focusing more on periods of relative domestic 
political stability, the specific role of the ruling party and its external rela-
tions requires further investigation. It is widely acknowledged that polit-
ical parties have important influence on regime durability, political 
reform and economic prosperity (Smith 2005; Magaloni 2006; Brownlee 
2007; Gehlbach and Keefer 2011; Bueno de Mesquita et  al. 2003). 
Empirics in this book have exemplified the different functions ruling par-
ties can play in authoritarian dominant party systems, and how party 
structures may fuse with state institutions and maintain close linkages 
with the business sector. Yet, literature on authoritarianism, on external 
party support as part of Western democracy promotion, or on China–
Africa relations, has so far largely neglected the international relations of 
authoritarian parties as well as the CCP’s relations to other parties. The 
CCP’s engagement with African political parties can be quite close (as 
documented here for the case of Ethiopia). A cursory review on the 
CCP’s contacts with parties across sub-Saharan African countries has 
indicated that there is great variance with regard to the intensity of party-
to-party relations. The factors influencing party-to-party cooperation, 
the effects of party-to-party engagement and the interaction effects of 
the CCP’s and European engagement with African parties (for example 
through some EU member states’ political foundations) would thus be 
relevant for future work.
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6.6  Policy imPlicationS: facinG a fork 
in thE road?
The basic parameters that have shaped African government’s responsive-
ness towards the EU since the late 1990s are currently undergoing funda-
mental changes, suggesting that the EU’s good governance strategies are 
now at a crossroad. Support for governance reforms is still on the EU’s 
agenda. Yet, the security and migration agenda increasingly dominates EU 
external relations. There is a growing uncertainty among European pol-
icy-makers whether supporting governance reforms is the right thing to 
do. Moreover, domestic challenges in Europe, such as growing populism 
and illiberal domestic reforms in some EU member states, the Brexit or 
the EU’s response to the refugee and migration crisis, question the EU’s 
credibility and legitimacy to support reforms elsewhere. Even though the 
EU gradually strengthened good governance support between 2000 and 
2014, there is no guarantee that this trend will continue in the future. 
Three developments suggest that the EU will face more challenges to 
implementing its agenda in the coming years: changes in the field of inter-
national development policy, the stabilisation of (dominant party) authori-
tarian contexts and China’s evolving African policy.
First, the field of development policy, which has substantially influenced 
the EU’s good governance policies in Africa, is undergoing significant 
changes (Klingebiel and Ashoff 2014). The international aid effectiveness 
agenda has passed its peak (Chandy and Kharas 2011; Mawdsley et al. 
2014) and the ‘decade of generosity’, during which aid budgets succes-
sively grew, seems to have come to an end. Instead, with the increases in 
refugee and migration flows, aid budgets have come under pressure to 
support short-term measures to prevent refugees and migrants from mov-
ing to Europe and to cover the refugee costs in Europe rather than to 
promote long-term sustainable development.
These changes in the area of development policy have important direct 
implications for the EU’s policies to support governance reforms in 
African countries. Shifts in aid modalities (for instance the decline in 
direct budget support) and changes in donor-government aid dialogues 
at country level as a consequence of the unravelling international aid 
effectiveness agenda make it more difficult for the EU to use these fora to 
bring governance reforms onto the agenda of its relations with African 
governments. Moreover, setting material incentives for African govern-
ments to cooperate on governance reforms becomes more challenging, if 
C. HACKENESCH
 223
aid is concentrated on countries where migrants originate or transit, and 
if aid is used for short-term crisis prevention and migration management. 
If the EU gives priority to using aid funds to leverage cooperation on 
migration management, it cannot credibly leverage for cooperation on 
governance reforms at the same time.
Second, the question of how to find the most appropriate strategy to 
engage with dominant party regimes will remain a key challenge for the EU 
in the near future. One-third of all countries in the world are authoritarian 
dominant party systems (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010, 125). The façade of 
nominally democratic institutions is making it quite difficult for the EU (and 
for other actors) to find an appropriate approach to supporting governance 
reforms. The same type of intervention (for instance, support for elections 
or the judicial system) may diverge from the preferences of the government 
under some circumstances, while it may match them in others. The analysis 
presented here gives reasons for policy-makers to pay more attention to the 
incentives of authoritarian governments to set up formal democratic institu-
tions to enhance their position in power rather than to view these institu-
tions as natural stepping stones towards a more democratic system.
The EU needs to design its good governance strategies in such a way 
that incentives are set for African governments to engage with the EU. 
Otherwise, if governments do not engage at all, the EU cannot make any 
impact. The problem is, if the EU’s good governance strategies fully con-
verge with the preferences of the government and the EU does not use 
windows of opportunity to press for greater political openness, it risks 
endorsing the regime rather than encouraging reform. Thus, finding the 
right balance between aligning with the preferences of African govern-
ments and pressuring for governance reforms is a delicate issue.
Third, China is likely to become more rather than less relevant as a coop-
eration partner for African governments. China’s ‘footprint’ in Africa will 
increase further. Over the past few years, China has been as important an 
economic cooperation partner as the EU only in a few African countries 
(such as Angola and Ethiopia). However, the example of Rwanda shows 
that China is likely to become more relevant for those African countries 
that have few natural resources and a limited (geo-)strategic and political 
importance. In conjunction with shifting priorities and strategies in the 
field of development policy due to the rise of the migration agenda, the 
EU will also face more difficulties in remaining an attractive partner in 
these countries and thus a partner who can credibly ask African govern-
ments to engage in governance reforms.
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The more China invests in Africa and the more economic relations 
intensify, the more one can expect that the Chinese government will have 
an interest in government stability, regime stability and effective policy-
making processes. While China has continued to lend rhetorical support 
for its non-interference policy, its implementation has become more dif-
ferentiated in response to the specific context in African countries 
(Verhoeven 2014; Aidoo and Hess 2015). This has also been visible in the 
cases analysed here. Even if China does not develop similar instruments as 
the EU to support the effectiveness of government institutions, there 
might be more convergence in the EU and China’s preferences at least for 
stable and effective institutions.
At the same time, divergences in the EU and China’s strategies will 
remain with regard to supporting the inclusiveness and democratic quality 
of decision-making processes. We have seen that China’s rise in Africa did 
not undermine the EU’s efforts to engage with African governments on 
governance reforms between 2000 and 2014. China’s presence is one of 
the several factors that impact African governments’ preferences and 
incentive structures to introduce political reforms and to engage with the 
EU in such reforms. More relevant than China’s presence is whether the 
EU itself is tapping the full potential of its strategies. With a cooperative 
approach that aims at establishing an active engagement with African gov-
ernments in governance reforms, the EU is potentially well-situated to 
support reforms even in light of the rise of China. However, the EU 
should be more strategic in exploring opportunities for supporting politi-
cal reforms.
Which Way Forward?
Academic research and findings from this book give evidence that EU’s 
good governance support can work, if it is not overly ambitious, well-tar-
geted to the local context and consistently applied. However, conclusions 
from the analysis presented here point to the need for the EU to take the 
domestic power game in African countries more strongly into account and 
to further adapt its strategies to local political dynamics. In other words, 
one size clearly does not fit all. Such a clear differentiation would need to 
happen at several levels.
The EU needs to strengthen and further develop instruments to sup-
port governance reforms ‘beyond’ the field of development policy. Other 
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policy fields such as trade, energy, fisheries or climate policy increase in 
importance, opening additional areas to set incentives for and to engage in 
governance reforms. The case of Angola has been a particularly revealing 
example of the limited reach of the EU’s bilateral aid instruments in sup-
porting governance reforms. In light of the close integration of the 
Angolan elite in international financial markets and the tremendous flight 
of capital, EU support for draining tax havens, for instance, can have a 
direct effect on domestic political reforms and would thus need to be con-
sidered as part of the EU’s policy for supporting governance reforms in 
certain countries.
In addition, the EU needs to more strongly differentiate its strategies 
for engaging with different regime types. The EU should not only dis-
tinguish between democratic and authoritarian but also distinguish 
between different types of authoritarian regimes, and notably between 
different dominant party systems. The EU can adapt its strategies when 
engaging with different countries, as this study has shown. Yet, ulti-
mately, the EU still draws from the same toolbox when engaging with 
African countries regardless of their regime type. In light of the growing 
diversification of domestic contexts and political realities in African 
countries, the EU will need to make more efforts to diversify this 
‘toolbox’.
The changes within the EU and in EU development policy, the consoli-
dation of dominant party regimes and the rise of China produce consider-
able adaptation pressure for EU good governance strategies. However, 
unlike events such as the Arab Spring or the crisis in the Ukraine, this 
adaptation pressure rises gradually rather than imminently, making incre-
mental rather than fundamental changes to the EU’s policies a likely 
scenario.
notES
1. Angola’s rate of oil production and international oil prices were still rela-
tively low at that time.
2. China’s decision to grant the new African Union headquarters is probably 
the most visible sign in this regard.
3. According to Zhong Weiyun (2012), the CCP started to establish relations 
with African communist parties and national liberation movements in the 
1950s. In the 1970s, the CCP expanded its cooperation to non-communist 
African parties. Zhong argues that the political openings in Africa in the early 
 CONCLUSIONS 
226 
1990s had a negative impact for the CCP’s relations with African ruling par-
ties because some parties were swept away and the new incumbents had little 
knowledge and sometimes little interest in closer party-to-party links. With 
the turn of the century and China’s growing economic cooperation with 
African countries, party relations again gained prominence. Zhong’s article 
‘Inter-Party relations promote Sino-African Strategic Partnership’ is pub-
lished online at http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-08/28/con-
tent_26353120_3.htm, last accessed 5 October 2013.
4. China provided technical assistance for the Ethiopian News Agency, the 
Ministry of Information and the state-owned radio station. These actors 
receive very little to no support from the EU or other Western donors (see 
Chap. 4).
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